The Ethics and Politics of the Syrian Refugee Phenomenon

A constructionist epistemological approach towards understanding the European

Commission's ethical framework.

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my family, friends, and supervisors for all of the effort they have contributed to this thesis.

Abstract

This thesis examines the ethical construct of the European Commission's (EC) socio-political responses regarding the Syrian refugee phenomenon by implementing an inductive qualitative strategy. Utilizing constructionism as my ontological approach, to examine how the EC's social realities came into existence and are influenced, assembled, and maintained in specific social contexts, I set out to answer:

"Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

To help achieve this goal I implement a thematic analysis in which I construct an analytical framework, incorporating the binary continuum of partialism and impartialism, to gage the ethics of political theories and the social constructs they implement to justify the inclusion, exclusion of refugees into their communities and territory. The findings revealed the EC constructs its ethical stances from a universal liberal approach which understands refugees through concepts of human dignity and impartiality while limiting its scope to be particularistic towards its representative population, showing partiality towards its community's shared way of life.

Given the significance of the EC as an influential institution for millions of people, this thesis has contributed to better comprehending some factors that determine how and what influences their institutional ethical decision making which could aid in predicting how future "crisis" are handled. Through examining the work of Matthew Gibney (2004) on impartialism, partialism, and the principles of humanitarianism, this thesis also tests' and develops ethical theories, assisting in bridging the disparities between theory and practice. Additionally, having identified the institutional values of the EC, it contributes to identifying general patterns in liberalism and offers possible solutions which contribute to advancing ethical theory building; mainly through implementing impartial inclusiveness of concepts of the good which could facilitate a paradigm shift in societies that are favorable towards refugees. Lastly, this thesis contributes to the studies of the political and social trends that appear to be on the horizon, mainly the challenge to the current global liberal order of international politics by populism.

Abbreviations

EC   European Commission

UN   United Nations

WWII   World War II

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1   Introduction

1.1 Historical Perspective

In 2011 few could have anticipated the profound impact brought about by the Syrian civil war. The ripple effects of this calamitous event have not only changed international politics; it has also challenged ethical ideologies and moral reasoning. What was once a distant conflict in a country relatively obscure to Western states, was now of paramount prominence. The long-reaching consequences have set unprecedented repercussions, which among many other things has forever altered the demographics of more than two continents. What made this so compelling was the number of refugees produced, accompanied by the need to protect their basic human rights. In 2015, the refugee phenomenon reached its height when more than 1.3 million asylum seekers reached Europe (Pew Research 2016). From 2011 until 2018 it is estimated that 13 million Syrians have been displaced, of which 1 million are refugees to Europe (Pew Research 2018). This foreign calamity was now a domestic reality to some of the European Union (EU) bordering states.

Consequently, the 2015 refugee phenomenon received the warranted attention of the international community when thousands of refugees lost their lives after endeavoring on perilous journeys in their quest for protection by European states. This is compounded by the ambiguous refugee policies and practices of Western liberal states who for all intended purposes, acknowledge the protection of human rights held by refugees yet implement questionable practices. How would the EU respond to its ethical duty and legal mandate of assisting people whose states cannot protect them?

If one were given over to moral reasoning, it would be hard to argue against protecting the livelihood of vulnerable people. However, the protection of refugees is more than just ethical rationale. Instead, it becomes highly political since it involves and impacts the decision of other human communities. States are hardly motivated to assist refugees out of a purely altruistic concern; rather decisions are made in a more significant political context that involves a vast array of domestic policies — thereby making refugee protection inherently political as well as compellingly moral (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012, p.102). This dilemma of ethical, legal, and political convergence is commonly referred to as the "refugee crisis." This notion of "crisis" is

further developed by the perceived imminent threat to the stability of host European societies, which is triggered by the mass migration of people with vastly different cultures. While migration is not an anomaly to Europe, some states and their communities became greatly concerned by the threat of their culture, institutions, and identity. Fear grew among EU citizens that these societal disruptions if allowed could amount to an accelerated transformation by the perceived antithetical values of refugees who are marked by their distinct cultural and religious identities.

Furthermore, the refugee phenomenon displayed the weakness of the EU to handle the mass movement of refugees. Disillusioned by the crisis, some member-states and their citizenry sought answers. Right-wing European partialist, populist parties offered simple solutions to these complex social issues. They exploited traditional shared stereotypes and dichotomies of the good host community comprised of "us" versus the constructed imagery of the dangerous "them" of outsiders. This was accomplished by amplifying fear, to the degree that it was politicized, and thereby legitimized the right of exclusion (Wodak 2016, pp.3-7). Given the concern over rapid social change within EU societies, populist' are provided a platform for raising and producing issues and concepts on identity. An evaluation of the populist rhetoric demonstrates how they attempt to revise historical narratives to construct collective narratives of identity (Wodak 2016, p.36). Alongside the issue of identity are the politics surrounding EU skepticism, migration, and social cohesion, which are other characteristics of European populism. These populist parties propose ideologies to reclaim the sovereignty of their state and the autonomy of their communities, thereby threatening the survival of the EU.

In response to the perceived crisis and existential threat to the EU, the European Commission (EC) attempts to regain control of this perceived instability. It does so by giving its own account of the situation concerning refugees, identity, and social cohesion. Through their political influence, they advocate for member-states to see refugees vis-à-vis their humanity, rather than dehumanizing them. Moreover, in their adamant, fierce opposition to the populist/nationalist wave, the EC proposes their supranational agenda. For the EC, the best possible solution to this transnational crisis is through the solidarity of EU member-states. The EC recognizes both their ethical and legal obligations to help refugees and promote the social cohesion of outsiders with host states by

appealing to values and civil obedience as a means for community bonds. In their political speeches, they call for citizens to embrace diversity.

1.2 Significance, goals, and personal interest

Understanding the significance of this historical phenomenon, EC President, Juncker stated: "To regain a sense of perspective is to understand that migration is one of the defining challenges of our 21st century. We will be defined by how we respond" (European Commission 2016i). This depiction of the refugee phenomenon portrays its political and ethical significance and why I have chosen to investigate this area. More, in particular, the focus of this research is on the ethics and politics of the EC concerning the refugee phenomenon from 2015-2017. While the study of migration has received warranted attention (Joppke 1999; Castles, Haas and Miller 2014; Collier 2013; Carens 2013, Gold and Nawyn 2013), there appears to be an underlying concern in the arguments of moral and political theorist concerning the case of refugees. "Refugees are not to be conflated with migrants" since the primary purpose of migration is to improve quality of life while refugee protection entails saving life's (Collier and Betts 2017, p.124). Consequently, refugee studies have likewise been given ample consideration. Comprehensive academic writing concerning the most relevant intellectual, political, social, and institutional challenges are detailed in the Oxford Handbook of refugee and forced migration (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014).

More recently, research and studies in European societies have gone underway covering an array of issues such as; analyzing media representation of refugees and asylum seekers (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017); evaluating responses and reactions from selected European countries such as Germany, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and UK (Orchard and Miller 2014); mapping the primary questions governments face regarding the goals, design, and implementation of resettlement policies and programs (Beirens and Fratzke 2017); reception capacity and challenges faced by EU Member States (Kegels 2016); as well as a comprehensive study on the human smuggling of refugees (Townsend and Oomen 2015). Moreover, investigations into agencies have taken place so as to determine if EU policies should be regulated on a state or supranational level (Coromina and Saris 2012); how EU immigration policies are harmonized with member-states (Givens and Luedtke 2004); how the principle of solidarity is used in deepening

supranational integration of EU policies with member-states (Bast 2015); and how concepts of state theory and are affecting the treatment of refugees (Gill 2013).

The case of the refugee merits special attention due to its political, legal, and ethical implications as illustrated by the copious studies and publications listed above. Furthermore, studies into these areas would suggest a gap between a more concrete implementation of political ideologies with the more abstract reasoning of ethical theorist.   Studies into refugee migration also suggest a global trend in which forcibly displaced people continues to rise. Bridging the gap between theory and practice thus becomes highly relevant. Many ethical and political theorists have extensively shown the moral shortcomings in the treatment of refugees by Western countries. What few have been able to accomplish is to show how ethical theories might be practically incorporated into the international political order of states and supranational institutions such as the EC. Although moral idealists point out what and how states should ideally look like they do so from a highly theoretical position. These abstract moral ideals, however, are hardly taken seriously by real institutional actors such as states and supranational agencies. An overwhelming number of moral theorists fail to address in very practical ways how supranational institutions and states, under their current capabilities and in the current international order, can politically respond to the current dilemma of the treatment of refugees. So while the field of refugee's studies is plentiful, there appears to lack investigations into a more defined ethical understanding of specific political actors such as the EC and how they can better incorporate political policies that appease the ethical standards of moral theorist.

As pointed out above, studies have identified how states have ethically acted, thus *describing* and *judging* their behavior. However, more attention is needed in *explaining* and *analyzing* why institutional actors have done so explicitly. Again, here I emphasize that there are theoretical works into the ethics of political theories; however, not much into testing and applying these theories. This research project aims at bridging the gap of theory and implementation by assessing the specific ethical theories of partialism and impartialism (Gibney 2004) with a case study of the EC. Additionally, this thesis intends to test, refine, and advance ethical theory building by providing a greater understanding of the 2015 refugee phenomenon as well as the political institution of the EC. The refugee phenomenon needs immediate as well as long term solutions;

thus, the study of the institution behind the policies for EU member-states becomes vital. It is their decision making that controls the political agenda of the EU, and thus why I have chosen them as a case study. Furthermore, the goal of this research is to identify general patterns in liberal ideology and interpret the cultural significance of populism in regard to how it is impacting the historical refugee phenomenon.

My interest in this area stems from being a child of immigrant parents, as well as having personally migrated to different parts of the world. In 2010 I had the privilege of living near the Myanmar border in Thailand, where I volunteered at a refugee camp. During my time in Norway, I have also actively been involved in the Vietnamese community, many of whom are refugees. Additionally, I have established relationships with refugees from Kosovo, Myanmar, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Having been deeply impacted by many of their stories has added to my benevolence for assisting people in need. This is compounded by my particular interest in ethical human behavior and cultural practices.

1.3 Purpose, strategy, and structure

My objective through this research is not a normative analysis of terminology, so as to define who is a refugee (Miller 2016; Lister 2013; Gatrell 2013). Nor is it to take a historical evaluation of policies and laws (Betts and Loescher 2011; Miller 2012; Betts and Collier 2017; Haddad 2008). Although I do briefly assess some of the EC's political choices, I do not extensively evaluate their policies. Rather my objective through this research is to apprehend a better understanding of the ethics behind the politics of refugees in the EU through specifically analyzing particular political statements from the EC. I set out to answer the research questions:

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

To accomplish this, I use a deductive qualitative research strategy as well as implement a case study design. Furthermore, this research utilizes constructivism as an ontological approach, thus taking particular interest in what forms the ethical framework of the EC and how it is constructed

(Bryman 2012, pp.33-4). I chose to sample the naturally occurring data of political speeches (Lewis and Nicholls in Ritchie et al. 2014, pp.53-4) from particular actors in the EC since official policies and written statements only give a technical perspective and not a comprehensive understanding. To analyze the data, this research incorporates a thematic analysis which focuses on "discovering, interpreting, and reporting patterns and clusters of meaning" (Ritchie et al. 2014, p.271). I further detail this process in chapter 2, broadening my reasoning and description of methods that are employed in this research.

Chapter three details an essential part of the process of my thematic analysis, which involves constructing an analytic framework. A survey of the literature in the relevant areas concerning the ethics and politics of refugees led me to draw from the theories of Matthew Gibney (2004) who uses a binary approach of partialism and impartialism as a continuum for gaging the ethical stances of political ideologies. This chapter elaborates on existing theories within partialism and impartialism, mainly that of populism, nationalism, global liberalism, and cosmopolitanism and how they construct ideas of culture, identity, community, and social cohesion. Identifying how these themes are socially constructed gives rational to how one ethically justifies the inclusion or exclusion of refugees, thereby framing the ethical framework needed for the analysis. Closely related to these themes are the sovereignty of states and the autonomy of their national-communities. I conclude this chapter with reviewing what Gibney (2004) calls a humanitarian approach in which he details how humanitarianism uses an impartial definition of refugees, seeing them vis-à-vis their humanity while considering the partial limitation of states and offers the principle of "low cost" as a guide to implement ethical state policies.

In chapter four, I begin the analysis of the criterion data generated by the participants. Here I examine the political speeches of the EC. After briefly reviewing over a hundred documents, I chose to analyze thirty-seven speeches. These documents reveal little to no significant divergence in how these particular actors of the EC formulate their ethical framework. It would appear that this framework is based on human rights when they strongly advocate against discriminating, dehumanizing, and stigmatizing refugees. The EC, through a strong political appeal, suggests hosting states and their communities to show tolerance and call for social cohesion based mostly on liberal values. This construct of refugees would align itself strongly on the impartial continuum.

However, further analysis of their construct of state and the supranational agency would suggest an alignment on the partial continuum. The EC, in a similar fashion to states, display how they show partiality towards their citizenry by carefully guarding their institutions, territory, and membership when they limit the entrance of refugees. Understanding their legal and ethical duty, while working within the constraints of member-states, the EC takes a comprehensive approach which appears to follow the principle of humanitarianism. This strengthens the case of Gibney (2004), who sees the implementation of the low-cost humanitarian principle as the best medium.

In chapter five, I begin my discussion on what was discovered, what it means, and if the objective of the thesis was met. I accomplish this by comparing the main findings of my analysis with the literature and evaluate if those theoretical arguments are the best methods for implementation. I determine the binary approach of partialism and impartialism does not sufficiently depict the ethical stances of the EC; rather, I offer an alternative framework for evaluation. Having concluded that the humanitarian principle is not adequate to ethically challenge political actors, I suggest the findings point towards a liberal, universal ethical approach which limits the scope of their ethics. This conclusion is further strengthened by some of the emergent themes revealed in the data mainly that of the religious identity of refugees and the local state politics of populism. What these emergent themes reveal is the EC's ethical stance is heavily influenced by their political agenda of supranationalism, which is threatened by the Euroscepticism of populism. Given the politics surrounding the refugee phenomenon, I agree with Gibney (2004) that highly abstract theoretical ethical ideologies are mostly ignored and make recommendations for how liberal democratic states can better implement ethical policies. I conclude the final chapter of the thesis by summarizing my research. This is followed by elaborating on the limitations I faced and offer further suggestions for research.

1.4 Presuppositions, targeted audience, and scope

Throughout this thesis, I adopt certain presuppositions from political and ethical fields. Given my intended audience are graduate students whose interest lie in refugee studies as well as a political and ethical theorist, I presuppose the terms "politics" and "ethics" need not be heavily defined. Furthermore, when referring to "liberal democratic states" or the "West," I presuppose my audience has an understanding that these terms apply to states that abide by moral principles which

justify contemporary political institutions and policies (Carens 2013). However, I do elaborate on specific terms in the subsequent methodology chapter mainly since certain methods and how they are applied need to be dictated. Additionally, in chapter three, I specify certain terminology primarily to display how certain frameworks are constructed.

Lastly, a brief word of the scope of this research project. While the politics and ethics of refugees can be examined from many different angles, the scope of this research is strictly from evaluating the political speeches of the participants. I thereby concentrate on the themes that emerge from the data and in the literature on this topic. These themes mainly revolve around the ethics regarding the socio-cultural effects of refugees in EU societies and not on socio-economic aspects since the EC does not frequently correlate economic hardship with refugees. Similarly, the issue of terrorism and radicalization are not associated with refugees since the EC makes great efforts to disassociate these areas politically.

2 Methodology

The following chapter details the specific methods I have embarked on utilizing throughout the research of this thesis. I have attempted to carefully describe not only the methods but also the particular reasoning to why and what I have chosen. Since social scientific research varies greatly, it was of great importance as a researcher to detail as best as possible the process I undertook. The applied science of social research is hardly a defined set of rules. Thus the nuances and intricacies are paramount. This chapter details another step in the process of accomplishing the objective of answering the research question since at the heart of any research project is the question. Thus the objective of this thesis becomes answering:

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

In better understanding the Syrian refugee phenomenon, I also hope to gain insight to; What values does the EC as an institution represent in its political and ethical stances? Are sovereign states and their autonomous communities justified in favoring the claims of their citizens over the claims of refugees?

Helping accomplish this task, I have chosen an inductive qualitative research strategy which is detailed in the first section. Second, I lay out the design I will employ, which is a case study of the EC. Here I detail why I have chosen a case study, who the case study involves, what are some of the difficulties involving this strategy, and how I went about the process of selecting the EC. Third, I detail the data collection and sampling. Again here, I answer the questions regarding how I have chosen my data, what particular data that entails and why I have chosen this specific sample. Following this section, I attempt to answer questions about the quality of my research. Here I address issues regarding reliability, validity, ethics, and possible problems I may encounter during my research. This also includes certain biases I may have as a researcher. Lastly, I discuss the analytical process in which I elaborate on how themes and codes emerged as well as my interaction between the literature and data. While this chapter may, at times be highly theoretical and abstract, I aim to balance this by detailing how I applied these abstract theories to my research.

2.1 Research strategy and epistemological approach

An inductive qualitative research strategy offers a framework for how to understand and interpret the social meanings of how the European Commission has responded to the phenomena of the Syrian refugee dilemma. One of the main advantages of qualitative research is its capability to carefully examine a phenomenon which cannot be accomplished by other means. On the one hand, quantitative researchers emphasize and can create correlations between variables. However, their approach can often limit their ability to best describe how a phenomenon is contextually comprised. Consequently, its contribution to social problems can be lopsided and limited (Silverman 2014, pp.14-7). A qualitative research strategy also coincides with constructionism as the epistemological approach. Constructionism emphasizes comprehending a social phenomenon through the understanding of the social construct of people (Bryman 2012, p.33).

While forced migration is not an anomaly to Europe, how states have responded to the Syrian refugee phenomenon have caused to question the EU's ethics on entrance policies. This goes to show the dynamics of social behavior. Constructionism lends to the thought that culture and human behavior are organic and fluid. Thus making them largely dependent on social actors rather than the idea that organization and culture are external factors outside of the influence of humans. This gives way that human actors such as the Commissioners have a strong influence on institutions such as the EU. Constructionism emphasizes understanding that facts and how people's realities are formed in specific social contexts (Byrman 2012, pp.33-5). For example, while at the forefront of their messages the EC may speak of solidarity, politics of fear, security, values, and so forth, their underlining message is of pushing forward their ideologies of supranationalism while at the same time confronting competing theories such as populism. Thus when a member of the EC is speaking of the fear of citizens, it should be taken in the social context of populism. Or when the EC's understanding of an impartial approach towards refugees is made based on human dignity, it should be understood that it is influenced by the common European history of human rights formed after World War II. Constructionism, therefore, allows qualitative research to focus on how individuals create their behavior in naturally occurring situations such as speeches (Silverman 2014, pp.24-7).

While the EC is an institution, it is comprised of individual Commissioners. Constructionism is thus an approach for evaluating the constructed realities of the commissioners who in turn influence the EU. This ontological approach also sheds light on the conceptual framework of partialism and impartialism in which political theories can be evaluated through an ethical lens. These two main ideas are vital concepts that run throughout this thesis. Constructionism allows room for the interpretation of how people are affecting the social reality of outcomes for refugees rather than an external constraint by which they must abide by. In using this approach, I hope to capture how the Commissioners have constructed their political stances by analyzing their speeches and how this is inadvertently affecting their moral, ethical stances or vice-versa. For example, has their concerns with populism, a partial approach, affected their political and ethical justification towards the refugee crisis. Constructionism looks more in-depth into how social realities came into existence and are produced, assembled, and maintained. This thesis will focus on explaining rather describing and analyzing rather than judging.

2.2 Research design

Research design is the framework of the collection and analysis of data, which indicates the importance and emphasis of the research process. To accomplish the overall goal of this thesis, I have chosen to implement a case study design. A case study research design is "concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question" which can include a single organization, institution, event or time frame (Bryman 2012, pp.66-7). Most case studies emphasize a specific location. However, emphasis from case studies can be put on the sample from which the analyses are drawn from which means that the location merely provides the unit of analysis and may not be the focus itself. A case study is thus primarily focused on expounding the unique features of a case (Bryman 2012, p.69).

 In this particular case, the study behind the sociological responses of the Commissioners to the Syrian refugee phenomena, the audience is made aware of the different socio-cultural reasons, justifications, responses, and settings that take place within the EU. This is true since the Commissioners are the ones that are guiding the political sails of the EU. So for example when addressing the ethical responses and political stances that the EC has taken, insights towards their institution, value systems, thought patterns, and identity formation can be classified so that through

these observations theories can be drawn and explanations for differences can be easily asserted. This will help the reader and researcher have greater clarity, insight, understanding, and awareness of the social construct in various socio-cultural contexts.

This does not mean that there are no specific issues that one may encounter in applying this design. Reliability, replicability, and validity are markers for the quality of design. One of the difficulties in choosing a specific case study is how can it be representative of a wider population. This is especially true since attempting to show the Commissioners response does not indicate an exemplifying case. Generalizing is one of the foremost critics and limitations of case studies; however, a case study strategy is not primarily intended to be generalized. "Instead, case study researchers tend to argue that they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which they then engage in a theoretical analysis […] The crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to a wider universe but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings" (Bryman 2012, p. 71). Another major obstacle is safeguarding the consistency when gathering my data so that similar methods are used. Even if this is accomplished the issue of context may be a possible dilemma. Investigating a social phenomenon is very context-specific. Therefore, special attention must be given. For example, the rise of the refugee dilemma that the EU was facing is in response to the war in Syria and the rise of populism in individual EU states is due to the increase in immigration from people of different ethno-religious cultures.

Establishing that the design of this thesis will take is a case study of the European Commission during the time frame of 2015 till 2017, it is essential to understand why the European Commission has been chosen. The EC is one of the central supranational institutions derived from but independent of governments from the EU. The purpose of the European Commission is to "propose new EU laws and policies and monitor their implementation. Along with the other main institutions, it develops the overall strategy and political direction of the EU" (European Commission-a). At the head of each department are the Commissioners who are under the direction of the President. The European Commission is comprised of 27 Commissioners and Vice-Presidents and Presidents from every member state where EU interest supersedes those of national ones. These commissioners make collective decisions on strategies, policies, and law proposals. They lead the Commission's political course and make up one of the principal institutions of the

EU (European Commission-b). If thus, the goal of this thesis is to comprehensively understand the moral climate of the EU in regard to the refugee crisis, it is essential to study those who are making the decisions for this institution.

There is no doubt that the EU is one of the most politically dominant institutions in the world, with over 508 million citizens in 27 member states (European Union-a). With such a significant influence and impact geographically, economically, socially, and politically, the EU commissioners have made themselves some of the greatest agents of authority and power in the world. The European Commissions' response from 2015 until 2017 was chosen to get an indication of the political atmosphere and moral climate concerning the refugee crisis in the EU. The scope of this project does not allow for how member states have responded to the policies that the EC has set out; instead, I analyze the key actors who have compiled their political policies and stances. This is a crucial point to understand. In analyzing the EC's political responses in the form of speeches, they are explicitly addressing some of the concerns of their member states. This is just one factor in giving clues to what this thesis sets out to investigate. When specifically stating that analyzing the EC's responses will provide insight into the 'moral climate' and 'political atmosphere' of the EU towards the refugee crisis was is meant is that a specific angle will be taken. It is not possible to cover this phenomenon from all aspects; rather, my focus is on ethically reviewing the political stances of the EU that was formed by the EC. Choosing this specific date range is of particular importance since this was when the refugee crisis seemed to hit its climax in both numbers and attention. During this period, reformations and interpretation of laws and the implementation of specific policies concerning refugees were likewise taking place. Not to mention the various suggestions from the global community to how this phenomenon should be handled, especially since supranational bodies like the EU were greatly divided.

2.3 Data collection and sampling

Data collection is one of the most important elements in a research project. Thereby making its selection of utmost importance. Naturally occurring data in the form of text will be used to gain insight into the Syrian refugee phenomena (Lewis and Nicholls in Ritchie et al. 2014, pp.53-4). I have chosen to review official statements and speeches from the Commission, and while this naturally occurring data may be a useful tool in this research project, it is not the only manner to

study this phenomenon nor is it without problems. Naturally occurring data is heavily reliant on the researcher's interpretation and may not sufficiently provide a full account of the phenomenon. As stated earlier, cultural context is a valid concern and a possible problem I can encounter (Lewis and Nicholls in Ritchie et al. 2014, pp.54-5). Additionally, there is the common problem of sampling selection for the purpose of generalizing. Qualitative research uses non-probability samples such as purposive sampling which chooses cases that are of particular interest and relevance to the research project. This, however, does not allow the sample to be statistically representative. Instead, qualitative sampling should be characterized by its relevancy (Ritchie et al. 2014, p.113).

Sample units are chosen by what they can offer to the in-depth research with two purposes in mind. First, to safeguard all of the main areas of exploration are covered. The main concern of qualitative research is too extensive and comprehensively explore a phenomenon for detailed understanding, to acquire clarifications, and to create ideologies, concepts, and theories (Ritchie et al. 2014, pp.113-4). This has led me to choose criterion-based sampling in the form of speeches from the European Commission. Being particularly interested in ethics and politics in Europe, I found myself limited by language. Since studying ethics to political responses mostly takes place on a national level, I found myself confined to finding official documents in English about the EU which the EC provided. This sample unit allows for insides to which ethical stances the EC is taking when addressing the concerns of the member-states and its citizens. The Commissioner's speeches were chosen mainly since official policies, and written statements only give a technical perspective and not a comprehensive understanding. It is actors such as the commissioners that are behind political systems. Their policies and decision making are in control of the political agenda of the EU. The European Commission is formed by different departments that were created to focus on specific areas to develop policies. I, therefore, chose to focus on the departments that are relative to the refugee phenomenon at study.

Second, to safeguard that those sample units have enough variation so that the impact of the subject can be investigated. Since qualitative research is mainly concerned with the nuances and analyzing of a phenomenon, it is vital that sufficient variant data is collected to help better identify if there is any impact from that variation. This has led me to choose speeches from different commissioners

to help determine if there are any significant nuances between their understanding of the refugee crises. I have thus chosen the following commissioners, vice-president and president; Jean-Claude Juncker, Frans Timmerman, Marianne Thyssen, Pierre Moscovici, Dimitris Avramopoulos, and Christos Stylianides.

These political actors were chosen for the pivotal roles and decision making in specific departments, which help form the political and ethical direction of the EU. After reviewing the Commissioners departments, I was able to select those that are in various ways correlated to the refugee crisis. I then proceeded to identify speeches of interest. At this initial stage, one hundred-fifty-one, total documents were selected, varying in size from 1 to 6 pages long. Forty-six documents from the president of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. Sixty documents from Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner of migration, home affairs, and citizenship. Ten documents from Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner of economic and financial affairs, taxation, and customs. Fourteen documents from Frans Timmerman, first vice-president, better regulations, interinstitutional relations, the rule of law, and the charter of fundamental rights. Fifteen from Marianne Thyssen, Commissioner of employment, social affairs, skills, and labor mobility. Six documents from Christos Stylianides, Commissioner of humanitarian aid and crisis management. After the initial review and identification process sixty of the documents had no relevance, I thenceforth continued a more thorough examination of the documents. While familiarizing myself with the rest of the documents I chose thirty-seven documents from the European Commission for closer examination.

Giving speeches on the same topic to different audiences would only naturally lead to repetitiveness on many issues. However, there were nuances between the various political actors within the EC. The nuances were greatly influenced by the particular interest of the Commissioners, Vice-President or President. For example, Timmermans was commissioned by the President to emphasize the rule of law and rights, while Thyssen was the commissioner of social affairs. There was, therefore, a natural tendency for the commissioners to highlight specific issues; however, I did not see significant evidence that there were contradictions to their views when shared topics were addressed. For example, when speaking of solutions to what they termed the refugee crisis, they tended to follow the script that solidarity was the best solution and required

for the best possible outcome. Similarly, when addressing how to control and manage the refugee crisis, the EC generally spoke of external borders.

The selected documents were taken from the official website of the European Commission and are a direct response to the refugee crisis phenomenon. In May 2015 the EC came together to present the European Agenda on Migration which attempted to bring a new comprehensive approach to migration management. This was a direct response to the refugee crisis. Through various means of public discourse, the Commission has attempted to address some of the issues and concerns of member states. These statements come in the form of speeches, press releases, and policies proposals that are released from the EC through their website. In particular, the EC's speeches and statements will be analyzed.

2.4 Questions regarding quality of research, biases, and ethics

Reliability and validity are essential factors in determining the quality of a social research project. External reliability refers to how well the research project can be replicated. This presents specific difficulties since social phenomenon are context-specific meaning there is set in a particular social setting and surrounded by specific circumstances. However, if the integrity of the context is kept the same, I believe there is little difficulty in producing similar results. To safeguard against this, I carefully documented my steps throughout the research project, thus leaving a trail for how I conducted the project. Being a novice at conducting a research project, I carefully attempted to keep records of my process through journaling. Documenting first ideas and questions in an attempt to reveal my thought process of how the project might come together. I have already addressed how I selected my data. I will also shortly discuss the process I undertook during my analysis.

It was also very easy to get off topic when closely related issues were discussed throughout the speeches. I avoided integrating parts of speeches that did not refer to or speak directly to the refugee phenomenon. For example, if the issue of state sovereignty was spoken of outside of the context of refugee's, I did not use that data as part of my analysis. This helped to give me focus and concentrate on the subject matter of this thesis.

The social researcher has to be aware of the biases and influences that they bring to the research project. Every approach, method, analysis, and theory begin from a particular perception or position which can influence the lens in which they receive and interpret information. Researchers are heavily influenced by a vast array of cultural dynamics which affect their understanding since "there is no neutral perspective from which culture (social) can be studied" (Thwaites, Davis and Mules, 1994:221). Being a child of an immigrant and migrating myself to another country, I can empathize with other migrants and recognizing the hardships that minorities face while integration into society has also made me sympathetic to the cause of immigrants. This would naturally lead me to sway towards favorable policies on entrance towards immigrants if not carefully guarded against. My ethical and moral reasoning have come under the influence of being raised in a Judeo-Christian background, thus also lending to the cause of helping those in dire need such as refugees. Being made aware of the biases that religion is a strong identity marker in my own life has caused me to take a cautious approach to the issues regarding refugees who also claim a strong religious identity. Coming from a Western state and being influenced by a particularly high standard of life, cultural and social tendencies I am made aware that in many ways I cannot sympathize with the hardships of those seeking refuge. However, I have personally come to know several refugees and have formed a friendship with them. This has naturally led me to be exposed to first-hand accounts of their stories. This may also influence my paradigm on entrance policies and refugees.

I short word on the ethics of my research project. Given the documents of my analysis are public speeches that are accessible through the EC's official website for public use I had little ethical issues with the exception of context. I aimed as best as possible to not take out of context the data to fit my personal interpretation or misconstrue the meanings and content of the EC's political statements.

2.5 Analysis

An analysis is a recurring process that begins at the start of a research project and continues to the end. Consequently, it must be given careful attention. While there are many approaches one can take in the analytical process, thematic analysis is commonly used and will be implemented to form the primary approach. Qualitative research has no set of guidelines for analysis. However, the thematic analysis concentrates on both the content and context of analyzing the speeches of the

Commissioners (Bryman 2012 pp.578-80). Thematic analysis "involves discovering, interpreting, and reporting patterns and clusters of meaning within the data. Working systematically through texts the researcher identifies topics that are progressively integrated into higher-order key themes, the importance of which lies in their ability to address the overall research question" (Spencer et al. in Ritchie et al. 2014, p.271).

2.5.1 Data Management

Within the analytical process, there are two significant procedures, and although they are distinct, they are closely correlated. The first stage in the process is data management. As stated earlier, this part of the process refers to breaking down the data into more manageable portions by creating labels, themes, codes, or memos. There are five stages in the process of data management that I implemented in the thematic analysis process. First, is getting familiarized with the key topics that are relevant to the research question by getting acquainted with an overview of the subject. Second, constructing an initial thematic framework by creating a list of topics that are assimilated into themes. Third, identifying which data can be grouped by indexing and sorting. These more significant portions of the data that are similar are also known as 'topic coding.' Fourth, reviewing data extracts which pertain to further refinement of grouping and organizing the data. Lastly, is data summary and display. This relates to specifically reviewing and labeling what each participant is saying and later displaying it by theme and participant (Ritchie et al.2014, pp.282-284).

I attempted to follow this outline as carefully as possible with a few exceptions. First, after having studied and having a good understanding of ethical approaches within international relations, I refined my focus and study points to cover the particular interest of the migration phenomenon. Having no particular background in this field, my interest in different ideological theories led to briefly familiarize me with the material. During this process, I came upon some; however, not many references on refugee and asylum-seeking. I then turned my efforts to reading material on refugees. I immersed myself in this topic and soon became overwhelmed with the plethora of resources; however, I was able to focus on material that specifically dealt with the ethics and politics of refugees. This then led to other subtopics, in particular, the political theories of nationalism, populism, and global liberalism. Having also studied identity formation with

integration policies, I was aware of some political theories; however, I was still not fully learned when it came to the topic. I began to study populism, where I was introduced to further reading material to help ground me more in the ideology of partialism. I also had studied political/ethical theories of utilitarianism and cosmopolitanism. This then led to the foundation of familiarizing myself with the literature.

The next step in the process was to construct an initial framework creating a list of relevant topics for coding. The thematic analysis process includes organizing the data for interpretation. This organizing is broken down into manageable parts by building codes, categories, or themes. It is here that I decided to use the work of Matthew Gibney (2004) who uses the binary approach of Impartialism and partialism to make general categories for grouping ethical and political ideologies. I found that utilizing his approach allowed for a broader spectrum so that both ethical and political theories could be evaluated. This was particularly useful since my thesis incorporates analysis from two closely related yet distinct fields; political and ethical. While some theorist divide ethical reasoning into teleology and deontology frameworks, I found this approach to be limiting. I have also chosen to categorize it in such a manner since, within the boundaries of ethical practices and ideologies, there ranges a comprehensive continuum of choices. Thus I have chosen to focus on two specific groupings that serve as an umbrella for more particular ethical and moral reasoning. I also began to label speeches during the initial framework phase. There were reoccurring vital themes throughout the literature and speeches of the EC that I found helpful to use as labels so I began to label the speeches so that I could later return to them for better analysis.

Third, identifying which data can be grouped together by indexing and sorting. These are more significant portions of the data that are similar are also known as 'topic coding.' Being a novice, I found this part of my thesis to be the most difficult, especially since coding is more interpretive rather than a tightly defined science. Codes are typically "a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and /or evocative attribute for a portion of language based or visual data" (Saldana in Ritchie et al.2014, p.277). Following the theories and approaches laid out by Gibney, I found my work significantly simplified. I began to make initial codes for my data such as borders, citizens, security, ethical, human rights, etc. During this process, I also used coding to simplify the bulk of my data, so I could quickly later identify and locate it

for retrieval. Practically speaking coding is used to organize, retrieve, and interpret data. It is the process where researchers can classify relevant and significant data for interpreting. Coding and retrieving were a commonly used approach for my analytic strategy. In doing so, it is used for three specific purposes; identifying pertinent phenomena, gathering instances of those phenomena, and analyzing it (Coffey and Atkinson 1996, pp.27-29). I coded, indexed, and sorted my data into more manageable sizes so that it was readily accessible. This was not only time consuming but also extremely crucial to the success of my thesis. This is especially true since I was examining a large amount of data in the form of speeches and statements. Indexing helped me to cogitate more analytically over the data. After indexing and sorting my data, new topics of interest began to emerge. This is where I deviated from the outline and step by step procedure and blend the fourth step in the analytical process I was hoping to follow, going back and forth between the data and the literature.

To simplify this process, my original intention was to use computer software. However, I chose rather to manually code for two reasons. First, being novel to coding, I wanted to take an approach that would immerse me in the material to best familiarize me with the data as well as familiarize me with the process. I felt that in the short and long term, the process of manual coding was most beneficial, seeing how this could possibly be my first and only chance to do so — following on that my second reason was for the experience. I did not want to over convolute my first experience by having to learn a new program while at the same time processing an abundance of fresh information from the data itself as well as the theories that I was incorporating in my thesis. If I was to pursue analytical work in the future, I wanted to best familiarize myself with the process and experience from the ground up. However, in hindsight, it would have been a good investment to learn a new program for coding.

Fourth, reviewing data extracts which pertain to further refinement of grouping and organizing the data. Manual coding also helped me during this process with identifying new emergent codes so that I could re-categorize some of the data, thus creating new codes. As stated earlier, the third and fourth step in the analytical process tended to be intertwined with coding, indexing, reviewing, recoding, reviewing, and so forth. I was able to come up with new emergent codes as well as codes from the literature. One of the most discussed issues in both the literature and data were on

the topics of politics, states, borders, security, safety, citizens, identity, group formation, duty, obligation, and rights. What was regularly referred to in the data and thus emergent codes was the issue of solidarity and religion. When first reviewing the literature, I did not find much relevance in this topic, nor was it referred to frequently. However, it appeared to be a significant topic of discussion for the Commissioners.

Lastly, is data summary and display. This relates to specifically reviewing and labeling what each individual is saying and later displaying it by theme and participant. For example, Commissioner Stylianides emphasizes third-country support and makes strong connections between dignity and education for children, even calling it his "obsession." He appeals to human morality and makes a strong case for the cause by depicting the dire situation with what he calls "key facts," which are usually statistical numbers. He does this while not losing refugees in the transition of making them just numbers, often portraying the horrifying, vivid situation in Syria and abroad. He also uses the unprecedented term crisis to depict the refugee phenomenon a nuanced difference from most others in the EC. He refers to solidarity as being pragmatic, a term he often uses, which is another nuance that is mainly used by him. After understanding the specific themes of each participant, it simplified my analytical process.

2.5.2 Data interpretation

The second primary procedure in the analytical process is the abstraction and interpretation of the data to give an overview of its findings. It is here that the researcher refines the data to gather what are the significant findings from the research. The description is the initial step to discover what is happening in the data and identify the nuances of the phenomenon. I have briefly addressed some of the different nuances between the Commissioners, Vice-President, and President, that were discovered during my analysis of the text. Likewise, I have briefly discussed carefully categorizing what individuals are articulating about a specific theme and how it may vary from others. Each theme that was identified during the data management process is now systematically reviewed so that the diversity of responses, paradigms, and experiences are carefully recorded. This process includes moving from the initial surface level components of the data and shifting to a deeper diagnostic. This often involves higher levels of abstraction since this is usually associated with theory building (Ritchie et al.2014, p.284). During this process, I was not able to identify any

significant nuances so as to point out any contradictions that the Commissioners were making. However, having established categories of central analytical themes by comparing similarities and differences, I began to see how all of the data correlated together. This was accomplished by looking for links that occurred in the text (Ritchie et al. 2014, p.285). During this process, I began to identify certain patterns that the EC was making that was closely associated with populism and liberalism. It is also here that I began explaining why the data has taken the form that has been identified. In chapter five, during my discussion where I interpret what the data revealed, I give an alternate interpretation of the data and justify my reasoning for theory building from what I considered emergent, vital themes from the data and literature. During the data interpretation process, I attempted to analyze and build theories that were supported from the data and literature. I aimed to avoid theorizing from a highly abstract position and make recommendations that are directly correlated from the data and literature.

3 Analytical Framework

The following chapter elaborates on an essential part of my thematic analysis which consist of composing an analytical framework in order to determine how the EC has socially constructed their ethical understanding and justification for their political responses towards refugees. Utilizing constructionism as my ontological approach I aim to set the parameters for discovering and interpreting the data, the political speeches and statements given by the EC. Accomplishing this brings us one step closer in achieving the objective of this research project;

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

Given the copious research and literature on ethical and political theories I have chosen to incorporate the binary approach of partialism and impartialism, from the work of Gibney (2004), as a continuum for gauging the ethical stances of particular political theories. Since states are the primary agents for determining refugee care, and both ethical and political responses are under investigation, I have chosen this particular framework for two specific reasons. First, this dichotomous approach acts as an umbrella for *efficiently categorizing* both the data and literature which would be arduous to accomplish if political theories are for example strictly seen in teleology, ends based, or deontology, duty-based, approaches. This is especially true since some political ideologies such as populism are not purely ethical theories. Second, this also allows for a *simplistic manner for identifying the ethical positioning* of the political ideologies under investigation. The latter point addresses the *depth* while the former point speaks of the *breath* of the ethics and politics of the refugee phenomenon. Given the complexity of this social phenomenon I have selected my analytical process to incorporate this varied approach in which various political theories are analyzed under ethical ideologies to efficiently reach my objective in the most straightforward manner.

I begin this chapter by reiterating some of the presuppositions established at the end of chapter one, briefly depicting specific terms and how they will be used throughout the rest of the thesis. Second, I elaborate on partialism which holds that states are comprised of distinct, self-determining, communities whose primary focus of interest is that of its constituents. While the

ideologies and doctrines within partialism are too numerous to address, I specifically focus on populism since this appears to be one of the main themes throughout the data. However, I do concisely describe the main ideological principles of ethno-nationalism. Third, I expound on impartialism which sees states as moral agents in which equal consideration of both state interest and foreigners should be afforded. Lastly, I conclude the chapter with what Gibney (2004) terms as a humanitarian approach which utilizes an impartial definition of refugees, seeing them vis-à-vis their humanity while considering the partial limitation of states and offers the principle of "low cost" as a guide to implement ethical state policies.

3.1 Presuppositions

Having established in chapter one that the intended audience for this thesis are graduate students in the field of ethics and politics I presuppose certain terms need not be heavily defined. It is however paramount to establish specific terms before adequately expounding on the partial, impartial approach thereby establishing the framework necessary for the analysis. I thus set out in this section to concisely define how the terms: politics, community, citizenship, identity, culture and state are used in the context of this thesis.

I refer to **politics** as; the "study of influence and the influential" (Lasswell 1936, p.309), in which an exercise of authority and power are made over certain matters or subjects, mainly pertaining to the public decisions human communities take through a system, institution or representative agency (Almond, Powell, Strøm, and Dalton 2004, pp.1-2) which is specific to the notion of 'citizen' revolving not just around a single person but a community thereby making politics innately social (Minogue, p.10).

The concept of **community** has come to hold the notion of categorizing various social groups into two distinct manners. The first is a more general utilization of the term where one "can look for some common phenomena that might justify" using the "concept to characterize such a wide range of social groups" while a second application of the term defines it as a narrow "smaller and more coherent set of associations" (Yack 2012, Kindle Location 772). These conceptual dichotomies of community rightly reflect the context in which they are specifically used by partialist and

impartialist. Impartialist use the term in a more general sense so as to categorize human beings belonging to a common universal community while for partialist a community must hold some defining characteristics, and to some degree, distinguishing factors from other communities so that an understanding can be formed of what community they belong to and what membership involves (Gibney 2004, pp.7-32). Partialist define a community as; a group of individuals who, "in the course of time, have come to trust and identify with each other in a special and exclusive way" (Gibney 2004, p.30), and hold a shared bond brought together by a shared identity forged through a common way of life and beliefs ranging from politics and civil duty to culture, religion, and ethnicity. This community forms what is commonly referred to as a nation. Since communities are constituted through group formation these terms are often tantamount.

Formal entrance into these national communities are found in the concept of **citizenship** which is best expressed through its duality of being both internally inclusive and externally exclusive. Citizenship has both sociological, "basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of a community" (Marshall in Joppke 2010, p.10) and political implications pertaining to the "rights and benefits accrued to the individual by the state" (Joppke 2010, 10), thereby making them internally inclusive while at the same time externally exclusive meaning that foreigners do not share in these same privileges (*ibid*, p.15). This duality of citizenship similarly serves as a two-fold purpose for states in that it controls access by excluding unwanted outsiders from membership while at the same time validates the nation-state so that members feel part of and for a specific community. Conversely this makes citizenship an instrument and object (Joppke 2010, pp.15-6). States now use citizenship as a means that allows it to be a closed and self-perpetuating community making new membership an internal process with difficult access (Joppke 2010, p.17). One of the main ways it accomplishes this is by forming a national identity. If membership includes certain expectations and sacrifices, such as paying taxes or serving in the military, then there needs to be a sense of connection to the community. Forming a national identity serves this purpose; it is a means of connecting both past and future generations with common bonds of affection, duty, and interest so that its members can focus around it and inspire their loyalty (Gibney 2004, p.30).

Identity can hold a multitude of meanings from "referring simply to social categories or roles" to "basic information about oneself" (Fukuyama 2018, Kindle Location 230). However, the social scientific term in this research refers to identity as the; "set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person" (Burke and Stets 2009, p.3) and "form an integral part of their self-understanding" (Parkeh 2000, p.1). So while identity is something individuals poses it pertains to how one relates to others in a broader context. This is significant since people can posses' various identities which are dependent on their roles within specific groups in society thereby characterizing them according to those positions. Consequently, as long as individuals live in societies, identity will have an interdependent relationship with the social structures that form, influence and maintain them such as groups and communities as well as the cultural norms they produce (Burke and Stets 2009, p.3).

Culture is relevant in attempting to explain the imperative influence it has in shaping identity since it is a substantial factor in shaping what is right and wrong, life expectations, one's role in society, and forms the basis for identity formation. This does not mean that culture is a unified process rather a collaboration of practices that entail many complicated issues regarding human beings. Cultures are internally diverse, represented by several actors, and have a range of interpretations from within, thus making it hard to specify some of its meanings. One can, however, note certain aspects of its manifestation and as difficult and complex as it may be to define and identify for this thesis I will refer to culture as "the ensemble of social practices by which it is produced, circulated and exchanged" (Thwaites, Davis, and Mules 2002, p.1). Culture is that created system however it is not solely theoretical and "the way it organizes human life is not *ad hoc* and instrumental rather grounded in a particular manner of conceptualizing and understanding it" (Parekh 2000, p.143). Since human beings' desire to understand the significance of life, both individually and collectively, and how they fit into the scheme of society they form a system of beliefs and practices that dictate and determine the meaning and significance to human life.

The **state** was formed as a structure of political authority which was held as an abstract entity, portrayed as an impersonal, neutral, and synthetic agent that could best centralize authority and

coercive force over a community while at the same time hold the loyalties of its members through its constituents' concerns of self-preservation and security (Gibney 2004, pp.198-200). States were formed by collective groups of people occupying a territory seeking social order, security, and self-representation (Wendt 1999, pp.201-214). Empirical evidence points that at its conception the state was embedded with the sole principle of benefiting and privileging its community members and although the state was formed by a collective group of people for security, it has developed into its own entity so that it is not reducible to those people. This inevitably has allowed the state to continue its safety and growth. Its goals thus become two-fold, the guarantee of its survival by concentrating the focus, power, and authority of its community as well as to bring order, protection, prosperity and security to its members (Gibney 2004, pp.200-1). For states to flourish, there was a need for them to protect their territory, offer security to its citizens, and distribute their socio-economic benefits such as welfare and education. Security was provided not only to protect the community's way of life but also to safeguard their identity. Through the use of borders and citizenship states distinction from other communities. It is only apparent that with the formation of states and their territories that borders were formed to keep safe the "insiders" and keep away the "outsiders" (Gibney 2004). As the state's role has developed and changed throughout time, one thing has stayed consistent, the pursuit of conditions that maximize its self-interest as well as the interest of its members. The economic agent pushes states to be very particular and self-serving as well as provides a means for justification and legitimization. Accordingly, this bolsters the interdependent relationship between states and their citizenry. Citizens believe in government as the representation of the people makes the state the best agent for political authority. The strong agenda of states having the long- and short-term interest of maximizing both their economic and security interest for their citizenry goes a long way in legitimizing the role of the state (Gibney 2004, p.210).

Supranationalism may be seen as the formation of collective institutions such as the EU and EC and were formed as a response to the transnational ethical and political obstacles since the modern state's particularistic nature limits its capabilities in addressing some of the major global issues such as the refugee phenomenon. Despite these limitations, the state has not only survived but has flourished to become the dominant character in world politics (Gibney 2004:202-3).

3.2 Partialism

Central to partialism is the view that the fellow citizens of a shared state make up a self-determining, autonomous community. This community, which is usually manifested in the form of a nation, forms a shared cultural way of life, sharing in social practices, traditions, myths, and customs which are produced by particular cultural norms made of customs, ethnicity, religion, and language. This shared cultural way of life is thought to be tied to a specific spatial territory known as the homeland in which it is the duty of this community to see its protection and flourishing (Gibney 2004, pp.23-6). Since culture is understood as a means of something that can be passed on, then its meanings are hardly ever fixed. This does not mean that concepts cannot endure for long periods, it does, however, mean that there are instances in which meanings can evolve and transform rather quickly. Partialism may see culture as more static nevertheless, it still recognizes its fluidity, hence the need to safeguard it from the influence of outsiders. This does not mean that all partialist are opposed to change; instead, they are more specifically concerned with a rapid change in their cultural shared way of life which could lead to a challenge in their identity. Foreigners then become viable threats for transforming a community and expediting change. Furthermore, partialist reason that if people are seen as cultural entities, then it is natural for special affection and an allegiance to protect the communal, cultural life, and political will of a community, which determines the governments social, democratic, and justice positioning (Gibney 2004, pp.30-1). The members thereof seek out its self-interest and guard against anything that can be harmful to the community such as financial instability, cultural deterioration, and the loss of territorial space.

Since cultures ultimately affect individuals within a community, partialism justifies exclusion on the rationale that the cultural community should be able to look after its well-being. Partialist, hold firmly to the idea of self-autonomy and the need for their community to culturally express itself, making decisions for its flourishing with no hindrance or persuasion from outsiders. Since partialist see the state as an autonomous community, it is essential for the construction of unity or ties to be formed. This is especially true since their democracy and identity are crucial principles of its formation. This community has come to have a specific understanding of trust and identity with fellow members. While it is true that partialist differentiate in what constitutes the homeland or community, there lies an agreement of certain aspects such as language, religion, and historical

residence. These minimal commonalities are vital in understanding their justification and how they see refugees as a threat to their communal lifestyle that they now enjoy (*ibid*, pp.35-40).

Aiding in protecting this community is the modern-day nation-states which are perceived as democratic agents. Democratic representation is closely connected to the idea of popular sovereignty, a reformed view on state sovereignty. This holds that if citizens of a state through democratic means have the right to choose what states do, then rightly so should they have the opportunity to decide their state interest among themselves without the influence from outsiders (Gibney 2004, p.208). Guaranteeing the state's survival is accomplished by concentrating the focus, power, and authority of its community; one needing the other to strengthen and fortify itself. Helping achieve this task is the state's ability to provide and act as a source of national identity.

States are no longer merely a structure of political authority that are abstract entities rather are an agent of a united distinct people seeking self-representation and interest which also control territorial lands that partialist believe are necessary for their community to flourish, blossom and culturally express itself as well as to safeguard its relevance and practices. This spatial territory holds special affection and is not just a matter of geographical occupation rather homelands that over long periods have helped shape and maintain their national identity and communal bonds (Joppke 2013, pp.36-9). Additionally, states Advocates for the preservation of ethnicity, culture, and religion have found a powerful ally in the agency of the state. In such cases, states become protectors of their citizens' identity (Gibney2004, pp.205-6). These combined factors all lead to why the state is the primary actor in the international world order and leaves little doubt to why the very nature of states is particularistic. States and citizens have interdependence on each other. At the very core of its ideology, the state can be said to have a duty and responsibility to their citizens, thus making states callous to the needs of outsiders.

Under partialism ideologies such as communitarianism, nationalism, populism, and conservative theories are represented. However, the scope of this thesis does not allow for further exploration into these specific political theories with the exception of populism and a concise examination of ethno-nationalism. In the preceding chapter I have detailed my reasoning in doing so claiming that my thematic analytical process has led me to interweave between the literature and data.

Consequently, I have refined my analytical framework to reflect key themes which has led to the elaboration of populism in the proceeding section.

3.2.1 Populism

Populism is a hotly challenged political theory which in various contexts can have numerous meanings, from liberal core values to right-wing associations, thus leaving little consensus in defining the ideology. So while the term is widely used, it is hardly carefully defined. This may be for numerous reasons. Müller (2016) describes populism as an "inner logic" over that of a "codified doctrine" and as with many internal rationalities hard to articulate by individuals (Kindle Location 163). Taggart (2000) sees populism as having a chameleon form which is easily adaptable to its socio-political surroundings. For him, populism is a hollow ideology than can be filled with other ideologies. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) also recognize this. However, they attribute this feature of populism to be a "thin" centered ideology. They see the term ideology to mean a set of normative ideas about the existence and relations of man and society, how a person perceives themselves and others in society, including societal structures. What makes it "thin" is the attachment it must make to other ideologies instead of standing on its own. Thus contemporary populism in Europe seems to attach itself to nationalism, another "thin" ideology (Kindle Location 706). However arduous the task may be in defining the term populism there appears to be a key aspect of the ideology that can be identified. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) more closely define populism as: "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Kindle Locations 703-706). Further difficulties arise when historical accounts are carefully analyzed, one can end up abandoning the term due to discrepancies. However, some main descriptive characteristics can be alluded to.

While most connotation of the concept has correlated it with merely trying to be popular, influenced by a majority or attempting to reach a majority, this does not accurately depict the current wave of *new* populism that has come about in the past four decades. We begin however by first examining a more traditional view of populism. Taggart (2000) has identified six key themes in traditional populism. Populism is first adamantly opposed to representative politics, thus

making the relationship between the two an ambivalent one. That is, hostile towards established politics while at the same time reluctantly political. Second, they affiliate themselves with a community that is projected as an "idealized heartland." It identifies itself with a similar group of people and attempts to set them in the same idealized background. This allows them to disregard notions that seem foreign to this specific group and helps to make a distinction between them and those on the outside. Populist see themselves as the people, an identity constructed from their perceived history and from inward. Third, it lacks essential standards, thus making its adaptability useful for opposing political principles as well as its close association to other ideologies. Fourth, it takes advantage of what is a perceived crisis by responding to it dramatically. Fifth, due to its opposition towards established politics, it attempts to make its movements in the political realm relatively simple and in-return it becomes self-limiting. Sixth, it is heavily influenced and takes on certain sociopolitical aspects from the context in which it arises from (pp.2-5).

The contemporary form of populism that is now facing Europe differs from that of the classic style of the ideology in various ways. Populism in this context is predominantly held by political parties on the far-right. It is no longer a single movement arising from within a country that holds no similarities to other populist movements; rather, it is a series of movements and parties that are strongly related to other concurrent movements. This more closely reflects what some have called anti-institutional politics of populism (Taggart 2000, p.73). It seeks to re-establish its political agendas around taxation, immigration and nationalism thereby repudiating Europe's modern welfare state and its political agendas. It makes a conservative effort to try to distinguish itself from dominant established politics, which also exemplifies the change it is advocating for (*ibid*, p.74).

Although contemporary populism has new identifiable features, it still holds some of the same characteristics of the classic form. Populism attempts to address three major concerns of their community. First, the problem of the government and their policies which are trying to push forward the agenda of the "dangerous others." This usually includes elite liberals who often favor more open policies towards immigration. Second, the problem of "outsiders" who are seen as causing societal and economic complications. These outsiders are usually seen as not caring for the homogeneous community and would instead enforce their own culture and religious practices.

Often these outsiders are seen as the leading cause of any national problems such as burdening the welfare state and causing further financial instability by taking jobs away from the homogenous community. Third, the homogenous community is seen as the savior to the woes of their cultural and economic problems and thereby must take control of their role as 'rightful sovereign' (Marzouki and McDonnell in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016, p.3).

Representative politics plays a paramount role in the ideology of populism. The term depicts the institutions and formats that constitute a liberal democracy such as political parties, voting, policy-making, etc. This representative politics is embodied by politicians who represent the particular interest of the elite ruling class of society, thereby making populism a revolt of the ruled against the rulers. Populism also sees contemporary representative politics as dysfunctional when the liberal elite focus "on the overrepresentation of minorities" (Taggart 2000, p.110). This protest politics takes on different forms in accordance with their revolt against representative politics, thus allowing for more opportunities for variant forms of populism. So when a new representation of politics arises such as that of the EU, then so does the possibilities for populism. What is notable is the effect that populism has in dichotomizing political issues seeing things mainly in black and white, good and bad, pro and against. When attempting to make little distinctions between those of the "heartland" and those outside, it helps simplify politics as well as providing a visible force of opposition. This binary approach helps in identifying "them" and "us," which gives a sense of solidarity from those within the "heartland." In defining these binary categories, the role of identity plays an imperative part. Populist seem to implement a combination of identity markers to combine a national identity. Since populist are opposed to immigration, one of the best ways of lumping this group together is to find an identity marker that would serve the dual purpose of labeling both "us" and "them."

One key aspect of both classic and modern populism is the emphasis of the dichotomous view of the host good community and the dangerous others. There is also no denying the claims that empirical evidence of populism has an intense spotlight on identity claims. Populism is marked by the notion that they are for "the people." The variant forms that this new populism is manifested in are primarily dependent on the manners that were used to mobilize support (Taggart 2000, p.87). In most national contexts throughout Western Europe, this seems to be around immigration. This

then can be another uniting factor in identifying populist parties in western Europe. Since populism is a thin ideology that acts like a chameleon, taking the forms and attaching itself to other thick ideologies, the people provide a great deal of flexibility. Its appeal is also found in its number, yet this should not be confused with the notion that the people represent a plurality; instead, they are seen as fundamentally being a monolithic unit (*ibid*, p.92). Defining what exactly is meant by "the people" can be problematic. "The people" are seen to possess' certain values and characteristics that are appealing. So when referring to the "working class" or "silent majority" is made, it typically is associated with the majority of common constituents of a state and thereby representing the heart of that country. This silent majority is an essential asset to populism still the challenge remains in attempting to determine who is deemed worthy to join this community (Taggart 2000, p.94).

Taggart (2000) identifies the people as represented by specific virtues but is generally seen in terms of who are the outsiders. Populist determine this not by setting parameters and requirements or giving specific essentials of who they are rather by claiming who they are not. This may be because it is easier to identify the villains as well as for their members to be portrayed in a better light when the outsiders are demonized. The lines of exclusion are clearly defined. In making certain groups villains, populist gain more significant support while at the same time bring solidarity to their community (p.94). They rally support and reinforce a sense of unity when they single out a group and demonize them for the woe's they are causing in disrupting their silent civil majority. Thus they create an easily identifiable enemy and sharp socioeconomic and sociopolitical distinctions.

Taggart (2000) also closely associates "the people" with what he calls the "heartland." He depicts this heartland as a "territory of the imagination" that arises in times of crisis and requires defending, thus provoking people into political action" (p.95). This territory of the imagination is representative of the positive features of what "the people" envision as everyday life. This then allows for the justification of demonizing those on the outside. Since this makes "the people" of the heartland at the center of civil society, those on the fringes are excluded. This would include the marginalized, minorities, and the "others" who threaten the homogenous stability of the "heartland." Currently, in Europe, this identity marker is rightly recognized as a religion.

Newer forms of populist movements in Europe have sought to form communal bonds based on a thick interpretation of national identity. They do so by claiming ethnic and religious bases for identity formation and often claim that a mostly homogenous "good" community is under assault from "elites" and "outsiders." Contemporary populism in Europe uses religion as a social action of "belonging" rather than of "belief" and is centered on two main ideas, restoration and battle. In an attempt to use religious symbols and imagery in secular society, populist have disassociated its meaning of faith rather it is used as a set of codes to mark the community (Marzouki and McDonnell in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016, p.2). Additionally, religion is used in an attempt to re-establish a set of symbols and traditions that constitute a lost or endangered native, religious, national identity which is based on a set of an easily identifiable set of codes. This particular use of religion makes it an intrinsic part of culture ultimately binding the two as an inseparable part of the heartland's identity (Marzouki and McDonnell in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016, p.5).

3.2.2 Ethno-Nationalism

A historical account from ethno-nationalist holds that nations were given in nature, are inherently part of humanity, and are an extension of kinship and tribalism; consequently, they are perennial and primordial. While ethno-nationalist recognizing that nations can change, even to the point of extinction, they content nations are a timeless category, whose features can be traced through human biology, manifesting through particular types of socio-cultural communities (Smith 2009, 3). For ethno-nationalist nations are enduring significant communities of action and purpose, which require considerable effort and are made up of essential vital factors. Nationalist who take a historical analysis from ethno-symbolism find a correlation between ethnicity and nations that aids in explaining their key aspects of distinction and characteristics, in which they see cases of ethnic groups transforming into nations. Moreover, they reason that cultures use symbolic components of myth, history, and traditions that are often embedded in common ethnic ancestry in forming nations (Smith 2009, p.7-18). Ethno-nationalist chooses cultural elements of symbol, rituals, traditions, myth, memory, and value tied with ethnicity as a means of cohesion and point to this as being a states community's main identity formation.

3.3 Impartiality

On the other side of the spectrum from partialism is the ideology of impartialism. Impartialism sees states as a cosmopolitan agent in which it takes equal account of both its citizens and foreigners via there humanity. It is expressed through such ideologies such as cosmopolitanism, global liberalism, and utilitarianism, humanitarianism too name a few (Gibney 2004, p.59). Impartiality finds its moral force in its inclusiveness. It helps states to see themselves as agents of morality and responsible for its entrance policies so that they can be more comprehensive; seeking to find and see the commonalities of people vis-à-vis their humanity and not for their socio-economic, political association, religious practice, ethnicity, or nationality (Gibney 2004).

Some partialist understand the basis of human rights on natural law and rights. The notion of natural rights and law make moral demands on human conduct, practices, and institutions. The focus of natural rights is on the subject from whom the rights are being violated, that being humans who as right holders have moral value and claim. The emphasis on human beings would also suggest equality based solely on their humanity because all have the same rights as well as there being no difference with whose human rights are at risk — thus leading to the progression of our modern-day concept of human rights (Pogge 2008, p.60-3). The strong emphasis on the equality of humanity is the basis for impartialism.

Other impartialist hold the roots of the modern idea of universal justification is grounded in the Christian theology of human dignity meaning that all human beings share something in common and belong to the same community (Gibney 2004, p.64). Strengthening the case for the universality and impartialism of human rights is the case that empirical evidence points towards a universal recognition of what composites human life and to live a life void of some these features (a sense of morality, need for food and shelter, and ability to feel pain and pleasure, etc.) would be to lack human dignity. Thus for the flourishing of human nature, there is a minimal requirement of certain aspects of life that are needed to achieve human dignity and vice-versa. This would also point that those basic needs for human dignity should be seen as more than just essentials. When an understanding that needs requires the responsibility of someone meeting those needs, it shifts to be held as rights (van Hooft 2009, pp.73-80).

It is also significant to note that relevancy must be given to rights and justice within the moral framework of human rights in impartialism. Declarations of justice should be met with the same outcomes to every person with the exception of moral relevance concerning them. Justice demands that there be no discrimination and thus requires impartiality. This is particularly so regarding the actions that call for moral duty and obligation when issues of justice and rights pertain. Rights also presuppose the notion of responsibility. If there is a claimant of rights, then likewise there is the duty of one to provide or meet those rights. This also goes to legitimizing the right for it is only real to the extent that it can be claimed. This, however, would suggest that there is an agreement on the right being advocated (van Hooft 2009, pp.57-60).

We have already seen how different philosophical stances on the justification of human rights can differ; however, legitimizing human rights is quite different in that they are recognized by states in international law and politics. This effectively validates human rights and duties as relative and normative. Cosmopolitans argue that moral actors, institution and people alike, are not freed from exercising justice so as to hold it in the same regards as charity consequently making it optional. Instead, in the same fashion that the claims to human rights are universal, so must their adherence be. If human rights are grounded in and seen through the concept of duty and obligation that is more universally accepted, then the case for impartialism is strengthened (van Hooft 2009, pp.60-2).

Impartiality does not make community distinctions; rather, it sees all humans belonging to a common community, which makes it a global force with no exclusive allegiance for compatriots. Cosmopolitanism within impartialism holds three main principles. First, individualism makes the autonomy of human being and persons of primary concern rather than that of groups. Second, universality seeks to apply a standard of equality to all human beings. Third, is a generality, which emphasizes the concern of human beings is for everyone and not just those of similarity (Pogge 2008, p.175). Cosmopolitanism differentiates the institutional from the interactional approach. The latter is concerned with the moral associations and interactions with one another and that "every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern" which can focus on subjective or objective principles. Institutional cosmopolitanism applies social justice to institutional structures and systems, thus making the principles of ethics of human interaction as

secondary and indirect. This is in contrast to the interactional concept, which directly pertains to the ethical practices of individual persons and groups (Pogge 2008, p.17).

Since impartialism is constructed heavily on these principles, it inevitably leads to the question of moral obligation and begs to ask the question; does one have a particular commitment to compatriots over foreigners? Some within impartialism hold that Rawl's idea of the "original position" could be extended on a global scale meaning that if people were not made aware of certain knowledge such as ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status etc. they would take an impartial approach. From this position of what Rawls calls a 'veil of ignorance,' people within a society can make impartial judgments that are fair and just. While Rawls principle mainly pertains to members of a shared community such as fellow citizens the point can be expanded to states instead of people (Rawls in Gibney 2004, p.60). Nagel (1991) uses a similar approach to the political and ethical theory when he recognizes the breakdown between collective and individual standpoints. He states the ethical basis for political theory for individuals concerning society must be understood from a binary approach of the personal and impersonal points of view (Nagel 1991, p.3). It would appear the requirement for impartiality is constructed on the principle against treating individuals unreasonably based on difference.

3.3.1 State sovereignty

Since the formation of states, there seems to be clear evidence that there is to some degree, a disconnect between the state and its members. In fact, as evident from the cause of refugees, there at times an apparent misuse of the state's authority. Impartialist view that the modern state has, to some degree, failed. Carens (2013) makes a strong case for impartialism when he states three reasons in doing so: casual connection, humanitarian concern, and the normative presuppositions of the state system. Causal connections mean that in some form states are affiliated with the cause of making refugees which impartialist would suggest should lead to moral obligations. Impartialism holds that if states have a role in bringing instability to nations by aiding in civil unrest and conflicts as well as aiding in wars through funneling the means for the conflict, then they have a causal connection and to some degree accomplices.   When considering the case for causal connection the evidence helps one to understand why states should take into consideration

humanitarian concern and how normative presuppositions of the state system function (Carens 2013, pp.195ff). While the international political system of states may benefit the majority of people, it does not do so for refugees whose states have failed to provide them with protection. Since every person is born into the state system, it lies in the collective responsibilities of states to care for refugees. Sovereign states hold political self-determination meaning that states are autonomous over the territories they govern and control. One significant way in which states control their territories is through borders.

3.3.2 The case for open borders

Borders play a vital role in both the state and its citizens as well as providing amble reasoning for impartialism to make a case for open borders. One of the greatest proponents for open borders makes a morally compelling case by proposing three underlying interrelated assumptions. First, social order, along with its institutions and practices, are socially constructed human concepts and as such, can change in principle. Although the case for open borders in the present may seem implausible, there is the possibility for future change given the fluidity of international institutions. Second, the changing of social order must take place on the premise of human dignity and equality. Third, any form of constraints on human rights, such as equality and freedom, must be morally justified. This means that justification needs to take place on a level that addresses all parties involved including those who it may not benefit as opposed to general statements that it is for the good of the party making the justification (Carens 2013, p.227). Open borders allow freedom of movement, which is seen as enhancing individual autonomy. This is precisely why the right to freedom of movement is taken away from individuals when they are imprisoned. Freedom of movement is also indispensable to equal opportunity. The notion that all humans are of equal moral worth suggests that opportunities should not be based on the beneficial social position one receives at birth. This also allows for social, economic, and political equality. Thus the general case for open borders hinges on two components; freedom and equality (Carens 2013, p.228).

For impartialist, if liberal states allow the right the exit, they should equally allow open borders for the free movement of people (Gibney 2004, pp.60-2). The burden should be on the state to help out as many people as it could until the "ecological system" is in jeopardy of collapsing or if "tolerance in a multicultural society was breaking down" thus putting refugees and other

immigrants' peace and security at risk from different cultures. The tipping point for utilitarians on open borders is when the admitting refugees would be greater than the benefit. (Singer and Singer in Gibney 2004, p.63). Global liberals would argue for open borders along the same lines as utilitarians and set their limits for open migration as long as; liberal institutions are held intact, public order is not disrupted, or if there is no threat of national security. Others would go as far as allowing the free movement of people as long as the culture of the state is not endangered of being overrun. (Gibney 2004, p.64)

3.3.3 Group and identity formation

The state has proven to adapt because of its ability to grow into something more substantial than its original conception of only providing security and order for its members. Strengthening the case for impartialism are alternative concepts of culture, community, membership, and identity; topics that we will now explore.

Impartialist view that egalitarian rights are up for the task of providing pluralistic liberal states with the means of administering equality and freedom when solidarity and trust can be realized. Thick bonds of identity can be formed through means of anti-essentialism, which sees hybridity as a new model for creating identity. This ideology recognizes that cultures are dynamic in nature, organic, and ever-evolving forms of producing identity. In a post-immigration world where globalization is ever-present the essentialist view on strong ethnic identities are shifting (Modood 1998, p.378). What this means is that as people continue to migrate into nation-states that are culturally different than their own. Over time their culture and identity are changed by their new surrounding; this is especially true for second and third-generation immigrants. Anti-essential group formation is likened to elements that compose language, games, and family resemblances. Language was once thought to hold a single composition or ideal structure. This however changed when it was seen as various dissimilar types that reflected different reasons, histories, and types — thus making it implausible to gage it with an ideal standard. There were, however, some standards. For example, in the same way, that games had some continuity in the way that distinctive components come together, so those playing have an understanding and sense how to play, so games are different they still hold some similarities that they can be called games. "The point applies to the relations between the elements that give to a particular game its distinct

identity, and it equally applies to what different games have in common in order for each to be a game" (Modood 2013, Kindle Locations 1535). Similarly, family resemblances hold no essential characteristics while at the same time, display several substantial characteristics.

It is these ideas that lend to the notion that identities do not need to be bound to an essence that makes them static, thoroughly unified, or concretely defined. Rather in the same manner that family resemblance reflects the forming of community membership, it should also mirror new standards for group formation. It would appear that for non-essentialist community formation no longer requires the establishment of ideologies or theories. If impartialism offers a different approach to group formation, then it is plausible that there is an alternative view of citizenship.

3.3.4 Impartialism and modern citizenship

The inclusion of benefits to a state's community is best found in the modern-day notion of citizenship. Citizenship is of particular interest since both partialisms, and impartialism see the state's community as vital to their ideology. It, therefore, becomes of fundamental importance to understand what constitutes admission into a state's community. A thin construction of common bonds for community formation allows for broader inclusion of people in particular for pluralistic communities and their minorities. This is important since impartialist such as Carens (2013) liken citizenship in Western democracies to a "modern equivalent of feudal class privilege- an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances" (p.226). A close examination of feudal birthright reveals close similarities to modern-day citizenship. The main characteristic found in both citizenship and feudalism, hold high restrictions on the freedom of free movement so as to protect the special interest of those who are more fortunate by not allowing the less fortunate access to their community and benefits. These privileges that the more affluent have are not earned rather granted through being born into a certain social class or community. These exclusive birthrights and privileges that were morally condemned in feudal practices were ironically abolished with the notion of modern-day citizenship. Feudalism was thought to be an atrocity that only benefited some while the majority found the practice to be unjust, thereby denouncing its practice. It would now, however, appear that this same practice is now justifiable in modern-day citizenship.

The modern concept of citizenship is now being infused with the principle of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself declares that "everyone has the right to a nationality." Through globalization and the more recent phenomenon of migration, brought about by the last half-century, states are becoming less and less homogenous. While citizenship is continuing to evolve and redefine itself in western states, it is doing so in a more inclusive universalistic manner. This may be since states are becoming more pluralistic, and as states try to integrate outsiders into their political community, it becomes more challenging to define nation-state identity. Instead, outsiders are asked to conform to a set of general shared values and way of life that is found in most liberal democratic states. This means that the particulars of national identity are becoming generally universal, thus making both identity and citizenry more in line with a thin-ideological belief system (Joppke 2010).

How then can impartialism offer solutions to the need of common bonds that communities require? Liberal scholars within impartialism see the conflict and concern between unity and integration in pluralistic societies when states must remain neutral while at the same time, members are free to choose their pre-political conceptions of the good. This leaves no room for a political community to come in agreement with a set of principles to which they can bond to. Impartialist suggests that the best hope for this social bond should be civic and moral rather than historical and cultural. A political community must then find a shared identity in a coinciding agreement of values. Rawls theory of justice holds that if society is seen as a collection of shared lives to form a self-sufficient association, then a particular set of guidelines are required for adherence.

These guidelines establish a "system of cooperation" to benefit its participants, thus making an "identity of interests." A set of principles-based "social justice" is also needed to distribute the benefits of society. It is these principles that form a civic bond since they make up the underlying agreement and foundation of a well-ordered society. The principle of justice gives concrete forms to which society can assign rights and duties as well as properly distribute the benefits and burdens of a shared way of life found in a community (Rawls 1971, pp.3-7). In other words, the concept of social justice sets the parameters for social cooperation and unity, which replace ties of solidarity based on ethnicity, religion, or culture. The concept of duty and obligations one has towards other members in society can form social cohesion. The interdependent relationship between

responsibility and justice, rights claimers and upholders, puts them in social cohesion as well as provides members of a community the confidence for either (van Hooft 2009, pp.64-5). Thus the case for impartialism has been furthered strengthen.

3.4 Humanitarianism

Humanitarianism advocates for states to aid refugees and asylum seekers as long as the stakes are low. It is grounded on the same principle as impartialism, which holds that those outside of a particular state community should be held in the same regard as those within due to their humanity. It does, however, differ from many moral theorists who broaden the scope of impartialism as a means for states to open their acceptance policies to all migrants, while humanitarianism focuses on those in dire need such as refugees. For Gibney, the humanitarian principle is best portrayed through the Biblical parable of the Good Samaritan. The parable depicts a man who was attacked, injured, and in need of help. Several people pass by the injured man, including his fellow countrymen, a priest, and Levy, and do nothing to help him. Instead, it is an "outsider," a Samaritan, who offers assistance by attending to his wound, taking and paying for his stay at an inn. This parable gives root to the principle of humanitarianism which sees it the duty of people to lend help to those who are in great distress and need based on their humanity as long as the cost is low (Gibney 2004, p.231). It is important to note that Gibney describes Humanitarianism as a set of principles rather than a codified ideology. As such it can be seen as thin and adaptable to other sets of ideologies.

The humanitarian principles can be seen as a set of codes of conduct between people. However, this principle can also apply to how states treat outsiders. Humanitarianism is thought by some to be a guiding principle of many natural law theorists such as Grotius, Locke, and Vattel. It is also suitable to apply the humanitarian principle between states and refugees since they are some of the most vulnerable, distressed, and endangered people in humanity. There is also considerable evidence to support that states, more noticeably Western states, can do a great deal more to help refugees with little cost to national and state interest. While humanitarianism can be very vague and is seen more as a principle than a theory, it can be easily adopted by states if guided by the main principle of specifically helping refugees as long as the cost is low. Humanitarianism thus can be supported by partialist such as communitarians, so that states hold the sovereign right to

decide their own entrance policies while still being obliged to the humanitarian standard of offering assistance to refugees based on their humanity. The humanitarian principle would also seem to satisfy the set boundaries of partialist who agree to provide an entrance for refugees as long as the cultural or way of life of the state's community is not disturbed (Gibney 2004, pp.232-3).

While humanitarianism offers principles that are friendly to partialist, it also appeals to the moralist need of impartialist who are for helping refugees. Still, this differs from most impartialist who hold the freedom of movement for all people on an equal claim with even refugees. Humanitarianism understands the limitation of states as well as the considerations of its citizens. It is, therefore, more adapt to adjust to the needs of both states and refugees. For example, in regard to the political aspect that at times constrain states, humanitarianism offers a viable option for states to admit more refugees when the stakes or demands it makes are at a low cost. If "low cost" is guiding principles, it is therefore important to try an identify what exactly that means. For advocates of humanitarianism, the term low cost is a general and flexible equation that can be easily aligned with any political forthcomings as well as being flexible so that various states can adopt its principles. Thus low cost can hold multiple meanings in various equations depending on the political atmosphere of a given state (Gibney 2004, p.231ff).

Additionally, humanitarianism advocates for the fair treatment of those in need regardless of distance, thus helping refugees and asylum seekers alike. Resettlement also minimizes the unfair proportion of people who are capable of making the journey, whether due to financial or physical advantages, to become asylum seekers. When states also take on refugees through resettlement, it helps in balancing the ethical dilemma of non-refoulment which puts a higher priority on asylum seekers (Gibney 2004, p.240). Thus a balancing act must occur of how states receive refugees. A commitment to both avenues of asylum and resettlement must be taken to prevent a political backlash as well cutting down on the numbers of dangerous journeys that are undertaken by people who are trying to become asylum seekers.

4. Analysis

Having established my analytical framework necessary for the thematic analysis I now begin my data analysis of the speeches given by the EC. My aim is to abstract the most critical samples from the collected data that exemplify the EC's ethical positioning. I do this to achieve the objective of answering the question:

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

In my preceding chapter, three, I have laid out my theoretical framework, which revolves around the work of Matthew Gibney, who uses the umbrellas of impartialism and partialism to judge moral and ethical stances. This binary approach also helps in identifying the ethical positions of certain political ideologies and actors. These categories of themes are used to further explore topics of interest that reoccur in both the data and literature. This chapter will focus on those reoccurring concepts and codes as partially described in chapter two.

I begin this chapter by examining the EC's views of the politics revolving around the refugee phenomenon. In my methodology chapter, I have briefly discussed the importance of why the EC was chosen however when discussing the particulars of how the EC refers to politics in regard to refugees reveals certain aspects of the importance and priority in which they see this phenomenon. This helps put the refugee phenomenon in context as well as indicates the political atmosphere of the EU, thereby revealing the main concerns of both states and their citizens. Second, I will discuss human rights and moral duty. It is only natural that the topic of human rights would be of interest since the primary concern of this thesis covers the field of ethics. My analytical framework has also provided a focus on human dignity since it is the foundational basis for impartialism. Third, in an attempt to understand the social construct of specific topics of interest regarding the refugee phenomenon, it is essential to carefully examine the EC's understanding of identity, community bonds, and citizenship. This is of particular interest since partialist to a great degree justify the right to exclude based on their identity. Partialist see the need for their identity to be guarded against outsiders. Specific community bonds may allow outsiders access to their community;

however, ultimately, inclusion into partialist communities is mainly found in the form of citizenship. Fourth, I will present my findings on the EC's view of the modern-day nation-state. The function of the state plays a pivotal role in entrance policies, especially since they are the main political actors that govern entrance policies. How and why they exercise control is of great importance to this thesis, and even more so is how the EC views states. The state's role with its citizenry is unique, thus revealing its relationship towards each other has led to a closer examination regarding the topics of borders, security, and protection. Finally, I will review specific actions the EC has or intends to implement.

4.1 Politics and the refugee phenomenon

I begin my analysis with President Juncker's first state of the Union address in 2015 which could be considered one of his most important speeches since it would appear to dictate the political direction of the EU. It is also worth noting what the main political issues the EC feels are pressing the EU since this provides a good indication of where societal interests lie. The political atmosphere suggests what the concerns of both states and citizens are since politics refer to the public and authoritative decisions human communities take. This is the purpose of the State of the Union since it "requires the President of the Commission to take stock of the current situation of our European Union and to set priorities for the work ahead" (European Commission 2015a). As we will shortly see, at the top of the political agenda for the EU in 2015 was the refugee crisis however it is important to note how Juncker begins his speech by emphasizing politics as exercising authority when he states:

> "I would, therefore, like to recall the political importance of this very special institutional moment." He went on to say, "Having campaigned as a lead candidate, as *Spitzenkandidat*, in the run up to the elections, I had the opportunity to be a more political President. This is why I said last September before this House that I wanted to lead a political Commission. A *very* political Commission. I said this not because I believe we can and should *politicize* everything. I said it because I believe the immense challenges Europe is currently facing- both internally and externally- leave us no choice but to address them from a very political perspective, in a very political manner and having the political consequences of our decisions very much in mind. Recent events have confirmed the urgent need for such a

political approach in the European Union. **This is not the time for business as usual.**"
(European Commission 2015a)

It would appear that President Juncker was attempting to emphasize the political aspect of the EC. While an in-depth analyzes of precisely what the political aspect means for President Juncker is outside the scope of this thesis it is worth noting that in general when referring to politics the social scientific term at its barest level would come to mean the procedure or activities associated with making decision that apply to a community in a given territory. Politics refers to the exercise of control by governance over a specific community to decide who gets do what and why (Almond, Powell, Strøm, and Dalton 2004, p.2). This appears to be in line with how Juncker uses the term politics and precisely how he intends on dealing, in a "political manner," with the problems of the EU. His reference to being a "more political president" who wants to make a "more political Commission" followed by the "political consequences of our decisions" would suggest the control to exercise the decision making by authoritative rather than by forcible means since to some degree member states have delegated some sovereignty regarding policymaking to the EC.

This is substantial since one of the significant ethical concerns for moral theorist in impartialism pertains to how states exercise their sovereignty, a topic that will later be investigated. The EC is intent on bringing about policy changes in Europe that would affect its member states and its citizens. During a keynote speech in 2016 at Harvard University Pierre Moscovici, echoes the sentiments of the president Juncker by stating:

> "My main message is very simple: to overcome the challenges Europe is facing, we need a more political Europe, with a stronger euro area at its center. Yes, we need a more political Europe, one with solid legitimacy. You may wonder: where does European political legitimacy lie? Does it lie with the European Commission, which is often blamed by populist, but not only, for its omnipotence as much as its powerlessness? […] It is obvious that the United Kingdom has never been comfortable with the concept of supranationalism. Looking back over the past four decades, we can say that the UK has acted as a brake on the political integration of Europe…" (European Commission 2016 a).

Again here, the correlation between politics and authority are made. Moscovici is calling for a political Europe, a supranational body with authority to exercise decisions for over its territory and citizens. This is precisely what he means when he refers to populist claims of "omnipotence." He also calls for "solid legitimacy" which hold connotations of valid authority. When referring to the UK, he could be making the point that their opposition to supranationalism is a challenge to the authority of the EU by wanting to reclaim some or all of their state sovereignty and autonomy. He later goes on to state that the political legitimacy of the EC is not strong enough to bridge the gap between European nations and EU governance however the EC is the only institution that could accomplish the representation of all interest. This helps in identifying the ethical stances and how they are shaped by politics. Commissioner Moscovici mirrors President Juncker by stating:

> "A more political Europe is one of which projects vision for its people, a positive narrative against discourse based on fear, a vision of progress against all the populist Cassandras. A more political Europe proudly fights for open societies and open economies, as strong elements of its history, its identity. Its stands against nationalism and protectionism. To win this fight and defend its model, Europe needs first to protect its people, all its people. In this regard, reducing inequalities while generating prosperity must be the absolute priority. This is what I call a political Europe […] This political Europe is consequently social and federal." (European Commission 2016a).

Earlier in his speech, Moscovici identifies one of the significant challenges that they face is in the area of security, which he later identifies as a direct link to the concerns of EU citizens. Here he makes a direct correlation between citizens and competing ideologies that the EU is facing. His rhetoric of a political Europe goes against the movements of populism and nationalism, which plays on the fears of citizens towards migration, a political theory that in Europe does not favor refugee protection. This is also evident when he refers to a political Europe being open and social. When referring to a political Europe consequently being federal, he could be indicating a lessening of state sovereignty to a centralized supranational body such as the EU. In doing so, it would appear that the EC, through its political platform, is advocating for supranationalism.

4.2 Human rights

Having established earlier in his speech for a more political EC, Juncker proceeds to address what he feels is that the top of the political agenda for the EU, the most pressing and urgent political concern, the refugee crisis. During his same speech at the 2015 State of the Union address he states:

> "The Refugee Crisis: The Imperative to Act as a Union. Whatever work programs or legislative agendas say: The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis […] It is time for bold, determined and concerted action by the European Union, by its institutions and by all its Member States. This is first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity. And for Europe it is also a matter of historical fairness" (European Commission 2016a).

He has begun his speech by advocating for an EC that can exercise authority for refugees based on a matter of "human dignity." Here are some of the first indications of what kind of policies the EC would in act, and it would appear that at first glimpse they are impartial. Juncker states the migration "crisis" that the EU is facing is "first of all a matter of humanity" thereby referring to refugees as part of a common human community where people should be regarded with equality. While "human dignity" expresses value given to the necessities needed for the ultimate expression of human life. This also implies the notion of dignity as a necessity rather than that of just need. If seen through this framework human dignity also calls for rights since they are possessed by, human, claimants. Human rights are the bedrock of impartialism and hold that both "insiders," those of a particular state community should be treated equally with "outsiders." Juncker calls for "bold, determined and concerted action by the European Union, by its institutions and by all its Member States" thus holding them in par with cosmopolitanism, as agents that should be held accountable for being real ethical actors.

In an opening speech given at the fundamental rights forum in Vienna, Timmermans addresses both the politics and the basis of refugee protection. He states:

"[B]ecause politics is not about the past, it is about the future. And that is what I want to talk to you about today. Because there are challenging times for us- for Europe and for fundamental rights. Almost daily, we see attacks on our values and our way of life: on things that we hold dear, that are fundamental, that enable us to live freely and in harmony with our fellow human beings[…] When fear dominates, we only see threats, not opportunities, and we stop seeing people for what they are: people. And when we cease to recognize somebody else's rights, that in turn undermines the whole value system that safeguards our won rights as well. When we start dehumanizing the other, because we see him as a threat to us, we start dehumanizing ourselves" (European Commission 2016b).

In a similar fashion to Juncker and Moscovici, Timmermans begins his speech on human rights by referring to politics and the concerns of the communities. While not directly referring to community his reference to a way of life, shared values and living in harmony with others would suggest not only proximity but also common bonds which are characteristics of community life. He identifies the political challenge Europe is undergoing, an attack on the fundamental rights of their communities to challenge the community's social harmony. Later in his speech, he addresses the refugee crisis as "a major challenge for Europe, the biggest we have ever faced" (European Commission 2016b) and directly associates it with the topic of human rights. For Timmermans, the European community has a social cohesion brought together by the pillars of "respects for democracy, respect for the rule of law, and respect for human rights" (European Commission 2016b). This could be a reference for what he believes are the "values" of their communities as pillars are seen to be "fundamental" and would also allow for the community to live in harmony with their "fellow human beings." His speech and choice words echo the principles of moral and ethical reasoning, the core beliefs that human rights are the inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is inherently entitled to being human. How he describes those within their community as "fellow human beings" would appear to indicate an impartial point of view based on human rights. He would later go on to state:

"This is why we have made the management of the refugee crisis an absolute priority. This is why we have set out in our migration agenda a holistic approach to reforming our

migration and asylum system. We need to put fundamental rights at the core of our response" (European Commission 2016b).

For Timmermans fundamental or human rights are foundational to the management of what he calls the refugee crisis. Giving an understanding of human rights and ethical reasoning, one can see how Timmermans view is in line with an impartial approach of taking the worth of human beings as equal. For Timmermans, the view of seeing people as people and not as threats or opportunities is vital to his ethical stance. He would continue to emphasize this throughout his speech-making several references to human rights and the social phenomenon that Europe is facing, the "refugee crisis." It would appear that Timmermans counters the dehumanizing of people by bringing the reality of refugees as people in need to the forefront. Timmermans often attempts to make the refugee crisis personal by recounting stories of personal individuals, even recalling specific names, and has a strong emphasis on human rights. This is evident in his examples of using a particular case and person to bring to mind that refugees must be seen as humans. For instance, he would later state:

> "If I look back at the last year, we went from the iconic emblematic picture of poor little Aylan, drowned on the beach in turkey to the other emblematic even, with a completely different reaction, namely what happened in Cologne on New Year's Eve. Europe has sort of been swinging from one side to the other, between our feeling of solidarity on the one hand and our fear for identity on the other. We need to strike a good balance between the two. If we fear too much. The process of dehumanizing starts, and the refugee becomes a number, not a person. And persons drowning in the Mediterranean should always be unacceptable" (European Commission 2016b).

The dehumanizing of people in politics is a natural occurrence and is often used by partialist groups to justify specific policies. It serves as a means of differentiating a community with outsiders. It would appear this is taking place in the EU and why Timmermans is addressing the need not to dehumanize. He makes this point more clearly in another speech given on August 31, 2015, at Tilburg University about the European Union and the rule of law Timmermans states:

"Here again I often see the phenomenon of de-humanizing. Xenophobia and hatred can only happen if you de-humanize the other, if you start slowly taking away another person's humanity. Your neighbor is no longer a man, he's a Jew or a Muslim. And then step by step you take away a person's humanity. Are we not sometimes doing that for refugees, fortune seekers, and asylum seekers? (European Commission 2015b.)

Dehumanizing people allows individuals to easily exhibit and harbor xenophobic thoughts and behavior. Timmermans in appealing to one's humanity rather than their race (Jewish) or religion (Muslim) would suggest he is addressing the growing movements of partialist, in specific populism who dichotomize the good host population with the bad outsiders. This is further demonstrated when he refers to a community when he states that dehumanizing does not allow one to see one's "neighbor" as a "man." The idea of a community being distinct is fueled when a community can make sharp distinctions between those within and outsiders so appealing that there is no difference and that refugees belong to the same collective community of humanity is in line with impartialism.

Timmermans regularly throughout his speeches makes correlations between xenophobia and populism, mainly due to populism's efforts to bring a great divide between them and foreigners often using religion as a battle cry to rally their supporters. Evidence of this strong correlation is seen earlier in his speech when he links them explicitly together. He states:

"The challenges to tolerance and mutual respect in our societies, reinforced by the current crises, are real and serious. The forces of bigotry and populism, of racism and xenophobia are on the rise, and we simply cannot let them gain ground" (European Commission 2015b).

During a speech at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs on, Europe and the challenges for the humanitarian community, Christos Stylianides stated:

"The president of the European Commission Jean –Claude Juncker provided the moral framework of our actions when he said: 'This is a matter of humanity and of human dignity.

And for Europe it is also a matter of historical fairness.' We can never forget this. We must learn from our history" (European Commission 2016c.)

When Commissioner Stylianides suggest that humanity and human dignity are the moral frameworks, it would appear that it is an integral part of the reformations they want to bring. He also appeals to historical fairness as to suggest that refugees should be given equal consideration despite preconceived notions of race, ethnicity, and religion as was the case for refugees during the WWII. This is alluded to when he states, "we must learn from our history." The context for refugee seeking based on human dignity is formed from the experience of WWII. Since the convention of the UN in 1951, it has been the clear legal mandated duty of sovereign member states to provide refugee protection and assistance. Throughout their speeches the EC makes reference to both their legal and ethical duty. In another example from Timmermans he states

"Do we not forget sometimes that if you're in Homs or in Damascus and you want your children to survive, you probably want to leave the country now? And don't we forget that we as human beings have obligations towards other human beings that feel war and persecution, seeking refuge until they can go back? It is a moral imperative but, ladies and gentlemen, it is also a legal imperative. And I believe we can convince our population of this, as long as we make sure that people who seek refuge are seen as human beings" (European Commission 2015b).

The EC has made it an implicit point that assisting refugees is not only a legal obligation but also a moral duty based on human dignity. In doing so, the EC has often made appeals to their member states and audiences by referencing their history. This is important to note since drawing from a common shared history for the purposes of identity, the moral makeup of right and wrong of individuals, coincides with a partialist framework. I will further address this particular issue later what is important now is the recognition by the EC of human dignity as part of their ethical construct.

4.3 Moral duty

With an understanding of human worth also comes the awareness of moral duty. Because of this, it is with no surprise that the Commissioners often speak of assisting refugees as a duty. For example, Commissioner Avramopoulos ended his speech on a new European Agenda on Migration debate on March 4, 2015, by stating: "It is the duty of both the European Union and the Member States to save lives- we have no other choice" (European Commission 2015c). It is a common occurrence for the Avramopoulos to suggest it is the duty of Europeans to assist refugees. On October 22, 2015, he stated: "Winter is already here: there is no question that all countries have a duty to protect and harbor these human beings in desperate need" (European Commission 2015d). In this instance duty is correlated with human beings. In an EC press release, the Commission called for a renewed effort in implementing solidarity measures under the European agenda on migration on March 2, 2017. There Timmermans states: "All these measures have the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility at their core- a principle that binds each member state" (European Commission 2017a). Again, Commissioner Avramopoulos states: "The principles governing the EU for managing this issue are principles laid down by the Treaties: the principles of solidarity and responsibility" (European Commission 2015e). These statements by Timmermans and Avramopoulos are the broader sentiments of the EC where responsibility is typically followed by an appeal of solidarity, as seen in the two previous texts. It would appear that the Commissioners are making appeals to member states and their citizenry for their political agenda of supranationalism which is heavily dependent on both solidarity and responsibility.

4.4 Identity

In an attempt to understand the ethical framework of the EC it is essential to carefully examine the EC's understanding of identity, community bonds, and citizenship. These issues have been partially addressed in passing however, a more in-depth analysis attempts to reveal their construct on identity, group formation and citizenship. In proceeding section, we examine the data from the EC on these particular issues. We begin with identity since this would often appear in the data, usually accompanied with the strong of the communities fears as exemplarily when the Timmermans states: "Europe has sort of been swinging from one side to the other, between our

feeling of solidarity on the one hand and our fear for identity on the other. We need to strike a good balance between the two" (European Commission 2016b).

In a speech on Human Rights Timmermans' reiterates this when he states:

> "The refugee crisis has been one of the main factors contributing to the recent rise of populism and xenophobia in our societies. Why? Because it confirms all the fears people have of our inability to perform services to the community as is necessary, as institutions. The refugee crisis, coming on top of all other challenges, has made people fear that their identity is at stake, that their future is at stake and that their way of life is at stake" (European Commission 2016b).

Here, Timmermans makes a direct association between the rise of populism and xenophobia with the fears of citizens losing their trust in the EC when they are unable "to perform services to the community as is necessary", thereby confirming the anti-institutional politics that characterize populism when they feel their institutions have failed. It would appear that the institutional failures of the EC consist in part of not providing their citizenry with social security that comes with protecting their "identity", "future" and "way of life". This may also lend to the notion that the EC's social construct of their institution is a means that provides parallel benefits of states such as a common identity as well as a communal shared way of life. Likewise, this reveals their political agenda of their supranational agency and their role. Throughout their speeches the EC appears keenly aware of the populist rhetoric making explicit statements that oppose their ideologies such as the associate with the refugee crisis and the perceived threat they pose to host communities. More in particular they address the issue of identity. In this specific reference Timmermans addresses the fear of host communities losing their identity when threatened by refugees who possess a distinct identity hence the rise of xenophobia. While religion is not mentioned in the above content the EC frequently refers to refugees by their religious identity.

Timmermans later address what he may refer to when he uses the word xenophobia when he states:
> "But of course, inclusion is not only an issue for refugees, but for all those whom we fear or mistrust because they are 'different': 'different' by religion or belief, 'different' by skin color, ethnicity, or sexual orientation" (European Commission 2016b).

He would later go on to advocate tolerance, respect and fighting anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred. If taken in the greater context of his speech it would appear that in this particular case Timmermans is making a strong connection between identity and religion when he states: "(t)he refugee crisis has been one of the main factors contributing to the recent rise of populism and xenophobia in our societies" (European Commission 2016b) followed by tolerance towards specific religions and the fear of identity claims by some.

Similarly, the EC identifies religion as a distinguishing marker. In the above text when Timmermans is appealing to his audience for the inclusion of outsiders who have a different religion, he could be referring to partialist who make strong religious claims for identity and community formation. Christendom for many in the partialist camp is about cultural symbols that are disconnected from faith, practice, or moral beliefs that conduct one's way of life. That does not mean, however, that one cannot make moral claims when appealing to one's religion if used as an identity marker, so that is associated with faith. Such was the case when Commissioner Avramopoulos did during his visit to Hungary when he stated:

> "I believe we have a moral duty to offer them protection. It is a duty inscribed in international and European laws. It is a duty grounded in our principles. For me personally this is also a Christian duty. The appeal I would make to you is to continue to work with us, with the European Union, to find common and lasting solutions" (European Commission 2015f).

While in his speech there is no mention of populism or nationalism it appears, the commissioner is aware of the current situation of religious identity claims by populist in Hungary and makes a personal appeal to assist refugees based on faith and duty. As oppose to the populist use of religious claims he makes direct correlations between religion and its moral implications even making an appeal to "work with us, with the European Union".

Closely associated with the loss of identity is the loss of values which impartialist hold are a means of common bonds for community formation. When speaking of the most significant challenge

that the EU has ever faced Timmermans states: "It puts our values to the test and sheds light on the way we are capable- or incapable- of working together in the European Union" (European Commission 2016b). On January 15th, 2016 at "The Future of Europe" event in Brussels Timmermans again, in an almost identical manner state:

> "The refugee crisis in this context is of eminent importance. Why? Because it confirms all the fears, people have of our inability to perform the service to the community as is necessary, as institutions. The refugee crisis coming on top of all these other crises, confirms the fact that people fear that their identity is at stake that their values are at stake' (European Commission 2016d).

In the greater context of speaking against populism, it could be that Timmermans refers to values so as to suggest those brought by religious beliefs. In both cases where Timmermans makes the correlation between the fear of losing identity and values, the context is in being a tolerant society towards religion. Here values could be referring to religious claims, specifically in the context of Islam. This becomes more evident when religion is seen as the primary source of producing values within a society which may be why populist use values as means of justifying their exclusions of outsiders when they believe other religions are not compatible with their values. While it could be that Timmermans is referring to religion when he speaks of values, there is also the possibility that he uses the term from an impartial framework. This is especially true when values are seen as social cohesion and common bonds in community formation.

4.5 Community bonds and social cohesion

Social cohesion was a top priority for the EC, often appearing in the data as detrimental for the integration of refugees. When addressing the concerns over European societal values being at stake "in a context where unprecedented challenges such as refugee crisis" due to populism, Commissioner Thyssen states: "social cohesion needs urgently to be reinforced" (European Commission 2016o). For the EC social cohesion is accomplished by what Timmermans refers to as "common ground" (European Commission 2016b), which can be seen as community bonds. Commissioner Avramopoulos reveals its importance and complexity when he states: "European societies are becoming increasingly divers, and successful integration is a key prerequisite for

strengthening our social fabric and cohesion. Effective integration happens at a local level, and the European Union continues to support cities and communities, particularly in the challenging context of the current refugee crisis, but also in the long run" (European Commission 2016m). In their efforts to find solutions to the complex social issue of implementing the social cohesion of distinctly different outsiders with national communities, which "happens at a local level"; the EC appears to advocate for the liberal values. Thus, when the EC is referring to values, it is more commonly used as an impartial community marker. Timmermans appears to hold more of a thin view on community formation when he states "Almost daily, we see attacks on our values and our way of life: on things that we hold dear, that are fundamental, that enable us to live freely and in harmony with our fellow human beings" (European Commission 2016b). This coincides with the broader view of other Commissioners. It is a common occurrence of the EC to refer to the values of EU citizens as a form of community bonds and social cohesion. Concerning the main objective of the EU commissioner Avramopoulos on October 19, 2015 states:

> "It is our primary task and our shared responsibility to ensure the security of our citizens, but we also need to defend the fundamental rights and values of our societies. We must draw on common European values of tolerance, diversity and mutual respect, and promote free and pluralist communities" (European Commission 2015g).

Here again, the reference to common European values is referenced as a means of solidarity towards accomplishing a particular task, thus being referred to as common bonds. Commissioner Stylanides often makes strong correlations between social cohesion and what he often refers to as "humanity." For example, in a keynote speech, "Europe on Stage" in Brussels stated: "In these times of rising violence and intolerance, we must embrace our social and cultural plurality. We must draw from the common elements of our culture. From our common humanity" (European Commission 2016). Here as in many other instances found throughout the speeches of the EC values are used in correlation with belonging to the European community. Values are also essential when speaking of citizenship. As European states become more pluralistic and attempt to integrate outsiders into their political community, it becomes more challenging to define nation-state identity. This then leads pluralistic states to search for a set of universal shared values to ask outsiders to conform to. This also leads to a shift from citizenship based on a homogenous national

community to a thin conception based on general universal values. This is more evident when examining EU citizenship and maybe one of the main reasons why the commissioners use the term values when using it as a community marker.

4.6 Citizenship

Citizenship is of high significance since it is the primary manner of gaining access to a political community. The EC's opinion that the modern concept of citizenship is now infused with the principle of human rights which was brought upon by international migration is on par with the impartialist view. Citizenship is continuing to evolve and redefine itself into a more inclusive universalistic manner in the EU. In a speech given by commissioner Avramopoulos on "Citizenship in the Culture and Education Committee of the European Parliament," he states:

> "The Paris and Copenhagen terrorist attacks and the migration crisis in the Mediterranean required the immediate and full attention of the Commission. All these events had a clear impact on European citizens. Citizens do care about the protection of their fundamental rights and they want to enjoy them in a secure society. Citizens cannot accept that people in need of protection put their lives at risk and die in the Mediterranean. To address these challenges and reply to the concerns of European citizens I have presented the Commission's responses, namely the European Agenda on Security and the European Agenda on Migration. Having explained that, I want to be clear: The issue the European Citizenship is one of the most important ones […] in France, the project entitled 'SUCCESS'consisted in setting up a network of young citizens coming from different cultural, social and national backgrounds, living in several popular multicultural disadvantaged neighborhoods and major European cities, to contribute to the reversal of populist, racist and xenophobic attitude in Europe and, to promote the founding values of European Citizenship. In that context, reflection was carried out, notably on civil participation of EU citizens and immigrants in the political and civic life, multiculturalism, mass media and transparency of institutions" (European Commission 2015h).

In addressing the concerns of citizens over refugees dying while attempting to reach Europe, Avramopoulos claims citizenship as being an important issue. He makes a direct correlation with

populist and the values of European citizenship. Liberal European states have attempted to disassociate ethnic, national ties with membership as is the case with EU citizenship. This means that a political community must then find a shared identity in a coinciding agreement of values. While EU citizenship is supranational rather than national, it is constructed to have minimalistic requirements. It is also secondary to the citizenship held by member states and is fundamentally based on rights (Joppke 2010, pp.161-3). This is clearly seen when Avramopoulos later states:

> "To me, the European citizenship, is this shared feeling of belongingness to the country of values called Europe, it has been the ultimate legitimizing rationale for moving Europe forward" (European Commission 2015h).

It is clear here that Avramopoulos uses values as a source for belonging and is the basis for European citizenship. EU citizenship, in some ways provides a set of social cohesion for all its members when it provides access to rights and social benefits. This also allows for a thin form of European identity and seems to be the postnational future of citizenship "free from the baggage of nationhood and nationalism" while at the same time states hold control of national citizenship which is the only means for EU citizenship (Joppke 2010, p.171). Avramopoulos echoes these sentiments when he states:

> "When we speak about citizenship, we often also refer to EU citizenship and the rights conferred to every citizen by the EU treaty. EU citizenship entails many precious rights, like the right to move and reside freely within the EU, or the right to political participation in the European and municipal elections and protects against discrimination. Raising awareness and reinforcing citizenship is one of the Commission's key roles" (European Commission 2015h).

It would thus appear that citizenship is essential for Commissioner Avramopoulos when addressing the concerns of citizens and refugees since it would allow outsiders equal rights with that of the homeland for partialist. Gaining access and membership to a community then becomes a political battleground for states. Consequently, this puts a strong emphasis to protect a state

territories and its community's membership. While citizenship speaks of the latter borders address the former concerns of partialist.

4.7 Borders

Borders have taken on a very pivotal role when it comes to the ideologies of the politics and ethics of refugees. This may be since borders are seen as a primary source of keeping out refugees. However, this is not their only purpose nor does is fully disclose the EC's framework on borders. Borders imply boundaries, territory, safety, protection, freedom for those within, and exclusion, among other things. All of these issues also suggest agency, both state, and supranational institutions and the close association with their communities.

We have previously examined the notion that a high number of outsiders can burden a society on many levels. Thus, the priority to "control and manage" the flow of migration is taken by governing borders. This high priority given to borders and migration is evident when the EC is persistently addressing the correlation of borders as a top priority to its citizenry. So much so that on November 9, 2015, Avramopoulos states: "As you know, securing the EU's external borders is one of the four pillars of the European Agenda on Migration" (European Commission 2015i). Throughout many of the speeches from the EC, there seems to run a particular storyline, with little divergence, when it comes to borders. Exemplified by Moscovici, when he states: "We also need to learn to think 'European' in terms of security, both internal and external" (European Commission 2017b). Borders are commonly referred to by the EC in this binary manner, internal and external, which also relates to matters of inclusion and exclusion.

4.7.1 Internal borders and freedom of movement

This is also exemplarily when during a speech to the committee on federal and European affairs on April 26, 2016, Commissioner Avramopoulos stated:

> "I am grateful for the invitation to meet with you today to have a discussion on the latest developments in the area of migration as well as security. These are pressing global issues. But as their impact is felt so acutely by our citizens, they are justifiably at the top of the

political agenda at national, regional and local level […] Temporary border controls are possible under certain conditions and Germany like other Member States has reintroduced them temporarily for obvious reasons. However, border controls are no long-term solution. And they cost us far too much as you know. Not just economically, but also – if not more- socially. Internal free movement is one of our greatest achievements; it is the backbone what we are as a European Union" (European Commission 2016e).

When speaking of internal, as in the above context, it is generally seen as a restriction and associated with negative cogitations of being financial and social hindrances to their communities. Here Avramopoulos specifically refers to borders hindering the internal free movement of its citizens, which is seen as "one of the greatest achievements" of the EU project. He also uses the free movement of people as a form of an identity marker when he states, "it is the backbone what we are as a European Union." This may be since the freedom of movement seems to be based on two values, equality, and freedom. These values are seen by the EC to form common bonds for EU citizens as well as enhancing individual autonomy. The concept, freedom of movement, is perceived by impartialist to be a right given based on freedom while at the same time being non-discriminate, belonging to the whole community. This is evident in the form in which this particular right is restricted or taken away from those who are incarcerated. And also, when it is given to all citizens in a specific state territory, providing them access to social and economic equality. If seen in this light, Avramoloupos may be referring to internal borders having a heavy social cost since the confinement of internal borders would impact the EU's societal values, freedoms, and economy. He would later go on to state:

 "Of course, an internal area without border implies that we are successful at reinforcing our external borders. That is why we need to regain control of our external borders and ensure that they are managed better. As you know we have been very active to achieve this goal. We proposed a European Border and Coast Guard, which will be crucial in this respect. It will help to re-establish the condition for lifting internal border controls but also to manage migration more effectively and to prevent security threats. A genuine European solution to the problems we are facing" (European Commission 2016e).

While the freedom of movement is seen as a great accomplishment for the EU, it is not a particular right given impartially to those outside its community. In fact, it is regularly referred to by the EC as a privilege only for its citizens and something that must be fiercely guarded against outsiders by protecting its external borders. Avramopoulos, in his statement, sees the pressures that immigration is putting on states, thereby making it a top of the political agenda. Migration is often seen in this manner by the EC, and one of the reasons for that is the tension it puts on internal borders. Discriminately restricting the freedom of movement to outsiders would lend to the partial view to protect the particular interest of its citizens above and beyond those who are less fortunate. This is particularly true since most of the forced migration that is taking place is from impoverished, less fortunate countries. Impartialist compare this discrimination to a modern form of feudalism that benefits and protects a particular way of life of a more privileged social class. This may be why Avramopoulos stated that migration and security are pressing global issues that are impacting the EU's citizens on a national, regional and local level and why having internal free movement of people the EU needs stronger, smarter borders. Which bring us to our next topic, that of external borders.

4.7.2. External borders

Closely related to internal borders is that of external borders. There seems to be a strong association when one or the other is mentioned by the EC. One reason for this is mentioned explicitly by Avramopoulos when he stated:

> "of course, an internal area without borders implies that we are successful at reinforcing our external borders" (European Commission 2016e).

In this specific instance, external borders are referenced in providing internal security. Security thus can be seen as a strong legitimating factor for borders and is often the number one contributing reason for their existence. When the EC speaks of borders providing security, this can pertain to a variety of different things from safety to identity. Security, however, is not the only objective of external borders. Throughout the speeches of the EC references to borders as a source of managing the flow of migration are often made, as seen when Avramopoulos explicitly states borders are to: "manage migration more effectively" (European Commission 2016e). This becomes relevant

since a major ethical concern of impartialist is the lack of accessible paths for refugees to a given territory. The EC has made it a point to address the need for legal pathways for asylum seekers to stop taking high-risk illegal journeys. Thus, borders as a means to exclude outsiders is extremely significant as is their means of justifying borders. A closer examination of borders used in the context of providing safety and controlling migration will be explored. First, I will review the instances when the EC refers to security as a means of providing physical safety, safeguarding the communities' territory, identity, and way of life.

4.7.3 Security

On the issue of borders as a means of providing safety, it is essential to have an understanding that the formation of states is a way for communities to offer self-preservation and protection. States were formed by collective groups of people for the specific reason of security. One particular instance where this exemplarily is given by Avramopoulos during the same speech when addressing the issue of security;

> "Member States are of course responsible for ensuring the security of their citizens- that is clear and beyond any doubt. But it is equally clear that the threats Europe faces today go beyond national security […] The internal security of one Member State is the internal security of the whole Union" (European Commission 2016b).

Much of the success of the state agency is due to its ability to safeguard its territory and offer safety to its citizens. Borders offer safety to insiders as well as keep away outsiders. While states have grown into more than just a means of providing its citizen's safety, this does not presuppose its initial and arguably primary focus, security. Borders offer protection by acting as a means of keeping away outsiders from the homeland and thus act as a means of justification. While some borders may be physical in nature borders presuppose that they are managed by certain authoritative agencies such as states who can exercise authority and force to keep away those who are not allowed access to a state's territory. Thus, giving assurances that the citizens within the territory are safe. This is what is meant by Avramopoulos when he declared that states are responsible for ensuring security for their citizens and while in this specific instance's safety is not

mentioned it is often highly associated with borders offering security. For instance, President Juncker, when speaking of migration and refugees in the state of the Union address in 2016, stated:

"Tolerance cannot come at the price of our security. We need to know who is crossing our borders. We will defend our borders with the new European Border and Coast Guard. We will defend our borders with strict controls on everyone crossing them" (European Commission 2016f).

This is an exemplary use of borders as a means of offering their citizens security. In this context, as is the norm for many of the EC speeches, the protection of borders is not only provided by states but also by the EU. It would thus appear the EC is pushing for the supranational agency of the EU as a more effective means of offering what the primary function of a state does, security. In fact, this is often mentioned in many of their speeches. President Juncker often claims that more "Europe" is needed in the EU and that no state can face the refugee crisis alone. This will be later addressed when the topic of solidarity is reviewed for now it is important to note that the EC is pushing the agenda of supranationalism as a better means to address the refugee crisis and in doing so, it is particularistic in giving preference to their citizens. On February 15, 2017, Moscovici echoes his sentiments when he states:

"If we want a more political Europe, we need three things: a Europe that better protects its citizens; a Europe that both more political and more democratic; and a Europe that delivers real economic dynamism" (European Commission 2017b).

This is also evident when the Timmermans states:

"Security is one of the major concerns of Europe's citizens. Today the Commission is proposing practical measure to upgrade information exchange-essential to fighting terrorism – and to secure our Union's external borders and strengthen control over who enters and leaves the EU. These measures will require closer coordination and cooperation within the EU and between Member States" (European Commission 2016k).

Here the reference is made to the concerns of citizens on the issue of security is made, and again, the solution is for the supranational agency of the EU. In this specific context, there is no reference to migration rather to terrorism that maybe since the EC is very conscience of making little to no reference correlating the two issues if one of two subjects come up. They have gone to great lengths to avoid this stating in one instance that "(i)n our collective effort to fight radicalization we must, by all means, avoid stigmatizing any community, ethnicity, or origin- whether they are Muslims, refugees, or migrants" (European Commission 2015m). There are, however, rare instances when the two are associated. On the topic of borders, security, migration, and terrorism Avramopoulos stated:

> "By strengthening our external borders, we will be better prepared for facing severe migratory challenges. Enhancing the exchange of information will enable us to fight terrorism more effectively. To ensure Europe's security, we need both strong borders and smart intelligence" (European Commission 2016k).

In another instance he would draw strong parallels between refugees, terrorism and safety, yet state the phenomenon of terrorism is distinct from the phenomenon of refugees, when he states:

> "We are here today, in the midst of both a migration and security crisis. As you all know, migration is not a new phenomenon. It is as old as mankind's history. –if we remember the refugee waves in Europe after the Second World War and the Yugoslav break-up. In parallel, we have also unfortunately experienced various terrorist attacks of different natures for several decades now already [..] Because, while we can argue that migration and terrorism-which are very distinct-are not a new phenomenon, they impact the lives of all of us [..] We are not weakened by the arrivals of vulnerable people seeking protection. We are also not weakened by terrorist attacks [..] In one year, the European Union has made enormous progress in both managing the refugee crisis abut also better cooperating to fight terrorism [..] But let me assure you that Europe has the strength to face these challenges by providing solutions to the complex issues of migration and security" (European Commission 2016j).

He would later go on to describe specific "concrete steps towards establishing an effective Security Union." Here, as in many other instances, a call for stronger borders is needed to provide security for their community, and it is best accomplished through the supranational agency of the EU. In the same manner that partialist see the primary function of the state is for the betterment of their population, so it would appear that the EC believes the same for the supranational agency of the EU.

4.7.4 Protecting a way of life

Security thus also plays a vital role in protecting a specific way of life and identity. We have already addressed some of these issues when discussing how partialist view their identity is at stake through migration; however, we will now see how the EC uses external borders as protecting a specific way of life. In a speech at "Future force conference" on February 2017, Timmermans states:

> "Europe is the Member States, the people, the citizens of Europe. It is an ecosystem made up of many different languages, cultures and traditions. Despite our differences, we work together based on our shared values. Values like democracy. Freedom. The rule of law. Fundamental values are the answer to basic questions. Like why do we need defense? Why do we need security? To be safe, of course, from threats. Military threats. Terrorist threats. Ultimately, this is about protection. But then- what do we want to keep safe? Our loved ones, of course. But beyond that, our way of life. Our open society, our democracy, our rule of law. And our freedom[..] So, again why do we need defense? We need it to protect our fundamental values of freedom and democracy. Otherwise, what's the use? Make no mistake: if our morale falters, military security will not help us. We also need the political will to protect our way of life. So, it is not enough to sit and gripe. It is time to act. All of us must fight for our way of life, our freedoms and values." (European Commission 2017c).

It is clear that here, Timmermans is advocating for the protection of the community's way of life and values, as we have seen values are important since they are a means for common community bonds by impartialist. This would suggest that he is advocating for a specific way of life that

favors and benefits EU citizens. In the State of the Union address in 2016, President Juncker made a strong case for Europe acting as a preserver of the European way of life. He stated: "The next twelve months are the crucial time to deliver a better Europe; a Europe that protects; a Europe that preserves the European way of life; a Europe that empowers our citizens; a Europe that defends at home and abroad; and a Europe that takes responsibility" (European Commission 2016f). In a similar fashion to Timmermans he would go on to state: "An integral part of our European way of life is our values. The values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law. Values fought for on battlefields and soapboxes over centuries" (European Commission 2016f). These two instances are the norm for the EC in making the correlation between the European way of life and values, and although at first, they are very particularistic, they hold notions of being impartial given values are a means of inclusion and social cohesion of outsiders.

4.7.5 Guarding territory

The notion of states being protectors of communities would also suggest that states governed territorial pieces of lands since communities also needed spatial grounds for living and flourishing. Since states have developed over time to become the primary agent in international order, then this has also come to mean that there is no room for individuals to live in neutral spatial grounds. Except for in extremely rare cases, people must belong to a state and occupy some of its territory. Partialist suppose that territorial space is necessary for a community to express its shared way of living while at the same time flourish through the states socio-economic benefits. Similarly, the EC has stated that one of their concerns is to safeguard their territory. In a speech given by Avramopoulos on a new agenda on migration on March 4, 2015, he stated:

> "Today's orientation debate marks an important step that we have taken to build a new narrative for a European migration policy that protects vulnerable migrants, safeguards our territory and is a driver for growth" (European Commission 2015j).

Here the protection of EU territory is part of the new migration policy being advocated by the EC. This may be since partialist have come to see spatial territory as representative of their homeland, which is entwined with their national shared history. For partialist, their homeland becomes vital to form community bonds and national pride when they see it as part of their ancestral myth, which

also helps shape their identity. In fact, because partialist see the states' territory as their homeland lends to their justification in protecting it. It is interesting to note that the EC often refers to the EU's shared history and past as a common bond that characterizes their community. There is no doubt that this shared history takes place in a specific territory, Europe, hence the need to recall its memory. This is also characteristic of partialist ideologies; however, when the EC uses it, it is to remind their European audience to exercise compassion towards refugees.

4.7.6 Migration control- restoring order

The EC addresses the issue of migration control in two manners. First, they see that the control of borders as necessary for the politics of public opinion and secondly for restoring the confidence of its citizens. When addressing this particular issue First vice-president Timmermans at 'Prague European Summit' Conference on November 13, 2015, stated:

> "I've been accused of being very tough on this as far as people who don't have the right of asylum are concerned. But that is because if we are not tough on those who don't have the right of asylum and if we are not more efficient in returning them where they came from, the right of asylum will crumble for those who need it. That has to be a principle. The European public will not support an asylum policy that is unable to distinguish between those who have the right of asylum and those who don't" (European Commission 2015k).

Here Timmermans is addressing the issue of gaining control of irregular migration in order to gain the support of the European public. In order to not produce a political and social backlash, it is of vital importance to gain the approval of citizens concerning refugee policies. Since states and the EU are vying for citizenry approval, the politics of refugee seeking is of great significance. While in this specific context, the issue of borders is not mentioned; it is with great frequency that the EC directly associates the issue of border management with the control of migration. As an example of this Timmermans on January 13, 2016 states: "The refugee crisis remains a daunting challenge for Europe [..] let's be very honest- 2016 starting with the next weeks and months, must be dedicated to delivering clear results in terms of gaining control of flows and of our borders" (European Commission 2016g). I have also previously used data to support the claim of borders as a means to control migration; what is specific to this context is how the perceived notion of

order is necessary for public acceptance. To this end and much more Moscovici, at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens on February 15, 2017, stated:

"I would like to talk to you today about how I interpret, and how to respond, to the populist tsunami that is rumbling across the West […] But what is driving this backlash? The fact is that a growing part of our populations consider themselves the losers of globalization. They feel they are at a dead-end economically, socially, and thus politically. They have lost trust in the existing systems, and are seeking new ways to express their frustrations, and new leaders who they hope will champion their interest. They want radical change, and they do not believe it can come from an establishment they see as detached from reality, geographically and socially distant from them, and indifferent to inequality. There are of course many facets to this situation, many specific national or local aspects with in international trend. There is no one-size-fits-all response, and no silver bullet that can burst the populist bubble. I certainly do not have all the answers, but I do have several ideas for how the European Union, and the eurozone in particular, can respond to this challenge [...] we need to respond to Europe's challenges   and the demands of our citizens. We need to fight the populists and Euroscepticism with vigor and with ideas [..] we need three things: a Europe that better protects its citizens; a Europe that is both more political and more democratic; and a Europe that delivers real economic dynamism [...] Europe must show that is able to protect not only its own people, but also those fleeing from war and persecution. There is no contradiction between keeping an open mind and heart for those fleeing persecution elsewhere, and the need to secure our external borders, which is a key condition for Europeans to accept the absence of internal borders […] I know that the inefficiencies and complexities of the current situation are a key driver of the urge to 'take back control'. Nations states are portrayed as the only political vehicle able to provide efficient action, democratic acceptability and control of one's own destiny. This is a mirage: but it is a politically bankable one. So, we have to find a way to strengthen the political contract- and the political contact- between Europe and its citizens" (European Commission 2017b).

Moscivici interpretation of the "populist tsunami" is based partly on their citizenry's loss of trust in the institution of the EC possibly brought about by lack of taking their citizens interest which he details as a lack of providing a sense of protection.   In an attempt to quench the fears of citizens being anti-institutional, the EC attempts to provide an alternative solution to the populism answer of national borders. The alternative is a supranational means of managing European borders, thus providing the sense of control that is needed for the trust of citizens to be restored in the EU. This is especially true since there is the perceived notion that refugees are a threat to the local community's well-being, however as demonstrated in the above context, the commissioner sees no conflict with helping refugees and protecting their community. One of the most pertinent manners of addressing the issue of migration control as well as security, is the management of borders for the EC.

4.8 Responses from the European Commission

A recurrent theme addressed by the EC was how the current refugee crisis revealed weaknesses in the Union's migration policies. A major response from the EC to handle this exposed weakness was relocation and resettlement schemes. In order for this to be successful, the EC called for a "fair sharing" of relocating refugees through its territory based on what appears to be a low-cost equation. This plan, however, is highly contingent on one thing, solidarity. Relocation schemes are particularly needed for supranational agencies to survive when a perceived mass migration crisis is apparent. This became one of the significant reformations the EC has made to their migration policies. What made resettlement and relocation schemes particularly attractive is it allows a state to better plan as well as negate the risk factor. This also helps to avoid a political backlash in that they help in predetermining a more precise calculation of cost when the number of refugees is known. It additionally gave the perception of having control over the situation. This made the EC strong advocates for solidarity, which was regularly referred to by the EC. The push for solidarity also reveals the EC's political agenda in supranationalism and how it effects their ethical positioning of showing partialism since it is advocated for on self-interest. Consequently, the proceeding section looks into first, the comprehensive approach the EC took and its resemblance to the humanitarian principle of helping refugees as long as the cost is low as well as the EC's strong appeal for solidarity.

4.8.1 Comprehensive approach

Several factors need to be taken into account for a state's absorptive capacity to take in refugees. Humanitarianism offers principles for equating a low cost rather than a codified doctrine or an exhaustive list. Taking this flexibility into account, it would appear the EC has formulated an equation for determining what the low cost based on; population, GDP, the number of asylum applications, and the unemployment rate.   In a speech presentation of the European Agenda on Migration on May 13, 2015, Avramopoulos stated:

> "The Agenda responds concretely to the immediate need to save lives and assists frontline countries with bold actions. This is not about opening or closing borders, because both are unrealistic. Capitalizing on our experience, we are responding to citizens' concerns with a comprehensive approach [..]For implementing relocation and resettlement, we have developed a distribution key based on objective, quantifiable and verifiable criteria. These criteria are: the size of the population and the total GDP, the number of asylum applications and persons already resettled, and the unemployment rate" (European Commission 2015l).

Furthermore, it would appear that Avramopoulos is addressing both the ideologies of impartialism and partialism by stating that opening or closing borders are both unrealistic. He then proceeds to state that the EC is responding to the concerns of citizens while at the same time taking a comprehensive approach. I have extensively covered how citizens play a paramount role in the ideologies of partialism, and as we have seen, the concerns of citizens are also at the forefront of the EC's agenda. While it would be highly impractical that governing agencies would or could ignore their communities, there is evidence the EC is attempting to take an ethical approach to address the needs of refugees. This is apparent in what they term "a comprehensive approach" to migration. It would appear when addressing the concerns of migration, prominence is given to the issue of forced or irregular migration. This may be the case since there is a high probability that a great influx of an unforeseen group of highly culturally different migrants can cause societal interruption. This has been the perceived notion in regard to the refugee phenomenon. To this end, the EC has responded with a comprehensive approach. Since this response is crucial, it is worth noting what is meant by a comprehensive approach.

Being aware of the inherent complexities of migration, the EC sought to address the immediate imperative of protecting migrants in need who were risking their lives in attempting reach the shores of Europe. Juncker on October 13, 2016, stated: "During the first year of the refugee crisis, we proposed and implemented a comprehensive migration agenda: saving lives at sea, providing humanitarian aid, supporting our Member States most under strain, relocating asylum seeker across the Union and returning irregular migrants" (European Commission 2016h). It would appear that this comprehensive approach outlined by Juncker tackles issues of prevention so that humanitarian involvement coincides with addressing root causes as well addressing issues of human rights. Understanding that this initial step was crucial, there also needed to be a long-term solution to the question of current weaknesses in the policies of the current migration system. The comprehensive approach took on humanitarian principles that saw the need to protect refugees based on their human worthwhile at the same time working within the confines of sovereign states and their autonomous communities. The previous section on the EC's framework on the role of the state and their institution, revealed the limitations of the EC's ethical implementation of refugee policy. Their comprehensive approach is exemplary of effectively implementing their ethical and legal duty while taking into consideration the function of the member-states and their own agency. The also led to the idea that the root causes of migration required assisting third countries since "the impact of global poverty and conflict do not end at national frontiers." The EC advocated for Europe to be a haven for the persecuted while at the same time securing their borders. Furthermore, the EC's proposals towards a comprehensive approach offers a framework in which they explicitly state their confidence towards bringing "tangible benefits for the refugees themselves, for the social cohesion of our societies. Addressing root causes of irregular migration is a great challenge which development cooperation can effectively address" (European Commission 2016l).

4.8.2 Solidarity

In order to create the right conditions for a prosperous Europe and keeping their values of societal cohesion, European solidarity was required. The EC's proposals were clear:

"We need to restore confidence in our ability to bring European and national efforts to address migration, to meet our international and ethical obligations and to work together

in an effective way, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility. No Member State can effectively address migration alone. It is clear that we need a new, more European approach" (European Commission 2015o).

The EC called the EU to meet their ethical and international obligations while still addressing the needs of their citizens. This, however, could only be accomplished through solidarity and shared responsibility. Solidarity is often associated with the with taking a comprehensive approach to migration by the EC.

Throughout the speeches given by the EC, there are often appeals for solidarity. Solidarity is seen as a vital moral virtue when President Juncker on April 15, 2016, states: "Today, Europe faces its greatest refugee crisis since the Second World War. This crisis is testing our values, and it is testing our will. And it is reminding us that solidarity is not only a moral virtue but an essential part of our European Union" (European Commission 2016i). Here Juncker makes an appeal to solidarity from a common shared European history, which representative of how the EC uses solidarity; as a community marker. Again, this is evident when Commissioner Christos states: "Solidarity is the foundation of our Union. Let us recall our common past. And our shared humanity. And let us never forget that: solidarity has built lasting peace in Europe" (European Commission 2016n).

To elaborate more on the issue of solidarity by the EC president Juncker stated:

> "Solidarity is a vital part of our shared project. No, it cannot be forced, it can only come from the heart. But our Member States need to understand that this is not only a moral question. This is about our ability to function. In a connected world, to share responsibility and resources is to promote our own interests. And when we need to share our sovereignty, we should do so. If we want to travel freely across our internal borders, we need to secure our external border. This is a shared responsibility that demands European tools" (European Commission 2016h).

Many of the matters spoken of here have already been addressed. What is of particular interest now is the ambiguous relationship the EC has with the moral claims of refugees and their personal self-interest. Raising the issue of shared responsibility and cooperation between states is complicated, and while they have spelled the formula of how to distribute the resettlement of refugees, the greatest obstacle becomes the willingness of states to do what is fair even at the cost of self-interest. There hardly comes a point when a democratic state can morally claim that it has done enough to help refugees. On November 13, 2015, Timmermans stated:

> "On Solidarity, there is no solidarity that does not have a core of self-interest in it. Be it because you believe in God, and the rewards of heaven, or be it because you believe that if you show solidarity now with others then they will show solidarity with you when you need it, both are for self-interest. This principle is challenged in our Member States, in the middle classes who for the first time in a long, long time are no longer sure that their children will be better off than they are today. This is a paradigm change in many European societies. If you believe that your children might be worse off, if you believe that the development of politics, of society, is a development that leads to loss of you, you will try to protect everything you have. And the call for your solidarity will be interpreted by you as a further element of loss rather than an element of gain. If we don't get European society to move away from that position, the call for solidarity will be very hollow and will not be answered. As politicians we must understand that if we ask for solidarity, it will only be given when people understand that it is in their self-interest to show solidarity. If we don't understand that concept, we will sound nice when we ask for solidarity, but we will not get it. So, the first responsibility in this crisis is to show to everyone around the European Union that first of all the refugee crisis can only be managed at a global and European level" (European Commission 2015k).

While in many cases the EC uses solidarity in reference to their thin formation of universal values to form social cohesion and transnational cooperation, it here refers to it as a matter of self-interest. The reference to solidarity in this manner is quite unique and is an exception to how they usually would address the issue. While the use of the term here aligns itself with the classical view that in order for solidarity to materialize and thrive a sense of societal community is necessary so that

there is the sense of belonging and empathy is shown towards a common struggle for the greater good. Here in an appeal to the European societal community Timmermans ask for solidarity on the basis of self-interest which can be seen as a sense of belonging since the effects are felt by all making what he calls the "refugee crisis" their common struggle by which their "responsibility" is solidarity for their greater good.

I conclude this chapter with a brief overview of the data. The EC takes a strong political stance in helping refugees vis-à-vis their humanity appealing to the liberal values of member-states for the social cohesion into national communities. However, a closer examination of the EC's framework regarding their supranational and member-state agency reveals their construct in which they provide their citizenry with spatial territory for their communities flourishing, safety and protection. Taking these limitations into account they take a comprehensive approach that appears to parallel with the principles of humanitarianism. The following chapter elaborates on these issues from the perception of the researcher where I discuss which ethical stances the EC has taken and what they reveal.

5. Discussion

The subsequent chapter discusses what was discovered in the data, what it means, and if the objective of the thesis were met. I aim to accomplish this by comparing the main findings from the analysis of the previous chapter with the literature and framework of chapter three and critically evaluate if those theoretical arguments are the best methods for implementation. Additionally, I discuss the main issues that emerged from my analysis and offer an alternative interpretation of the data. In Chapter Two, I set out to introduce the different methods applied throughout this thesis with the objective of answering the research question:

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

In accomplishing this task, I turn to the ideologies and thoughts of the expert in this particular field by reviewing the various literature on matters regarding the politics and ethics of refugees. This led me to construct an analytical framework from which I analyze the political speeches and statements given by various actors in the EC. In doing so, I aim to accomplish the objective of determining what values are represented in the institution. In my analysis, chapter four, I shift my focus from reviewing the views of experts and begin to examine the perspective of the participants. The examination of both the experts and participants has now led me to discuss the findings in which my voice as the researcher is given attention.

I divide the following chapter into two main parts. I discuss what the analysis revealed and what it means to interpret the data, how the data and literature interact, and present the findings. Subsequently, I identify the EC's ethical positioning, and what it means in comparison with the theoretical ethical reasoning found in the literature. In the first section, I compare the ethical theories of impartialism, partialism, and humanitarianism with the data. I aim to first, capture and frame the political atmosphere of the refugee phenomenon, which reveals the significance of local politics and the emphasis of influence by the EC to regain control of a perceived crisis. In pushing forward their political agenda, the EC focuses their efforts against populism, a contending ideology that threatens the legitimacy and authority of the EU's supranational institution. This is important since this would appear to affect the construct of their ethical framework. In this section, I also

expound on the moral reasoning for impartialism, a universal normative ethical standard. Second, in order to fulfill their legal and moral obligation, the EC demonstrates to take what would appear to be an impartial approach towards refugees. This universal framework is revealed through the examination of human rights, identity, values as community bonds, and citizenship. Third, I intend to demonstrate how the EC as a supranational institution must work within the constraints of the current political system of states, thereby limiting their scope of impartialism. This leads to a partial standing, which is further compounded by the innate nature of supranationalism that tends to favor the interest of their represented population. This section expounds on the partialist parallels found in states and supranationalism by examining their relationship to its citizens as well as their formation and flourishing. Fourth, I expound how the previous two points converge into leading the EC to take a moderate position that would appear to adhere to the principles of humanitarianism.

In the second section, I critically evaluate both the literature as well as the EC's ethical positioning. Here I also consider an alternative interpretation of the data and justify how the emergent themes of religion and a strong emphasis on the local politics of populism have led to this conclusion. Having identified their ethical stance, I begin to evaluate the EC's ethical justification critically. After a closer examination, I determine an alternative positioning may better describe the EC's ethical positioning. I discuss the difficulties found at both ends of the impartiality and partiality spectrum. This leads to a critical view of the positioning the EC has taken. I argue that although this ultimately leaves their ethical stance on the partialist side of the continuum, this may not be the optimal means of evaluating their ethical framework rather they should be seen in the light of limiting the universal scope of Liberalism. Although Liberalism is an optimal choice for ethical choices, it still presents unique problems. It is here that I discuss some of the general patterns with Liberalism and the emergent theme of religion. Lastly, I conclude by determining how this ethical stance reveals the values of the institution and offer solutions on moving forward with the ethics and politics of the refugee phenomenon.

5.1 Political atmosphere

First, I take to examine how the EC perceived the refugee phenomenon. The EC in many instances, refers to the refugee phenomenon as "a major challenge for Europe," even referring to it as "the biggest we (Europe) have ever faced" (Europe Commission 2015p) This may be due to the

perceived social disruption and instability caused by the massive migration of refugees who are, in many cases, distinctly different from the majority native population. These negative connotations are likewise suggested by the EC in the manner in which they offer solutions by attempting to regain control. These attempts are manifested in various forms; from the need to control borders to addressing the concerns of citizens over their loss of identity. What is consistent, however, is the perception of instability. This may give reason to why it is commonly referred to as the "refugee crisis." Likewise, the notion of a crisis is strongly correlated with its perception of imminence, which would lead one to conclude that refugees have the right to access states and their communities. If refugees would not have admittance to a territory and host community, which may result in unsteadiness, then there would be no crisis. However, it is precisely because they do have rights of protection that the refugee phenomenon is portrayed in this manner, thus further qualifying the term "refugee crisis." Furthermore, the right of refugees is legitimized through their legal and ethical implications. The ethical conduct, or rather the lack thereof, of European states during WWII caused the legal implementation of refugee protection. Thus, the legal rights of refugees appear to be birth from the concept of a moral understanding of human rights. The data reflected the EC's ethical framework of human rights to be the basis for their legal and ethical obligation towards refugees. Conversely, this frames the dilemma of the refugee phenomenon; the legal and ethical responsibility of states to offer protection to the mass migration of refugees who are perceived by some as a distinctive group and as such may expedite the undesired metamorphosis of the host society.

Second, an analysis of the EC's construct of politics is best portrayed through the framework of influence and the influential (Lasswell 1936: p.309), which is an exercise of authority and power over certain matters and subjects. The EC's framework of politics as the public and authoritative decisions human communities take through a system, institution or representative agency are perceived as innately social (Almond, Powell, Strøm, and Dalton 2004:1-2). Both the literature and data revealed politics as activity specific to the notion of 'citizen' revolving not around a single person but a community (Minogue 2000, p.9). Consequently, the framework of politics as an innately social and authoritative would suggest citizen are the paramount focal point of its activities. Additionally, the EC's rhetoric indicates a firm intent to exercise authority over states in regard to refugee policies, thus echoing the political framework of authority and influence it would have over citizens. This is further demonstrated through their frequent discourse on politics in their

contention over their legitimacy with competing ideologies. If politics is held as the notion of authority and influence similarly, it is a means to construct social and political standards for accepting refugees for their communities. This frames the context and content to why the EC has chosen to advocate the political side of their institution strongly.

Third, the politics of the refugee phenomenon centers around the main ideological themes that both threaten and strengthen the institutional legitimacy and survival of the EU. The EC's politics of vying for legitimate power against populism portrays an underlining struggle for the affection, attention, and devotion of EU citizens towards certain institutional agencies. The analysis demonstrates how political actors within the EU are using the fears of citizens to gain popularity and propose policies that are detrimental to what the EC considers the EU project. The EU project is mainly characterized as the federation of member states expressed through supranationalism and the benefits therein. Thus, when the local politics of states are poised through populist/nationalist movements to exercise their sovereignty and reclaim autonomy, the EC perceives this as a viable and imminent threat to its institutional existence and takes a strong counter-position thereby revealing how local politics have influenced their ethical stances. Consequently, it is vital to examine what the data revealed about these competing partialist ideologies, mainly that of right-wing populist movements as well as the moral, ethical arguments against partialism.

5.2 Contending ideologies

5.2.1 Populism

Paramount to the political ideologies that both threaten and strengthen the EC's supranational institution is the framework that constitutes identity formation. Both the literature review and data revealed identity as a means of unity, which focalizes its members to encourage loyalty, devotion, and dependability to the community and state. It accomplishes this by connecting past and future generations with common bonds of affection, duty, and interest. Thus, when the national identity of member-states is threatened by the mass migration of refugees, it produces fear from outsiders who are presumed to induce social disruption and instability. This sense of communal turmoil was commonly accompanied by a loss of confidence in the political systems and agents, often referred to as the elite, which they felt were responsible. This coincides with the anti-institutional politics of populism that seeks to focus its political agendas against immigration, thereby rejecting

Europe's liberal agendas which seek to help minorities. Moreover, the issues of identity, anti-institutionalism, the elites, were compounded with the association of the religious identity attributed to refugees. In their defense of liberal values of freedom of religion, non-discrimination, and equality, the EC recognized and characterized refugees by their religious identity. These liberal values also acted as a means of social cohesion, both within and among EU societies towards outsiders. Populist in a similar fashion used religion as an identity; however, in the process, they have "highjacked" religion, separating it from its moral and faith associations and applying it for identity politics. Populists used this dichotomy in pushing forward their agenda of the good homogenous Christian communities of the West and bad Muslim outsiders (Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016).

This framework is further strengthened when many right-wing nationalists and populist in Europe emphasis ethnicity, religion, and culture as the basis of their identity and community formation. Furthermore, this leads partialist to make a plausible defense for the ethical and moral justification of excluding outsiders from their community, when emphasizing the importance of culture within human value. Partialist see states as the ultimate will and representative of this cultural community; accordingly, when states hold strict policies, they are justified since the cultural community wills it so and points to cultural relativism as being ethically subjective. This forms the interdependent relationship of nation and state have come to forge the modern nation-state.

Furthermore, partialist make a morally compelling argument, seeing ethical subjectivism as a legitimate means against a normative standard approach of impartialism since there is no objective right or wrong rather that one's moral attitude is based on sentiments, not facts. Cultural relativism holds that there are no universal truths; rather truth is subject to culture and in the same vein, so is moral understandings. No one can judge what is right or wrong since standards are culture-bound and "(m)orality differs in every society and is a convenient term for socially approved habits" (Benedict in Rachels and Rachels 2012, p.14).

5.2.2 Impartialism- normative ethical standards

The modern nation-state in its particularistic form, however, seems to be at odds with the normative ethical standard of impartialism and appears at times to struggle with the ever-changing globalized world. To hold moral force, some impartialist believes that states should keep to a

normative ethical stance when it comes to immigration policy and should not favor the socio-economic and political request of only its constituents so as only to allow those who will help the state benefit. The cost and benefit of all effected, both citizens and foreigners should be taken into immigration policies. However, partialist will take up the issue that impartialism has the difficulty of producing a normative ethical standard since there appears to be an immense difference in the moral association between domestic and international affairs. The obstacle of cultural pluralism additionally gives room to moral subjectiveness, thus adding to the partialist case. Impartialist recognizes the problem that applying ethics to political theory is a struggle from within and a solution to universal impartiality and equality is to take the impersonal stance. From a personal standpoint, individuals will find it hard to reconcile realistic good morals with social and political institutions and policies (Nagel 1991, p.5). This impersonal stance is thus the ultimate basis for impartialism.

Impartialist argue that there seems to be a rather vigorous selective process when it comes to ethical matters so that states which exhibit partialist ideologies pick and choose certain aspects. This is especially true when states tend to want to engage in issues which appear more ethical and select only pieces of issues that are manageable rather than seeing the whole moral problem. It would be highly problematic even for partialist to disagree with the unfair, inhumane treatment of refugees, either by external or internal factors. What seems ambiguous for partialist is how morality only seems applicable in one's territory. This does not mean that an act is less atrocious, nor does it become legitimate if committed in another state. Impartialist would hold that the condemnation, killing, and torturing people for the difference in politics, gender, race, religion, or ethnicity should be the same in any and every country. Justice demands that there be no discrimination and thus requires impartiality. This is particularly so regarding the actions that call for moral duty and obligation when issues of justice and rights pertain. Rights also presuppose the notion of responsibility. If there is a claimant of rights, then likewise there is the duty of one to provide or meet those rights. This also goes to legitimizing the right for it is only real to the extent that it can be claimed. This, however, would suggest that there is an agreement on the right being advocated (van Hooft 2009, pp.57-60). However, partialist hold different standards for those outside of its community and do so on the right of self-determination and the autonomy of their nation-state.

One way that impartialism address the issue of moral subjectiveness and cultural relativeness is to see that morality is concerned with "what ought to be, not with what is" thus only needing minimal common underlining irrespective of culture (Amstutz 2013, p.16). Impartialist see this already taking place when the common systems of laws by states share in common four distinct features; "they were used to express a special class of *moral concerns*, namely ones that are among the most *weighty* of all as well as *unrestricted* and *broadly sharable*" (Pogge 2008, pp.58-60). For this to be more effective and accepted, one has to detach normative moral standards from a particular culture and religion.

Given that there appears to be legitimate rationale on both ends of the dichotomous impartialism and partialism spectrum. In the subsequent section, I set out to answer the morally compelling question of practicality; is it possible for institutional agencies to be impartial regardless of their allegiance to their communities?

5.3 Determining the EC's ethical positioning

Having established the political atmosphere, social significance, and ideologies in contention with the refugee phenomenon, I now discuss what the analysis revealed about the ethical stances of the EC and what it means; how to interpret the data, how the data and literature interact, and present the findings in comparison with the theoretical ethical reasoning found in the literature. My aim in this section is to describe the ethical framework of the EC.

5.3.1 Impartial construct

One narrative on the EC's ethical framework appears to be consistent with impartialism, which portrays morality as grounded in universal, unchanging norms that are validated based on people being mere human beings. The EC as political actors advocated for a paradigm shift in the way refugees and asylum seekers are portrayed, engaging in the public affirmation of their humanity by appealing to their moral worth and dignity. In doing so, the EC contest the deleterious stigmatization of refugees. Additionally, the EC appeals to the duty and commitment of their communities to uphold their moral and legal obligation of assisting refugees, which is based on the liberal social construct of equality of rights, justice, and benevolence. The EC makes emphatic petitions against dehumanizing refugees since this would allow the "idealized heartland" of partial communities to create sharp dichotomous views and distinctions between them and the perceived

threat of "dangerous outsiders" which consequently, vilifies refugees and allows the host community to be seen as the savior and rightful sovereign to the woeful problems brought about by the established political system.

In the EC's efforts to combat populist rhetoric and establish a sense of control to the perceived crisis they push forward their agenda for a supranational approach based on an impartial understanding of social cohesion and community bonds found in democratic values and civil connections. Holding to this thin view of community formation allows "outsiders" access to host communities by becoming citizens and permits for more diverse convictions for pluralistic societies to form and practice diverse ways of life. The allegiance to civil laws and democratic principles nullifies the thick formation of identity and community ties based on imagined narratives constructed on myths of religion, ethnicity, or blood; and may give reason to why the rule of law is believed to be one of the pillars in European society. Impartialism seeks to abolish community distinctions nullifying the exclusive allegiance for compatriots and undertakes this arduous task my socially constructing its own account of social cohesion of community bonds with its own narrative on identity-based on universal values. Among other things the EC's responses produced parallels with the framework of impartialist which see;

a) Commonalities from people vis-à-vis their humanity and not for their socio-economic, political association, religious practice, ethnicity, or nationality.

b) A grounding on the foundation of human dignity as rights suggesting that all human beings share standard necessities for human flourishing.

c) The concept that human dignity and rights have a strong emphasis on equality, thus holding no biases or preferences towards people of the common human community and as so is impartial.

d) D)The conviction that the moral onus is on humans towards humans but not limited to the human species rather applicable to institutions such as states.

e) The symmetry of human rights with duty and responsibility.

f) Values and civil connection for the formation of community bonds.

5.3.2 Partial construct

The impartial construct of refugees vis-à-vis their humanity gives only a limited view of the EC's ethical framework, depicting one side of the narrative. A closer examination towards the EC's positioning on the issues of borders, security, protecting the EU's way of life, and safeguarding their territory depicts an account that aligns itself closer with partialism. This depiction also provides strong parallels to the supranational agency of the EC and state approach. This is significant since although the EU can exercise some governance, states still have sovereign control over entrance policies and citizenship. Taking this into consideration leads to identifiable problems for the case of the EC taking a wholly impartial approach.

First, the confines of working and being composed of states which are predominantly partial leads to restrictions of governance; hence, the rhetoric by the EC of being more political. Second, the formation and function of the EC to represent the general interest of its member states and citizenry would suggest it is innately partial. So, while in many instances, the EC has led for more favorable reform on entrance policies for refugees, it has come with partial restrictions that parallel its positioning to why states are particular. Third, this further demonstrates how the local politics of populism is threatening the supranational agency of the EU and influencing the EC's ethical positioning when the EC attempts to address the concerns and fears of their citizen's loss of values, identity, way of life, by constructing their own narrative on identity and community bonds based on values from a shared common past formed in a spatial territory of an idealized heartland. Additionally, the EC's response to the anti-institutional politics of restoring the confidence to their communities' safety and territory, by the management of borders, displays their particularistic nature by limiting the access and entrance into their territory and communities. In a similar justification for the right of exclusion by states, the EC takes a partial ethical stance displayed when the EU acts as an agent that:

a) Provides identity through a common shared history, over a long period, in a specific territory.
b) Safeguards their community's particular way of life, values, and institutions.
c) Partial towards the particular concerns, freedoms, and benefits of their citizens.

d) Governs a territory that is needed for a shared community to flourish.

e) Provides and distributes socio-economic benefits for its citizens.

f) Excludes outsiders from joining their community through borders and citizenship.

5.3.3 The principles of humanitarianism

Consequently, in an attempt to meet its legal obligation of refugee protection and moral duty on human rights, while at the same being attune to the politics of states and the limitations of their supranational agency, the EC advocated for a comprehensive approach to migration. This included offering third country assistance by providing humanitarian aid and addressing root causes. The comprehensive approach also sought to address the weakness in their current system, which exposed ethical concerns of the high number of asylum seekers pursuing dangerous migration routes. Their resettlement and relocation schemes attempt to allow asylum seekers better access to EU territory and membership. Their ability to regain control of the perceived crisis was highly dependent on the EU's ability to receive, register, and distribute those who qualify for refugee protection by better managing their borders. Additionally, the EC declares to its member-states harsh restrictions for illegal migrants as well as proposes a low-cost relocation scheme. Respectively, solidarity from member-states is needed in order to resettle refugees among its territory and societies. This response appears to be in align with the principles of humanitarianism, which, offers flexibility to states while protecting refugees.

Parallels can be drawn from between the EC's comprehensive approach and the humanitarianism framework when they hold that:

a) Human rights as the basis for indiscriminately helping those in dire need as long as the "cost is low."

b) Third country assistance by providing humanitarian aid, addressing root causes and relocation schemes.

c) Priority for refugees and asylum seekers over other migrants.

d) Emphasis on resettlement schemes for the benefits of states and refugees.

It would appear that although impartialism is morally compelling other factors need to be taken into account when implementing ethical, political policies and practices, mainly that of

institutional agency and the political persuasion on human communities. Thus, having described the EC's ethical stance, in the succeeding section, I aim to judge their position.

5.4 Evaluating the EC's ethical stance

Having described the EC's ethical positioning through the impartial, partial, and humanitarian framework, I now seek to evaluate the principles of humanitarianism critically. This section aims at determining if humanitarianism is morally challenging enough to judge states when implementing the "low cost" principle of humanitarianism.

While the humanitarian principles appear to be advantageous, there are concerns regarding its validity as a moral force which put into question is legitimacy to be seen as an ethical approach. I begin my investigation to these claims by first reviewing how Gibney defines the humanitarian principles.

> "*Humanitarianism can be simply stated: the principle that holds that states have an obligation to assist refugees when the cost of doing so are low. This responsibility recognizes, like impartial theories, the existence of duties that stem from membership in a single human community. However, it is less comprehensive in scope that most impartial theories- specifying obligations only to those in great need*" (Gibney 2004, p.231).

It would appear that one of the guiding principles and pillars in humanitarianism is the conception of 'low costs.' Its generality allows it to be flexible so that its application can have numerous meanings. This grant states the ability to take into account and minimize the demands it puts on societies and their citizens so that a political backlash can be avoided (Gibney 2004, p.234). However, identifying this "low cost" minimum requirement can be very problematic for determining if a state is doing enough or just the bare minimum. This is especially true if a particular state has played a role in helping destabilize the state that is producing refugees. There is no shortage of western states that already claim they are doing enough to help refugees and are meeting the "low cost" standard set by humanitarianism. The subjectiveness and vagueness lead some to question if humanitarianism is morally challenging enough to judge states that set the "low cost" requirement (Gibney 2004, p.236).

Gibney (2004), recognizing these issues, takes a similar stance to impartialism and claims that humanitarianism forces states to give a justifiable account to why and how states practice refugee policies (p.236). He also claims that humanitarianism offers a framework that allows states to evaluate and assess its treatments of refugees in their current political environment. Accordingly, he believes that this will challenge liberal democracies to participate in resettlement sharing, thus tackling the cause of forced migration. This would also allow time for states to change the political environment so that public perception is shifted towards a more favorable view of refugees (Gibney 2004, pp.236-49). He argues that partialist actors fear that strict policies suggested by impartialism, such as ending non-arrival measures, would significantly increase the volume of refugees. Additionally, this may push partialist to use deterring factors such as non-arrival measures in order to keep the numbers low and more controllable. This is in part due to the political constraints of governments who are at the mercy of their constituents for being re-elected to office (Gibney 2004, p.238).

Gibney (2004) contends that when political obstacles are taken into account, theorists need to find ways of implantation that assist refugees without severe political and social threats. Strict impartialism does not allow for flexibility where humanitarianism may be more suitable for adaptation. His defense appears to address two main issues presented with normative ethical standards in international political theories. Mainly, the unwillingness for political agents to adhere to highly abstract ethical normative standards no matter how sound they are as well as the ways in which they can be practically implemented when taking into consideration the politics and complexities in entails. He also suggests that the humanitarian position would be acceptable by both impartialist as well as partialist.

Although the humanitarian approach appears to appease the partialist, his conclusion that it would be the rallying principles for impartialist as well, since they compose the minimal standards of overlapping consensus, maybe a stretch. He basis this on the assumption that "(I)mpartiaslist thus have reason to accept humanitarianism as a pragmatic and contingent accommodation to the world as we find it" (Gibney 2004, p.235). While this may be true, the generality and chameleon form of the humanitarian framework allows for it to be adopted by partialist ideologies thus at odds with impartialism. So while the principles laid out in humanitarianism make for a general and flexible

approach, this would also suggest that it is too vague and not well defined. This may be Gibney's intention when he claims that humanitarianism is very approachable.

However, the strengths of humanitarianism can also be perceived as weaknesses. Gibney recognizes humanitarianism as a set of guiding principles rather an ideology; admitting that they can be readily adopted by communitarians. If so, there are little to no distinguishing factors from partialist such as communitarians. Take, for example, the parallels of the EC's comprehensive approach with the humanitarian principles. Although they are within the framework of humanitarianism, there seems little divergence from the ideologies of communitarians. Gibney, in a similar fashion, states that "humanitarianism has been echoed in more recent times by communitarians" by what is called the "mutual aid principle" (Gibney 2004, p.233).

It would thus appear the ambiguity of the humanitarian principles is not adequately robust to suffice as an ethical approach if not attached to a thick-ideology. While *describing* and *evaluating* the ethical construct of the EC is vital, this only moderately meets the objective of this research, which sets out to *explain* and *analyze* why the EC has done so explicitly. Having achieved in part the goal of determining why the EC has taken its ethical stance, mainly as a political response to the ideologies that threaten its institution, I intend in the succeeding sections of this chapter to fulfill this objective.

5.5 An alternative interpretation- Explaining the EC's ethical stance

The consecutive section focuses on better *understanding* the data in light of the literature. There appears to be an ambiguous relationship in the partial ethical framework of the EC between populism and the humanitarian approach, which appears to echo communitarianism. While both ideologies are aligned on the partial continuum, there lies an apparent tension between the EC and populism. The analytical framework employed in this thesis does not adequately explain this ambiguity. I, therefore, offer an alternative interpretation for analyzing the data, which better *explains* why the EC has explicitly taken their ethical, political stance. Subsequently, I set out to *interpret* what this *explanation* means by *analyzing* the EC's liberal position in regard to the refugee phenomenon.

5.5.1 Liberalism

The humanitarian principles also appear to be within the framework of liberal theorist who advocate the right for exclusion. The parallels from the EC's comprehensive approach echoes liberal theorist who hold that the political self-determination of a state allows the freedom of association thus limiting their scope of universalism (Wellman in Wellman and Cole 2011, p.13). Liberal theorist, in a similar fashion to communitarianism and humanitarian principles, see refugees as the exception to the community's freedom of who not to associate based on human rights. Some liberal theorist also agree it is the duty of states to help refugees and may offer them access to their political community; however, it does have to "come in the form of more open admissions" (Wellman in Wellman and Cole 2011, p.120). States can offer third country assistance by contribution humanitarian aid, create safe zones, intervene with military force, even take preemptive actions so as to prevent mass migration. This would appear to be within the framework of humanitarianism since it meets the low-cost requirement as well as offer third country assistance while focusing on helping refugees.

In Gibney's defense of humanitarianism, he indicates the ability for ethical theorist and ideologies to hold universal ethics while limiting its scope. His confession of humanitarianism as a universal construct of ethics based on impartial principles (Gibney 2004, p.231), while simultaneously being consequential by limiting its scope (Gibney 2004, p.249), strengthens this case. This may also lend to his reasoning for humanitarianisms' ability to appease impartialist since the issue is not the universality of ethics rather how far they extend. Moreover, this would indicate that Western liberal democracies may not best fit into the binary approach of partialism and impartialism when it concerns both the politics and ethics of refugees. It would instead appear that liberal ideologies may be better understood through their scope of limitations on ethical universalism and how they reconcile the two (Wellman and Cole 2011). Gibney appears to take this approach when he presents humanitarianism as a principle outside of the partial and impartial continuum. The limiting of universal ethics in liberalism may also facilitate a better understanding of the partial divide between populism and the EC. While both may be partial, it would appear that the ethical framework of populism is particularistic while the EC's ethical construct is universal.

Additionally, liberal ideologies assist in better understanding the ambiguity of the EC's position of liberal values as forming thin community bonds with the thick formation of identity. It is apparent

that through their efforts to combat populism, the EC pushes for liberal principles of tolerance and discriminating against religion. In doing so, the EC acknowledges religion and culture as identity markers, which consist of the thick framework of partialist. The ambiguity of the EC's positioning arises when the partial framework of thick identity formation is not a means for community bonds, rather the thin-formation of values in the impartial framework. If seen through the binary partial, impartial approach, there would appear to be a contradiction on reconciling the two. However, if understood through the liberal non-essentialist framework, there is room to see how the fluidity of group formation could allow for strong identity claims to mesh with liberal values as a means for social cohesion. Identity formation is contingent on the social context of relationships, forming an interdependent correlation with each other, thus making it innately social. Therefore, the intricacies of ethical positioning on identity must be held in the context of group formation. Identity and group formation have long been debated within liberalism. Having a greater understanding of these issues, it becomes apparent that the ethical stance of the EC is expressed through their political expression of liberalism. It is important to note that while liberalism has not, up until now, been directly addressed the literature review has reflected liberal ideologies. For example, when presenting impartialism the ideas of; open borders, citizenship, group formation, are constructed through a liberal presupposition of justice.

Taking the approach of Liberalism and limitations of the universal application by no means nullifies the binary approach of partialism and impartialism rather a case to the contrary can be made. The binary continuum may offer the best approach for *political theories* to be evaluated from an ethical standard (Cole in Wellman and Cole 2011, p.175), which is the objective of this research. Partialism, impartialism significantly contributed to determining the ethical positioning of the EC's *political* responses. Partialism provided a vital understanding of the ethical construct of populism and other partial communities, which demonstrated their rationale for justifying exclusion. Similarly, impartialism provided crucial objections and alternatives for the political ideologies found in partialism.

Additionally, impartialism provides a sound, compelling rationale for a normative ethical approach and standard that challenge the modern-day political system of states and their citizens. As significant as the partialism and impartialism approach are, I believe the EC's positioning best resembles the liberal democratic ideologies that limit the scope of their universal ethical construct.

I state this cautiously with the understanding that I may appear to make an extremely fine distinction; however, the nuance is important in achieving the objective of this research.

5.5.2 Politics and ethics

After reviewing the data and literature, it is apparent that the impartial, partial divide does not offer the best approach. Gibney (2004) and Brown (2011) suggest that when politics are taken into consideration, one has to deeply consider if normative theorist offer the best solution given, they produce little to no results. Brown (2011) goes further in explicitly addressing the partial, impartial stating "[r]ather than a general moral theory, it may make sense to put the emphasis on the political and the local. Rather than seeing the outcome of clashes of interest between refugees and locals as to be determined by moral criteria, it may make more sense to acknowledge that such clashes are inherently political" (Brown in Betts and Loescher 2011, p. 166). It is interesting to note that Brown sees these clashes as inherently political in a similar fashion to how Laclau (2018) perceives populism, as inherently part of political discourse when it clashes with more "mature ideologies" (Kindle Locations 356). The "inherentness" of these issues being political suggests focusing on the local to find solutions since it would appear that politics to a high degree revolves around local communities. This also sheds light to the problem the EC and supranationalism are facing in applying its ethics and politics with the local politics and ethics of nation-states and populism. However, solely focusing on politics may deter from holding states ethically accountable. Brown (2011) acknowledges this when suggesting it would be better to do something practical, in the here and now, "[R]ather than trying to produce a compelling moral argument why refugees should be treated more favorably" (Brown in Betts and Loescher, p. 166). This is also shared with other intellectuals such as Miller (2016) who states:

> "So any problems that immigration may currently pose for the survival of the welfare state can be resolved by promulgating a norm that people ought to follow, one that follows from basic moral principles. This illustrates what I am calling an ethical approach to immigration. In contrast, a political approach gives greater weight to the evidence about immigration, trust, and support for welfare. It recognizes that the problem is real and needs to be solved collectively, by a policy initiative or an institutional change" (Kindle Location 376).

It would appear that this is the path the EC has taken and explains how and why a focus on local politics has influenced their ethical construct. That is not to say that one should completely ignore local politics for doing so would suggest imprudence. However, the goal of this research is to consider the EC's stance towards the refugee phenomenon ethically and to analyze why they have done so explicitly with the aim at testing specific theories in the hopes of refining, enhancing, and advancing theory building. Furthermore, focusing on the local and political side of the narrative of refugees may deter from ethically challenging political institutions from adhering to high moral standards. I concur with Carens (2013) who eloquently sums up whether or not the politics of immigration can be judged ethically when political and moral theorists attempt to separate the two. He states:

> "[T]his sort of attempt to shield immigration and citizenship policies from moral scrutiny is misguided. It confuses the question of who ought to have the authority to determine policy with the question of whether a given policy is morally acceptable. One can think that someone has the moral right to make a decision and still think that the decision itself is morally wrong. That applies just as much to a collective agent like a democratic state as it does to individuals" (p. 6).

If thus evaluating whether or not the EC has the political right to make decisions concerning their communities, I would reason that they are. However, in the following section, I contend that their political decisions may be morally wrong and while Liberalism offers solutions, it also generates ambiguous practices. Thus having a better understanding of which ethical frameworks the EC's has constructed and why they have done so, I now aim to analyze their liberal practices in light of the refugee phenomenon.

5.5.3 The internal struggles of liberalism

While the liberal approach may offer solutions, I contend that it also produces other distinctive problems. To help broaden this understanding, it is essential to see the attempts of applying the ideologies of liberalism in pluralistic societies. Take for example the shared idea within liberalism for compromise as stated by Brown (2011);

> "*Rather than trying to produce a compelling moral argument why refugees should be treated more favorably, it makes more sense to try to address directly the fears that key*

existing groups in society express and to try to meet those fears without compromising the interests of the newcomers. Instead of accusing the former of racism or xenophobia and trying to shame them into abandoning their opposition, a less moralized, more political approach would recognize that there is a genuine clash of interests here, which needs to be resolved in the way that such clashes are resolved in liberal democracies, by bargaining and compromise" (Brown in Betts and Loescher 2011, p.166).

Brown (2011) in a similar fashion to Miller (2016) and others have suggested a normative ethical approach must give way to a realist approach that takes into consideration the practical needs of people, as well as recognizing the constraints of political actors. Similarly, Gibney's (2004) more ethical approach takes into consideration the *politi* while at the same time offering practical solutions. There still persists a sense of compromise that tends to abandon hopes for a normative standard, outside of the Cosmopolitan approach of Pogge (2008) and van Hooft (2014), and the universal liberal approach of Carens (2013). I agree that compromise is optional; however, only if done in a fashion that does not compromise the integrity of liberal democracies and their principles. Let me qualify this. When Western liberal states publicly acknowledge the principle of asylum but practice questionable means that hinder as many asylum seekers as possible on their territory, then compromise should not be seen as the answer. This only adds to what some call the "organized hypocrisy" of states (Gibney 2004, p.229). When states limit the scope of their ethical boundaries, it suggests that they challenge the foundation of the liberal principles they claim to stand on. Liberal values of equality, freedom, and justice are either universal, in which they appear to contradict other liberal values or liberalism is particular, in which they appear to lose some of its moral authority.

The attempts of liberalism to be consistent in pluralistic societies has proven difficult. This has, in some instances, brought about the search for alternative methods to reconstruct social meanings. Given the fluidity of societies and cultures, this would not appear odd. However, some attempts seem counterintuitive. Such was the case for the EC when they attempt to reconcile the thick formation of identity, with the thin generality of universal values in a minimalistic non-essentialist approach for group formation and social cohesion. However, this leads to more considerable ambiguities, which produces a vicious cycle.

First, this begins when the concerns of citizens are neglected, discarded, or rejected. Consequently, institutions appear to be "out of touch" with their population, which in turn produces a loss of trust. Second, this then leads to platforms for dangerous ideologies to which citizens are attracted to precisely since they seem aligned with their interest. This was quite evident throughout the data and literature concerning the EC and populism.

5.5.4 Liberalism and the problem of universalism and particularism

To further demonstrate this, let us examine the ambivalent relationship between EU and national-state citizenship. EU citizenship is; supranational, constructed around the free movement of people and is minimalistic in its requirements, which is fundamentally based on rights. Similarly, liberal European states have also attempted to disassociate ethnic, national ties with membership. Many Western states require applicants to take citizenship test so that they are familiar with that sponsoring states way of life and shared values. Seeing it illiberal to require possible citizens to have national-state identities, they attempt to stay neutral through the application process (Joppke 2010, pp.161-3). However, the generality of values as communal bonds becomes problematic when they are shared by almost all Western states thus making it hard to distinguish one from another when used to mark a specific community, regardless of the size. So while this may reluctantly offer solutions on a supranational level, it produces problems on the local level. Joppke (2010) points this out when he states:

> "*all Western states trying to upgrade citizenship for the purpose of more successful immigrant integration, is caught in the paradox of universalism: it perceives the need to make immigrants and ethnic minorities parts of this and not any society, but it cannot name and enforce any particulars that distinguish the 'here' from the 'there'*" (p.130).

EU citizenship attempts to provide refugees and state communities social cohesion. However, it is only secondary to national citizenship and in the wake of the recent "refugee crisis," some EU member-states have once again reverted to a more nationalistic means of attaining citizenship.

The attempts to uphold liberal principles of being neutral towards identity is futile since every state is formed through specific cultural contexts (Joppke 2010; Carens 2000; Modood 2008;). There lies the conflict; liberal states are bound to certain principles that at times do not coincide with either their states' interest or other liberal principles. This internal struggle of liberal ideology is

hardly an anomaly. The constitution of identity and group formation have long been debated; from classical egalitarian responses to the French revolution to a hybrid approach of identity in multiculturalism (Barry 2001; Modood 2013; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Okin 1999, Parekh 2000). The refugee phenomenon once again exemplifies the strong claims of identity and group formation as well as the convoluted relationship it has with, among other issues, values, and social cohesion. This is highlighted by populist claims on identity and how they are affecting EU societies when a liberal institution such as the EC attempt to address issues of identity loss there again rises the ambivalent dilemma found in liberalism.

In a similar fashion, applying general universal values is difficult for states since they also are particular. This is demonstrated in the convoluted relationship liberal democracies have in guarding their institutions, which is heavily reliant on the values produced within society. In order for the well running of social systems found in liberal democracies, citizens must reciprocation a belief in the symmetry of values such as social trust and justice which are built within national communities (Miller 2016, Kindle Location 205-230; Rawls 1971; Phillips 2007, p.9; Cole in Wellman and Cole 2011 pp.267-70). When values are appealed for by the EC on the basis of social cohesion, it demonstrates it is socially constructed, maintained, and exercised within the context of a communities' shared living. If not shared by the community, there would be no appeal. Precisely because it is, demonstrates its legitimacy. This, however, produces further problems. First, values are constructed in societies. Second, values are thus seen as a means for social cohesion. Third, social cohesion, based on values, are needed for society and their institutions to function. Fourth, the values that produce social cohesion if allowed can be transformed by it. Fifth, this transformation may threaten social stability and the integrity of liberal institutions. Sixth, in response, social institutions need to be guarded by not allowing a transformation to occur, which can only exist if values are preserved that are produced in societies which also now need protection.

When liberal democracies advocate for social cohesion on values, they are exposing their values to change by the social cohesion that was created. Conversely, some of the values they are appealing for not only seem to be in opposition towards each other but may also cause the collapse of liberal democracies. I have alluded to some of these situations throughout this thesis, exemplified when the mass migration of a disparate group is allowed access to a state's territory and community. Similarly, I have also stated that the need to protect societal values and systems

is regarded as the point of justification, even for universal liberal, to control migration. However, what is not so determinable is where to draw the line. When discussing the ethics of refugees, it is reasonable to ask if the concerns of some EU states and their citizens of societal change may have a warrant. If so, then there would appear to be justifiable limits to their ethical boundaries.

5.5.5 Liberalism and conceptions of the good

The ambiguities of liberal ideologies, which may cause a vicious cycle that lead communities towards dangerous ideologies is further demonstrated when taking into account the social dynamics of religion. It became apparent throughout the data and literature that religion is a critical theme that plays a vital role in the ethics and politics of the refugee phenomenon. Take, for example, the constant plea of the EC in showing tolerance and fighting against discrimination against religious identities. In many instances, the EC made accusations of xenophobia. This may or may not be without warrant; however, pluralistic liberal societies should take into account the pressing concerns of their communities without shaming those that disagree. Consequently, in some instances, accusations of racism or xenophobia are unjustly associated with those genuine interests. Here I agree with the former part of Brown's view (2011) when he states: "*Instead of accusing the former of racism or xenophobia and trying to shame them into abandoning their opposition…* " (Brown in Betts and Loescher 2011, p.166). This is further demonstrated when the sincere apprehensions of citizens over the fear of losing their identity by competing systems of value, such as Islam, are written off as Islamophobic. Alternatively, when those that contest the validity of such systems are labeled racist, xenophobic, or bigots. Liberal societies should allow the space for deliberations on perceived threats, so as to be able to question, criticize, or contest systems of beliefs such as religion. This by no means suggests that the limit of criticism should be towards a particular system of belief so as to discriminate or show particularity towards one over another. However, as I argue, the best possible hope for solutions needs to come through honest deliberations from which logical conclusion can be drawn. This can only happen if real dialogue can take place in a civil manner of understanding and discourse on competing systems of values can be evaluated.

Religion, at its core, is a set of ideologies to which followers adhere. As such, liberal values should lend tolerance for dialogue rather than suppress it and label it as intolerance. Some would argue that religion is more than a set of codified doctrine, to which I agree, rather it shapes worldviews

to provide a framework that constructs deep systems of belief for the formation of identity, morals, and values. Conversely, for some, this makes religion above reproach. However, this is precisely why it should not be immune to critical evaluation. I constitute this with high sensitivity, aware of the historical and cultural affections that may accompany religion. As well as the implications it may produce in society when such a deep and sacred set of beliefs are questioned.

Nevertheless, in the same fashion that such scrutiny may produce resentment, equal consideration should be extended to a community when their systems of values are questioned. When these considerations are not afforded to the population, it cultivates a political atmosphere that is perplexed and in search of answers. Additionally, this demonstrates how a community may understand this as "organized hypocrisy" as well as an overrepresentation of minorities. These unintended consequences may push the population further to ideologies that are more accommodating regardless of how arbitrary they are. My argument is not that any specific conception of the good is incompatible with liberal states rather that communities should be able to make rational decisions based on facts which are brought about by dialogue. This, however, cannot take place if only assumptions are made and heard through general stereotypes, as is the case with populism since it appears to address the concerns of identity loss.

Open dialogues and tolerance do not negate the fact that racism and xenophobia may genuinely exist. Nor am I presumptuous in believing some political actors and ideologies do not use the genuine concerns of citizens to push forward their political agenda. When refugees are identified as Muslims rather than by their humanity, nationality, ethnicity, or race, they are often perceived as a group that seeks to advance their religious and cultural agenda. Consequently, perceptions of infiltration and invasion, a sort of Islamisation are central themes of the populist imaginary (Roy in Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016, p.186). This often leads populist movements to manifest themselves in xenophobia. The refugee crisis has given a more significant platform for populism to claim a religious identity as a means to exclude others from membership into their communities. The data revealed the EC had taken considerable measures in attempting to address these concerns by advocating for tolerance as well as fighting against discrimination, dehumanization, and the stigmatization of refugees.

However, it would appear that the EC has failed to address the genuine concerns regarding national values adequately. The data suggest that national populations are concerned that the very values found in liberal democracies which the EC is advocating for could be at risk of being lost if the host population and state do not protect them. Adding to the severity of these concerns are the strong religious identity claims of refugees who in some cases, make little to no effort to distinguish their religious doctrine from their political views. Some of the most dominant characteristics of liberalism are religious freedom and toleration, as well as its secular stance regarding religion, meaning separation of church and state (Modood 2013: Kindle Location 500). This inevitably puts refugees with strong religious identity claims at odds with the laïcité form of secularity found in most Western liberal societies if they are not able to reason their pre-political commitments in a secular manner.

Furthermore, empirical data suggest instances where it would appear Islam allows for justification of specific human rights violations. Specifically, that of women, sexual preference, religious freedom, and tolerance (Vogt, Larsen, Moe 2009; Okin 2009). So when liberalism advocates for the citizenry and community bonds based on human rights, there are genuine concerns that they are at odds with outsiders, particularly refugees who hold strong Islamic religious identities. Consequently, if a significant influx of Muslims is allowed their worldview for certain social justice issues such as; women's rights, sexual preference, and religious freedom, may influence the political agenda of a state thereby permanently altering it.

It would appear there is a careful balance that must be struck if states are to fulfill their legal and ethical mandates towards the protection of refugees. In the preservation of the values, systems, and institutions found in liberal democracies, there seems to be legitimate, ethical justification for limiting the scope of their universal ethics. However, doing so raises the additional question of exactly where the tipping point is for reaching the breakdown of liberal societies and their institutions; and whether or not states are doing enough to protect refugees. It would appear that political actors and moral theorist must strike an equilibrium between "how much is enough" and "not doing enough." Moreover, the alternative of not limiting the scope of ethical boundaries exposes some of the ambivalent disparities in liberal ideologies, mainly their inconsistencies and contradictions. This leads to vicious cycles of mistrust and platforms for ambiguous ideologies.

Even more onerous is the undertaking of supranational institutions such as the EC to find solutions given the enormous complexities of politics and applying a normative ethical standard.

Additionally, one has to wonder if there is ever justifiable reasoning in compromising what "ought to be done" with what can practically be done for people when their livelihood is in question. How should states treat refugees, given they are in dire need? Refugees are the exception states, and their communities should make, allowing them access to a states' territory and membership since it is a protected legal right and thereby exercising the liberal principles and values their democratic states embody. In the following section, I offer possible solutions on how to accomplish this. I do so by first identifying the institutional priorities that can be drawn from the data when analyzing the ethics and politics of the EC. Then recommend possible solutions.

5.6 Possible Solutions

The succeeding and final section of my discussion address what implications can be drawn from analyzing the specific ethic stances the EC has institutionally taken. Thereby revealing the values and priority of the institution which could allow for possible solutions in assisting refugees.

5.6.1 Implications

Depending on what cultures value, speak of, and prioritize determines how much their members see and engage in specific societal institutions and practices (Parekh, 2000, p.151). This speaks much to how members treat and value such things as religious freedom, political rights, and engagement. For example, if a culture is not heavily influenced by or puts little priority on religion, then their view on religious freedoms might be restricted. Alternatively, if a high value is put into the economics of the state, then their natural inclination will be to by all means safeguard its flourishing.

Having established the EC's specific priority towards liberal values; characterized, among other things, by its upholding of religious freedom and toleration, as well as separation of church and state (Modood 2013:Kindle Location 500), provides an adequate assessment of the EC's belief and conduct during the refugee phenomenon which is also supported by the data. While in many ways this secular liberal value has proven to be helpful it may also aid in the wrongful treatment of refugees who hold strong religious identities. This laïcité form of secularity is a predisposition to

limit the freedom of religious expression, thereby minimizing its role and value in communities, identities, and societies. This is exhibited through the negative connotations produced by cultural norms of secularity when religious actors are limited in participating in societal practices and are regulated to privatizing their pre-political convictions from the political sphere (Joppke 2004; Barry 2001). Furthermore, the liberal solution of privatizing religion appears contradicting when other social and political groups are able to participate in the political process and voice their opinion on matters that affect societal constructs, meanings, and values such as the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender group on issues of marriage and gender. Similarly, ethnic groups advocate for the protection of specific cultural practices, as is the case with many minority national communities. Additionally, when liberal scholars advocate for privatization and ask members of society to compartmentalize their pre-political conceptions of the good, which shape their worldviews, construct their moral reasoning, and structure their identity; testifies to the misunderstanding within liberal ideology of the paramount element religion plays in some members of society.

As is the case with culture and identity, liberal states are hardly neutral. So rather than neutrality the conclusion of liberal ideology should be the impartial inclusiveness of religious convictions, allowing for an optimal range on conceptions of the good and not presuppose that religious opinions and voices should heed to secular reasoning (Modood 1998). In the subsequent section, I further my argument by showing the intricate relationship religion and culture have with one another suggesting how this relationship may offer solutions to social reformations on inclusion towards refugees which inadvertently affect the political policies of assisting refugees.

5.6.2 Recommendations

Given the significant role religion is playing in politics, it may be time to rethink the priority to which theorist and politicians give to religion. This, however, does not mean that religion, in general, should be given more credence; rather scholarly attention should be given on how religion is used in the construct of social realities for specific communities. This is important to note in how it relates to refugees since, in more recent times, there seems to a strong emphasis on the religious identity of both refugees and national communities. While it is true that, a key aspect of right-wing populist in Europe are anti- Muslim and Christians "largely to the extent that they reject Islam" (Roy in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016:186), this is scarcely an anomaly. The manner

in which populism uses religion as a dichotomy of bad versus good is a tactic that has long been appropriated by other ideologies and religious actors; from the time of the crusades to the recent jihadist holy wars. Empirical findings concur the use of religion by various ideologies as a motif for cosmic war. This motif allows for the use of religious symbolism that portrays some as heroes and other as villains, as well as empowering the oppressed and dehumanizing the opposition (Juergensmeyer 2003, 2008).

Furthermore, religious identity claims appear to be part of the nationalist imagery, especially in Europe (Nussbaum 2012, pp.13-6). Nationalism to a great degree was birth from a secular ideology that emphasized "human auto emancipation" rather than "divine intervention" in which its "own political symbols, codes, rituals and practices" replace that of church and faith (Smith 2009, pp.75-6). Nevertheless, there remains an intimate connection between the two (Gellner 2006, p.136), since nationalism can be understood by the "cultural system" of religion which preceded it (Anderson 2006, p.15). This suggest a long-convoluted relationship between religion and culture and why it merits the thoughtful attention of scholars. Furthermore, this could aid in adequately addressing the concerns of national citizens and liberal state issues on identity, social cohesion, and values. Especially since it would appear that mainstream political parties are not as strongly oppose to populism arguments as they are too populist themselves (Roy in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016, p.187). Thus if Liberal advocates are more adequately equipped to address the religious, cultural enigma on identity, its societal role, and influence; they can simultaneously oppose the populist rhetoric and break the cycle of societal mistrust and disillusionment.

This case can be further strengthened by examining the "cultural system" of religion and its intricate interdependent relationship. Religion, in a similar fashion to culture, are expressions of a system of belief in which communities produce societal meanings; forming significance for life, its activities, and relationships. Empirical evidence suggests there is scarcely, a society that is void from the influence of religion. While it may be true that many Western liberal democracies now practice a form of secularity, separating religion from the state, there are few if any instances of a culture that is wholly secular or humanistic. This may be in part because of the role religion has played in the creation, constitution, and continuation in liberal democracies (Parekh 2000, p.146). This, however, does not mean that religion has an equivalent impact on all Western liberal states rather quite the opposite. There is a significant disparity in the manner, and degree religion has on

culture. Despite the disparity of influence, religion, and culture have on societies; they nevertheless help to develop a moral lens that assists in forming a shared belief in values and morality. This system of meaning and beliefs are indispensable to societal structure since it is where people understand their role and relationship towards one another in society. Thus both, religion and culture, aid in sustaining society by providing a means of identity and a set of values (Kollontai 2008, pp.61-3).

While it may be true that religion has and will continue to impact culture, the same can be said of culture on religion. Religion emerges from a cultural context and social belief that influences how it is manifested as well as how much of a priority it receives in society. This may give reason to why the same religion may appear contrasting in different states or why religion can be adhered to solely on the basis of social and cultural relevance. One may uphold certain religious practices that are divorced from spiritual meaning in order to maintain social status with what the community holds in high esteem or since it may be an integral part of the community's shared way of life (Parekh 2000, pp.147-8). Even those that claim religion is being hijacked by populism recognize, although appear to disagree, that there is a "modern anthropological approach towards religion" which suggests religion is merely a part of culture (Roy in Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016 p.83). Nevertheless, there is little denying the impact of culture and religion on societies displaying its intricate relationship.

Additionally, "(r)eligion can sound absolute, and it can serve as a translation for all other manners of perceived group conflict" (Baumann 1999, Kindle Locations 264-265)," which suggest that religion is multifaceted entailing aspects of culture and ethnicity and should not be misunderstood as a "class of facts different from other social facts", instead, "religions show an enormous range of flexibility and change" (Baumann 1999, Kindle Locations 280). From this perspective it would be highly irrational to ignore the fluidity of religion, particularly in Western liberal democratic states where religion has drastically evolved, as well as the predominant postmodern notions of social dynamics in liberalism. Moreover, if liberal ideologies hold to view of religion and culture as social constructs, influenced by actors, there is little denying it can evolve and be influenced by external factors. Establishing that religion and culture have a long-convoluted relationship in that at times they are very indistinguishable yet autonomous, is highly relevant and significant for two

reasons. First, this exemplifies the genuine concerns of a community that religion can impact a society. Second, it is possible that culture can provide a means of transforming a religion.

My suggestion, therefore, to allow for religious discourse and understanding in the political and social life of Liberal societies is to help facilitate a better understanding of religious actors and subsequently, on how to address the genuine concerns of host communities, especially since there is long-standing negative connotation in Western states with religious public discourse. Having better-informed societies allows for instances of moral outrage on the one hand, and moral acceptance on the other. Take, for example, populist religious identity claims and how it is used at the expense of Christianity rather for the rhetoric of Christendom and its symbols so as to strip away the spiritual meaning. Christendom is thus being "hijacked" by populism when religion is about cultural symbols that are disconnected from doctrine, faith, and practice and used as a means for battle and restoration (Marzouki and McDonnell in Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016, pp.2-9). A better understanding of how "faith-based" religious actors in the EU have condemned this hijacking by populist to facilitate division may induce a moral outrage. Similarly, open and honest public dialogue of how a religious worldview may harness violence or wrongly appropriate its moral authority may produce a moral outrage leading to religious reformations as was the case with Christianity in the 16th century.

I conclude with the anthropological understanding that the intricate relationship between religion and culture may provide a shift in the worldviews of both liberal and religious actors since "(c)oncepts and definitions are at the core of every worldview. They are attempts to make sense of and give coherence to our experiences" (Hiebert 2011, Kindle Locations 6600-6601). These concepts and definitions that makeup worldviews and beliefs, reflect deep levels of culture and provide the logic in which one perceives reality. This suggests that a shift in worldview is an individual's attempt to reconcile the world as they see it with the reality of how they experience. Worldviews are the complex process of meaning-making which brings order to our experienced reality; suggesting and further strengthening the case, that in a similar fashion to cultures or rather because of, are fluid (Hiebert 2011, Kindle Location 6754-6781). Furthermore, this would indicate that worldviews adjust as individuals develop and experience new and different realities, exposed through "surface contradictions, life's dilemmas and new experiences that cannot be resolved by simply acquiring more information, enhancing problem-solving skills, or adding to one's

competencies" (*ibid*, Kindle Location 6781). Worldviews are ever-evolving to cope with the changes of their experience in culture and provides great hope for the paradigm shift of both religious and liberal actors so that people in need of refuge receive the help they desperately seek.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Summary

Socrates once famously wrote of morality, "We are discussing no small matter, but how we out to live" (Socrates, In Plato's Republic, ca. 390B.C.). This appropriately summarizes both the immense importance and intense complexity of moral philosophy. Morality guides the "why" behind the decisions on how one chooses to live while the "how" speaks of the ethics or practicality of our morality. Sound in every moral theory is the notion of good reasoning, which should be the minimum conception of ethical practices. Sound reasoning follows that a case must be made not on the sole basis of emotions rather that which is supported by facts and arguments, created on valid, accurate assumptions from which logical conclusions can be drawn. It is with these assumptions that I investigated the ethics regarding the politics of the Syrian refugee phenomenon that swept across the EU and set out to answer:

> "Which ethical stance(s) has the European Commission taken in its political responses towards the Syrian refugee 'crisis'?" And "What does their ethical construct reveal about their institution and the refugee phenomenon?"

The objective of the research was to; bridge the gap between a more concrete implementation of political ideologies with the more abstract reasoning of ethical theorist by first, describing and judging the ethical construct of the EC, followed by explaining and analyzing why they have done so explicitly. Consequently, this implies testing and refining ethical theories in addition to advancing theory building in Liberal ideologies by identifying general patterns. Ultimately this research aimed at understanding the historical significance of the refugee phenomenon and gaining insight into the political institution of the EC, which could assist in how to predict and handle a future trans-national crisis in the EU.

I aim to accomplish this arduous task by implementing a case study of the EC, utilizing constructivism as my ontological approach, while incorporating a qualitative deductive research of the refugee phenomenon. Aiding, in my objective, was the thematic analytical process which produced a framework in which themes were used to interpret the social constructs of the EC. A duteous assessment of the literature led me to construct my analytical framework from the theories of Gibney (2004) who adopts the dichotomous partial, impartial spectrum in gaging the ethics of

political ideologies which use constructed ideas of culture, identity, community, and social cohesion to justify social practices and political policies regarding refugees. In addition to these social constructs are issues of politics and state agency, which similarly influence ethical practices since they revolve around autonomous communities. Taking into account these complex social factors, as well as the copious literature in ethical and political theories, I chose Gibney's (2004) binary approach for efficiently categorizing the data and literature which allowed for a simplistic, straightforward manner of identifying the ethical stances of the EC.

 Partialist contend that the autonomy of their communities and the agency of the modern, sovereign state allows them to exercise their self-determining right of association, which determines the inclusion, exclusion of its membership. Moreover, partialist interpret the association by an autonomous community as a sovereign right that should be exercised free from the persuasion of outsiders since it is from within that a shared cultural way of life is formed which among other things produces social meanings, constructs identity, and determines its political will. Partialist emphasize the protection of one's culture and society from outsiders understanding that culture, while being mostly static, can slowly develop to hold different meanings. They also, however, recognized that if allowed, it can transform at an accelerated pace, creating a permanent change in society so as altering the political will of the homeland's community on social and justice positioning. Partialism claims to make a plausible defense for their ethical and moral justification when emphasizing the importance of culture within human value (Gibney 2004). Embedded in partialism are the ideologies of populism which offer simple solutions to convoluted socio-political issues; creating dichotomies of the good homogenous host community and the dangerous outsiders. The populist imagery constructs a battle of the imagined "people" (Marzouki, McDonnell and Roy 2016), made up of the working class, silent majority; who are considered saviors from the invading "dangerous other" who seek to infiltrate their "idealized heartland" and transform it with their antithetical cultural-religious worldviews which are enabled by the representative politics of the liberal elite (Taggart 2000). Populist rally support by creating sharp socioeconomic and political distinction, demonizing those who threaten their shared communal way of life by dehumanizing them (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Moreover, populist exalt themselves as the "right sovereign," claiming socio-economic and cultural restoration (Marzouki,

McDonnell and Roy 2016) to a revised historical narrative from which they also construct their identity (Wodak 2016).

In stark contrast to this view are the ideologies of impartialism which seek to abolish distinctions among communities, seeing people vis-à-vis their humanity, advocating against exclusive allegiance towards fellow compatriots based on universal human rights and dignity rather than socio-economic, ethnic, religious, or national ties (Gibney 2004). Furthermore, the notion of human rights implies right holders and the duty of individuals and institutions alike to meet the basic needs for the human flourishing of those claimants who on the principles of equality, justice and benevolence demand impartial treatment (van Hooft 2009). Finding little validity in the cultural particularism of autonomous communities impartialist argue that sovereign states use immoral practices such as citizenship and borders to excluded lower socio-economic people which resembles the inhumane, abolished custom of feudalism, which sought to protect a privileged social class, inherited as a birthright (Carens 2013). Impartialist make the case that states go beyond being representative of a cultural community; they are territorial, a form of governance, and agents in the global political system that control boundaries of a territorial piece of land and the natural resources therein, allowing for no neutral spatial grounds (Joppke 2013, p.36); exercising the use of implicit and explicit force on a population that had no choice in subjection to its authority (Wendt 1999, pp.203-6). Consequently, as a byproduct of current international-order, when states fail to protect their communities or create and enable the instability which produces refugees, the state-system should provide solutions to the shortcomings of the social institution they constructed (Carens 2013, pp.256-8).

While it appears that both ideologies have ethical reasoning for justifying their stances, either option appears problematic. Understanding the need for protecting the most vulnerable people and implementing more favorable policies towards refugees, Gibney (2004) offers the humanitarian principles of a low-cost equation as an alternative to the highly theoretical, impractical standards of impartialism and the dubious disingenuous moral practices of partialism. According to the humanitarian principles, state limitations are taken into account, as are the ethical considerations for helping refugees, which emphasizes a general, flexible approach, seen as a medium between partialism and impartialism.

My thematic analytical framework enabled me to evaluate the naturally occurring, criterion data generated by the participants of the EC in the form of public, political speeches, and statements. The results revealed how the EC's ethical positioning is not straightforward; rather, it is convoluted given the various socio-political aspects of cultures, societies, and humanity. The way ethical stances are taken, and political statements are issued are tied and influenced by other external social realities concerning human communities and ideologies such as populism, and liberalism. So while the EC attempts to take an ethical stance that emphasizes helping refugees vis-à-vis their humanity, their rhetoric is limited by the constraints and limitations of working within the international order of sovereign states as well as their steady advocacy in supranationalism. Evidence suggests that similarly to the interdependent relationship of sovereign states and their autonomous community, the supranational institution of the EC has proven to display a particular innate nature, showing partiality towards its constituents. Consequently, in their hopes to confront the transnational dilemma of the refugee "crisis," the EC took a comprehensive approach which appears to parallel the principles of humanitarianism.

While humanitarianism does offer a flexible approach, I argue that it is not robust enough to ethically challenge and change the practices and policies of states outside of attaching itself to a more thick-ethical ideology. Thus having successfully described and evaluated the EC ethical framework I subsequently explain and analyze how and why they explicitly do so alluding to the role of local populist politics and propose that humanitarianism and the partialism, impartialism continuum does not adequately characterize the EC's ethical stance nor does it appropriately address the ambiguities identified in the data. Rather I contend that a more accurate assessment of the EC's ethical framework suggests a construction from an ethically universal liberal approach that limits its scope. I qualify this by re-examining those ambiguities and evaluate whether or not my assessment facilitates a better understanding. It would appear the alternative interpretation of the EC's liberal ethical approach more appropriately reconciles the thick-identity formation with the thin-bonds of universal liberal values for group formation and social cohesion. Furthermore, this better explains the antithesis of the EC's international liberal agenda and the nationalist efforts of populism while at the same time give reason to the EC's ethical framework based on the liberal principles of human dignity.

Subsequently, I set out to refine and advance ethical theory building by identifying general patterns in liberalism and offer solutions to bridging the gap between theory and practice. This revolves on interpreting the cultural significance of the refugee phenomenon and the controversial role of religion in liberal societies, refugee identities, and populist rhetoric. I argue that while the ambivalent values and principles of liberalism are mostly positive, there are apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies which produce vicious cycles of mistrust that leave communities with unanswered genuine concerns. The sincere concerns of some communities make them inclined to align themselves with dangerous ideologies such as populism, which appear to address their fears. Additionally, analyzing the EC as an institution reveals their emphasis on liberal values which, among other things, seeks to regulate religion to the private realm. The EC makes great efforts to fight against discrimination, advocating for tolerance and recognizing religious identities, however, their appeal for national communities to divorce themselves or compartmentalize their religious identities for universal, general liberal values seems counterintuitive.

Moreover, this testifies to the misunderstanding within liberal ideology of the paramount element religion plays in some members of society and appears not adequately to address the concerns of national host communities. I claim this is part of the cycle that inadvertently pushes portions of the population towards ideologies that appear to address their concerns. So while the EC recognizes thick identity formation, they appeal for thin community formation. Given the complexity of social cohesion in pluralistic societies this approach appears to suffice, however, as I argue allowing religion to be impartially inclusive in society may enact the change that is needed for culture to reform religious worldviews thereby allowing for better social cohesion. I conclude that this can take place if a better understanding of the convoluted relationship between religion and culture can be seen as interdependent; reciprocating change in how the other is manifested, thus opening avenues for religious reformation. When seen through an anthropological discipline there is hope that culture can affect change on worldviews which are the perceptions of reconciling the way one logically makes sense of the world as they see it with how they experience it. This paradigm of worldviews is heavily reliant and constructed by culture. Consequently, as people

develop, are exposed to different realities, and cultures change, so will worldviews. Given that culture, religion and worldview are interrelated gives hope for enacting favorable changes in societies towards refugees.

6.2 Contributions, limitations and further research

Having achieved the goal of this research by determining the ethical stances of the EC as well as interpreting the meaning of how and why they constructed their ethical framework - contributes to determining the values of their institution. Given the significance of the EC as an influential institution for millions of people, this thesis has contributed to better comprehending some factors that determine how and what influences their institutional ethical decision making. This analysis could aid in predicting how future "crisis" are ethically handled. Through examining the work of Matthew Gibney (2004) on impartialism, partialism, and the principles of humanitarianism, this thesis also tests' and develops ethical theories. Additionally, it contributes to identifying general patterns in liberalism and offers possible solutions which contribute to advancing ethical theory building. Lastly, this thesis contributes to the studies of the political and social trends that appear to be on the horizon, mainly the challenge to the current global liberal order of international politics by populism and nationalism.

There are, however, limitations to this research that need mentioning. First, the scope of this thesis mostly concentrated on the analysis of the socio-cultural effects of the refugee phenomenon. Other areas such as economic factors were, for the most part not taken into account nor were integration ideologies, all which affect refugee policies. This, however, does not negate the relevance of this thesis; rather, it could aid as a foundation for taking into consideration the ethics of economic and integration factors. Second is the issue of design. Since I was limited in finances and time as a researcher, I was only able to collect naturally occurring data in the form of speeches. This meant that the researcher heavily determined the analysis since the participants were not allowed to give further explanation to the construction of specific themes. While no research is free from biases, I attempted to stay as neutral as possible by reviewing a wide range of literature in order to take all aspects into account and present opposing views to different ideologies. This enabled me to give the best possible interpretation. As mentioned above time, constrained the design employed in this thesis; however, time also played another factor, which speaks of generalizing. This thesis sought to analyze the EC's responses of the refugee phenomenon during a specific time frame that means

the research is limited to those specific political actors who may not be in office in the near future. However, the general learned patterns exhibited by the principles enacted through this institution can apply to the overall view of liberalism, religion, and refugees.

Given these limitations, I would suggest further research into the institution of the EC that incorporates the use of interviews to broaden the understanding of how they construct their ethical framework. Additionally, interviews could shed light into the area of how economic and integration politics are affecting the ethical behavior of the EC. Since the EC appears too distant, any perceived negative connotation of refugees, their political speeches did not comprehensively address the burdens that societies may accrue such as economics. Lastly, I would recommend research that tests the theories that pertain to the aspect of religion. If the concern of communities is the adverse effects of what is perceived to be an antithetical religious identity with the values of host communities, then research should be given to test that hypothesis as well as the proposed solutions that this thesis suggests.

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