Press ethics and perceptions of journalism in Turkey

An analysis of journalists' ethical challenges
with special regard to codes of conduct and hate speech

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Abstract

This master thesis analyzes the ethical challenges journalists have in their work, with special regard to code of conduct and hate speech. When it comes to the issue of hate speech, this master thesis focuses at hate speech directed to minorities in Turkey.

The media market in Turkey is highly regulated by laws and regulations. As a result of that several newspapers have been in trouble with the law. This in turn leads to self-censorship in the business. Two media groups own 80 percent of the newspapers. This makes the media very concentrated. Media owners also invest in other businesses, such as energy, automotive, telecommunication. Since media owners also invest in other companies, journalists avoid writing critical about companies the owner of their newspaper has made investments in. Hate speech directed in newspapers at minorities, are not problematized among the public. After Turkey was founded as a republic, there was a homogenization policy in Turkey. Minorities didn't have the same rights in Turkey as Turks. Foreign countries such as France, Britain and Russia, forced Turkey to grant minority rights. This has caused a bad memory in Turkey, when talking about minority rights. Minorities are often written about as terrorists, like the Kurdish people. Hate speech can lead to hate crime, and there is no legislation of either hate speech or hate crime.

In order to have some reflections about the issues journalists have in their work with special regard to code of conduct and hate speech, I conducted 10 interviews with people who has worked and works as journalists, columnists and in organizations which have competence in this field.

The study shows that it's difficult writing ethical about issues such as corruption, non-unionization, Kurdish/Armenian issue, because the media owners invest in other sectors as well. The media is regulated with many laws, and these laws can be used against newspapers when they write about something which is in disfavor of the government. The media has a clientalist relationship with the government, which also makes it difficult writing critical news about the government. Since nationalism is deep-rooted in the society in Turkey, hate speech targeted at minorities don't cause reactions at the people. The only type of hate speech that has been problematized by the government is Islamophobia. What would normally been regarded as freedom of speech, has been violated in Turkey, blaming it for *insulting Turkishness.*

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This master thesis addresses challenges journalists working in Turkish newspapers have regarding ethical practice and hate speech. The starting point of this master thesis is minorities in Turkey. I want to look at how they are perceived and described by journalists in Turkish newspapers since I assume that newspapers are instrumental in shaping peoples' attitude towards minorities. It might also be the other way around, namely that newspapers reflect the already existing attitude people have towards minorities. Since hate speech in newspapers often are directed at minorities, hate speech is included in the research question. Further I want to explore to what extent journalists follow codes of conduct in their daily work, and if they don't, what are the reasons for not following a certain code of conduct. There might be several reasons for not following a code of conduct. Perhaps the problem is on the individual level, that most journalists are not well enough educated about codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. Or it could be on a structural level, that there is no room for following codes of conducts since a code of conduct concerns around ethical principles, and media only care about profit maximation. I also want to know whether the issue of codes and conducts and hate speech are interconnected. Perhaps lack of prioritizing codes of conduct leads to more hate speech. With these different issues in mind, the research question is formulated the following way:

How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes of conduct and hate speech?

In 1997 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on hate speech that stated the term "shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin" (Council of Europe: 2009). In Turkey there is neither hate speech, nor hate crime legislation, and there are no

real sanctions if a journalist writes hate speech toward a minority group in Turkish newspapers. The only suggestion of hate crime legislation is against Islamophobia. In Turkey more than 90% are Muslims, so this suggestion of legislation would not protect the minorities of the country.

The issue of hate speech in media has been on the agenda in several bodies in the Council of Europe, and also in several Turkish organizations. This means that this is an issue also on an international level.

There's a definition of minorities here, since they are a big part of this master thesis. According to Store Norske Leksikon, minority is used for ethnic groups which constitute a minority of the population in a country. The description is also used for subordinated or marginal groups, defined from ethnic "racial" or other characteristics as gender, religions, language or culture. Another important criterion is inequality in power and political influence. In many cases national minorities have originated through geopolitical borders between states, as for instance in Europe after the First World War (SNL: 2013). The minorities which will be in scope in this master thesis, are Kurdish and Armenian minorities defined as ethnic groups, which also distinct themselves from the majority in Turkey when it comes to other characteristics such as religion and language. The Kurdish minority is Muslim, but they have another language, and the Armenian minority has both another language and religion, since they traditionally have been regarded as Christians. Other minorities are the Romani people, and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people (LGBT).

By raising this research question I want to find out more about two different issues, how journalists in Turkish newspapers deal with codes of conduct and how they deal with hate speech. These two issues sometimes overlap. If a journalist doesn't care about following a code of conduct because the journalist doesn't find the code of conduct that important, the journalist might also not care about whether the article he or she writes can perceived as hate speech or not. Not writing hate speech can be implemented in a code of conduct. So code of conduct is more general and often contains "recommendations about hate speech" while hate speech is more specific. I think that those two issues are connected, and this I will try to show through my data.

1.1 Research question

The research question is:

How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes of conduct and hate speech?

Those included in the target group are people working in newspapers, television, non-governmental organizations and professors working at universities in Turkey. After getting to know about their background through the interviews, it turned out that some of the interviewees earlier had worked as a journalist. When writing Turkish journalists, I mean a person who writes for a newspaper or magazine. In this case not only those who writes a lot of reportages and do a lot of interviews in a newspaper, but also those working as columnists, or those who write for a newspaper once or twice a week, are included. By ethical challenges I think of challenges that would occur by the news production, such as the conflict between doing ethical journalism and writing sensational news.

By writing "in their work", I point at what their working at, I'm not thinking about ethical challenges at their working place, with colleagues and so on. According to The new Penguin Thesaurus dictionary, a code of conduct, is referred to as both guidelines, principles, and ethics (Penguin Books: 2000). Then it's possible to describe a code of conduct as ethical guidelines. In the case of journalism, a code of conduct is issued by a press council or a journalist association to help the journalists to follow a certain ethical standard.

1.2 Research objective

The objective of this research is to investigate the experiences and reflections the interviewees, which have competence in the field of journalism and hate speech in newspapers, have around the topic of the research question in this master thesis.

1.3 Motivation

The starting point of this master thesis was the minorities in Turkey. The reason behind it is because I want to know more about the situation of minorities in Turkey. I had read that Turkey used to be much more ethnically mixed before the First World War, and that during the nation building process

in Turkey, it became much harder for minorities living in Turkey. This made me wonder how the situation is for minorities in Turkey today, and to which extent the history forms peoples' perception of minorities. I had also heard about cases where newspapers portrayed minorities negatively, which has led to more hostility against minorities. This was not cases particularly in Turkey, but in general. Since newspapers are instrumental in shaping what people think of minorities, I thought it would be interesting finding out if it is difficult following a code of conduct, to avoid this sort of portraying of minorities, and which challenges journalists have with in the case of hate speech.

Politically I find Turkey interesting because Turkey is a regional power both in connection to the Arab world and in connection to Eurasia. After the Arab spring, Turkey was referred to as a role model in the Arab world regarding democracy. A way to look at how democratic a country really is, is by looking at how they treat their minorities. Turkey has been an EU candidate since 1995, and I also want to explore how this fact affects the media in Turkey and the treatment of minorities.

Hate speech in newspapers and in general is a phenomenon not only in Turkey, but also at international level. This means that the topic of this master thesis is not only in interest for those who live in Turkey. In a human right perspective hate speech and freedom of speech can be two conflicting rights. What someone will regard as a personal opinion about Christianity, and defend it in the name of freedom of speech, other will regard as hate speech towards Christianity. The court in a given country is the one with the power of definition of what is hate speech and what freedom of speech is, but these decisions are hard to make. This conflict between hate speech and freedom of speech, is present in many countries, and is a topic I would assume is of interest also in academia.

1.4 Research methodology

I did 10 qualitative interviews in Istanbul with people working in television, newspapers, professors at universities and non-governmental organizations. There after I analyzed the interviews by using thematic analysis. I'm interested in categories which emerged out of the interviews, and how these categories are discussed by the interviewees.

In the book of Alan Bryman, *Social research methods* (2012), content analysis is defined as an approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seek to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner. This is a term employed by Altheide (1996) to refer to an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in

the construction of the meaning of and in texts. It is also sometimes referred to as qualitative content analysis. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data (Bryman 2012: 290-291).

Since the data which will be used in the analysis are not document or texts, but interviews, it's arguably more correct to say that it's thematic analysis. But the emphasis of letting the categories emerge out of data and the role of the investigator is consistent with the principles of use during my analysis.

I read through all the interviews and tried to figure out which themes were emerging out of the data. When several of the interviewees pointed at the same theme, the theme was written as a sub-topic of the analysis, and abstracts were placed from the interviews and under the sub-topic. Some of the sub-topics were predefined since they were asked a question, and they answered upon that question. When doing qualitative content analysis, there is an emphasis at what is being said, not how it is said. It allows the researcher to proofread the quotations with the objective of making the quotation easier to read. The data were in the end placed in the context of both the background and the theory chapter, and makes the different chapters in the master thesis more interconnected.

1.5 Related research

There is a Turkish master thesis written in 2006 about press ethics and practice of journalism in Turkey: "A case study on Turkish journalists' self-evaluation of their codes of practice", written by Hilal Köylü. There is not so much literature on hate speech in Turkey, but Hrant Dink Foundation arranged a three-day conference in Turkey in 2012, which resulted in a book named *hate speech and hate crime* (Nefret suclari ve nefret söylemi). Minority Rights Group International (MRG), a non-governmental organization working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, in 2007 published the report *A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey.* In this particular project they focus on issues like displacement, anti-discrimination law, and educational rights of minorities in Turkey. European Network against racism published in 2012 the report *Turkey: Racism and related discriminatory.* In this report they write about different issues minority groups are heading in Turkey, such as employment, housing and racist violence and crime.There have also been published yearly reports from freedom house and reporters without borders about the press freedom in the world. One report that goes more into detail about the press freedom

in Turkey, is the report of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), 2012: *Caught in the Wheels of Power: The Political, Legal and Economic Constraints on Independent Media and Freedom of the Press in Turkey.*

In the case of racism and hate speech in the press Teun A. Van Dijk, in 1991 published the book: *Racism and the Press*. He has researched on discourse in the society, and how racism spreads through text and talk. This book in particular focuses on racism in the press, how the press use headlines and topics to promote their opinions, and how the readers use the information they get through the press. In the case of ethics in journalism, Jeremy Iggers in 1998 published the book: *Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest,* where he writes about journalism in general, and issues of following a code of conduct in journalism.

1.6 Outline

In chapter one you find the background for the topic, the reason for having this angle to the master thesis, methodology research object, and different motivations for writing this master thesis. It finishes with a presentation of the theory which will be used.

In chapter two you find the historical background of how minorities were treated under the nation building process of the Turkish republic. Politics, media and the society at large in Turkey can be understood through the lenses of polarization, which was also the main reason for the three coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Thereafter the chapter shifts to politics in Turkey today, and continue with the governmental regulations of the media. It finishes with the Turkish media landscape, which include the sub-chapter of polarization in media market, working conditions for journalists, self-regulation, hate speech and social monitoring of newspapers, which is done mainly by non-governmental organizations.

In chapter three you find the theory I will use for the analysis of my data. I will use social dominance theory in my analysis. Social dominance theory is about group-based social hierarchies, and why someone in one group tries to dominate other groups. In order to keep the inequality in a society, people and institutions hold on to different forms of legitimizing myths. In this theory legitimizing myths are separated into Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths (HE-LM) and Hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths (HA-LM). Within the first category (myths) as sexism, racism and nationalism fits in. Within the last category (myths) such as human rights and socialism

fits in. The concept of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating also fits to institutions.

In chapter four you find the methodology of the master thesis. The chapter starts with the presentation of the research design. The research design contains information about the number and age of the interviewees. Thereafter the research question is presented once again, and there is an explanation of why Social Dominance Theory has been used in this master thesis. In the end of this chapter there is a practical description of how money and time constraints affect the project, and of ethical issues around the project.

In chapter five you find the analysis. The sub-chapters in the analysis-chapter consist of categories/themes that emerged out of the data and themes that the interviewees were asked about during the interview. These categories/themes are as follows: Polarization, minorities, media group/ownership, auto-censorship/self-censorship, government/freedom of speech, codes of conducts in practice/implementation, nationalism in Turkey, hate crime legislation and Islamophobia and social media. I start each sub-chapter with an introduction, thereby change between excerpt of interviews and an analysis of this excerpt, and a conclusive analysis of all the excerpts in the end of each sub-chapter.

In chapter six you find a conclusion based on the findings in the data in connection to the background and theory-chapter.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the society in a given country, it is essential to take a look at the historical events in this country. Since minorities are a big part of this master thesis, the focus at the historical background will be about how minorities have been regarded by the state in the transformation from the Ottoman Empire till the founding of the Republic of Turkey and the decades thereafter. Thereafter the focus will be at politics in Turkey earlier in history and today. Since 1999 Turkey has been an EU candidate, which has led to a democratization process in Turkey. This democratization process has had both progress and set-backs. Media is closely connected to both politics and other financial sectors, which in turn affect what the journalists can write about in terms of politics and business. The government regulates the media by passing different media laws onto the media. These laws affect both freedom of speech and self-censorship and self-regulation in journalism.

2.1 Historical background of the Republic of Turkey

The Ottoman Empire lasted from the fourteenth to the twentieth century, and stretched almost from Vienna in the west to Iran in the east. This resulted in diverse ethnic and religious minorities being included in the empire, most of them being Jews and Christians. Christianity, Judaism and Islam have Abraham as their stamfather, therefore Christian and Jewish minorities were accepted as 'people of the book' (Pulton 1997: 43). The empire allowed religious groups limited autonomy in governing themselves through the millet system.

Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire there was a rise in nationalism, as well as demands for rights and equality, among both minority and majority groups. Different groups belonging to the empire, wanted to have their own nation state, this was especially the case at the Balkans. This was at the time when nationalism was on its rise in Europe. Turkey was also affected by the nationalistic sentiments. The government failed to meet the society's demands for democratization and equal treatment. This situation led the outside powers such as Russia, France and Britain to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, by claiming to be protectors of the Christian minorities. The war with Russia in 1915 almost led to a complete destruction of Christian communities in Anatolia. This event has afterwards been called the Armenian genocide, even though it's not recognized as the Armenian genocide by Turkey.

The peace treaties were established in 1919–20, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its allies. The victorious states required defeated and new states to guarantee the rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. Minority protection was imposed on Turkey in the Treaty of Sevres. Meanwhile, much of the former Ottoman territory was occupied by the Allied powers. Turkey reacted to this intervention by foreign powers with the War of Independence. The result of this War of Independence was the creation of the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 (MRG 2007: 6).

The Republic was geographically much smaller than the Ottoman Empire. They looked to Europe, and particularly to France, to find a nation state model which they could use while forming the Republic of Turkey. They imported ideologies used in the nation state building process in France, namely secularism and nationalism. The core elements of this ideology have later been called "Kemalism" after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Nationalism is often seen as a modern phenomenon which originated in Europe at the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century.

While economic success can decrease the risk of nationalisms, economic troubles can have reverse effect (Pulton 1997: 2, 6). Since Turkey had experienced losing a lot of their territory in the transition from the Ottoman Empire till the republic of Turkey, and felt they were behind Europe in sense of modernization, nationalism arguably had good conditions for growing in Turkey. The project of modernization was connected to nationalism. This project was conducted mostly by the elites in Turkey, and not done by the grass movement (Kavli 2009: 104).

After Turkeys' War of Independence, they negotiated a new Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. They were again compelled by the European powers to grant minority rights to 'non-Muslims'. These recurrent events of foreign powers forcing Turkey to grant minority rights, has created a memory in Turkey where 'minority rights' are being associated with an unjustified interference in their internal affairs.

While a separate legal regime was created for some non-Muslims which in practice meant only Armenians, Greeks and Jews, all Muslims categorized as 'Turks' became subject to homogenization policies. These homogenization policies can be regarded as one step in the nationalization project of Turkey. Non-Muslims had to pay the high price of 'second-class citizenship' in return for minority rights, and various ethnic groups, as well as individuals belonging to non-Sunni denominations of Islam, had to suppress their differences in order to get 'full citizenship'. The process of eradicating non-Muslims from Anatolia continued after Lausanne with the 1923 population exchange agreement, whereby Turkey and Greece 'exchanged' large parts of their respective Roma and Turkish minorities (MRG 2007: 7).

The nationalization process in 1930s formed the official policy of 'Turkey exclusively for the Turks' (Pulton 1997: 115). Many professions were closed to those who weren't ethnic Turks. Various ethnic groups who shared a common Muslim identity were labeled as 'Turks' and became subject to homogenization policies through various laws and policies adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the concrete homogenization policies were as followed: nationalist theories advocating the supremacy of the Turkish history and language, forcing resettlement of minorities in predominantly Turkish areas in order to assimilate them into the 'Turkish culture', prohibition of the use of non-Turkish names, the ban on the use of minority languages in schools and in courts, and the requirement of 'belonging to the Turkish race' for recruitment to military academies and employment in the public sector (MRG 2007: 7). In 1934, Law 2510, regulating the distribution and settlement of Turkey's population, saw Eastern Thrace restricted to inhabitants of purely Turkish upbringing and education, and the forced removal of the historic Jewish communities of Edirne and

the Straits zone. This anti-Jewish campaign led to the flight of 8-10,000 Thracian Jews to Istanbul in the space of a couple of weeks. Some of these policies and policies later in the Turkish history, have almost led to eradication of different minority groups.

The situation worsened with Ismet Inönü, the successor of Atatürk. The severe economic crisis of 1939-42 was blamed on Jewish and Christian businessmen, and the Turkish press launched a vicious campaign against them. Religion and ethnicity were the criteria used to define how much tax a person should pay. There were two lists: one for Muslims and one for non-Muslims. Non-Muslims paid up to ten times as much as Muslims. The published list of defaulters revealed that they were almost all Greeks, Jews and Armenians. Another aim of the tax was that it would destroy many of Istanbul's non-Turkish businesses which had survived the economic nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s. The situation regarding non-Turkish Muslims was also problematic. A serious revolt of Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds led by Sheikh Said was ruthlessly put down, and hundreds of his supporters including himself were hanged (Pulton 1997: 116-119).

In order to make the people loyal to the nation state, a nation state needs an ideology that people can believe in. Building a national sentiment within a given country makes the people think that they have something in common.

2.2 Politics in Turkey

Turkey has secularism as state principle, and defines their selves as a secular state. The ideal of secularism as state principle comes from the party of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was the leader of the Republican people party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP).

The fact that the ideologies of secularism and nationalism was forced from top-down, make the ownership to these two ideologies harder. Even though people in Turkey were happy that changes were made in the country, they didn't necessary agree to all the methods and the ideologies behind these changes. Some people supported the ideology of secularism, while other people were more skeptical to secularism. Turkey has been divided in two when it comes to the ideology of secularism, and has led to a polarization both at society at large and within politics. This polarization in politics was more visible when the one party system ended after the Second World War. This polarization further led to political instability in the country. The military took the role of protecting the heritage of Atatürk, and when the military feared that this heritage of Atatürk and

CHP was in danger, they conducted a coup. This happened both in 1960, 1971 and 1980. A way of trying to create more stable Governments, was by introducing the law that a party needed at least 10 percent to be part of the Government. In 1982 a new constitution was made. Arguably this was a constitution made in order to protect the values of Kemalism. This constitution is the one they have in Turkey today. Islamistic parties have several times in history been banned, since they have been accused of threatening the secularistic values in Turkey (Kavli 2009: 105).

2.2.1 Government

Today it is the party called justice and development party (Adalet ve kalkinma Partisi-AKP) which is in government. They are the only party in government, which means that they have a one party-rule. AKP won the Turkish parliament election in November 2002 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which became prime minister in 2003. AKP was founded as one of two successors after the Islamistic inspired virtue party, Fazilet Partisi (FP) (Kavli 2009: 106). As earlier in Turkish history, the secularist side feared autumn 2002 that the secular nature of the republic and basic freedoms was in danger. Many people voted for AKP in the election because they thought that this party perhaps would be better able to govern the country in a more responsible way than the earlier governments had managed to do. The project of Erdogan has been trying to combine western modernity and traditional Turkish and Islamic values. By doing that, he tries both to please the secularist side, and the Islamic side of the population in Turkey. AKP regard themselves as a "centrist-conservative, democratic political party" (Kavli 2009: 108).

In Turkey the prime minister has a lot more power than the president, and you could arguably say that Erdogan has the same power in Turkey as president Obama has in USA. Erdogan is thinking of running for precedency in 2014, and also to move the executive power from the prime minister to the president. This means that he would practically have the same role in Turkey in the future that he has today (Nytimes: 2012).

Turkey still has the same constitution which was made in 1982, two years after the coup initiated by the military. Having a constitution which was made two years after a coup is not an ideal situation, and is not suitable for the situation Turkey is in today. The government is now working on a new constitution. The work started with the setting up of a Constitution Conciliation Committee, following an agreement between different parties on equal representation. The committee is composed of three members from each of the four political groups in parliament. The Conciliation

Committee held public consultations with a broad range of stakeholders between November 2011 and April 2012 to receive the views of political parties not represented in parliament, of state bodies, professional associations, trade unions and non-governmental organizations. For the first time ever, representatives of non-Muslim minorities were officially received by parliament. This is a democratic move by the Government.

The key challenges to consensus on the substance of the constitution include views on the separation of powers, state-society-religion relations and the Kurdish issue. A meeting was held between the Prime Minister and the leader of the main opposition party CHP, looking for opportunities to make progress on the Kurdish issue, but there was no follow-up (European Commission 2012: 7-8). Judicial reform and the normalization of civilian-military relations remain priorities of the government. The government has again started to work with its commitment to EU accession. Some of the legislation was adopted without enough consultation, which caused strong criticism. Members of the government reacted negatively to the criticism from the media and civil society, and brought court cases on a number of occasions, for instance when criticized for supposed nationalist tendencies (European Commission 2012: 10-11).

2.2.2 Parliament

The new parliament convened on 1 October 2011 with all parties represented, following a crisis over the courts' refusal to release eight MPs-elect from pre-trial detention (what is MP?) Work on political reforms and the parliament's ability to perform its key functions of law making and oversight of the executive, continues to be prevented by a lack of spirit of compromise among political parties. The 10% minimum limit for acquiring seats in parliament remains the highest among Council of Europe member states. The 10% limit was made in order not to have stable parties in the parliament, but it's also a democratic problem if a party has 9% and thereby cannot obtain seats in the parliament. Consultation of civil society remains the exception rather than the rule (European Commission 2012: 8-10). Civil society often represents voices in the society which are not so often heard, and civil society often has a watch dog function towards the politics in a country. Often civil society organizations are experts in a certain field, and that's why it's problematic if they aren't taken seriously.

When it comes to the policy making of the media, the parliament in general has a limited role. In accordance with strict party discipline which dominates the political culture in Turkey,

parliamentarians often vote in line with the party politics. Little discussion on substantive issues

takes place in the parliament, and in those cases where it does, it is quite partisan. Opposition parties often express their opinions through accusations rather than constructive criticism whereas the government rarely takes into account their feedback. The political culture of lawmaking and the legislative workload caused by the need to harmonize the national legal framework with different EU criteria, prevent the parliament from responding in time to the unforeseen needs arising from a fast changing media sector. The regulatory agencies' role in policy making is also quite limited. They have to prepare drafts in accordance with the political priorities of the government, which then finishes these before submission to the parliament (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 18).

2.2.3 EU

The democratization process in Turkey and the work with writing a new constitution is linked to the EU accession process. In order to become a member of EU a country has to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. The key criteria were defined at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. Countries that want to join EU need to have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Further they need to have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU, and the ability to implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Commission: 2013). Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 1995, and in 1999 Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate country. The accession negotiations started in 2005. Some of the European institutions Turkey already is a member of, is the European Council, OSCE and NATO.

Turkey's acceptance as an official candidate for membership to the European Union (EU) has generated a huge political reform process, which further accelerated after 2002, when the ruling Justice and Development Party came to power (European Commission 2012: 4). There has been a progress towards granting limited and conditional language rights to ethnic and linguistic minorities and remedying some of the property rights violations against non-Muslims in the 60s, but there is still a lot more things to do.

AKP have reversed many human rights reforms the latest years, especially after 2005. Turkey still has a restrictive Anti-Terror law, and their Penal Code maintains authoritarian provisions in violation of fundamental rights and freedoms (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 64). When it comes to the protection of minority rights, they have been reversed. Examples of these are: the criminal proceedings against intellectuals, advocates and writers for criticizing Turkey's minority policy and/or advocating minority rights, rising nationalism and racism, the strengthening of ultra-right-wing groups, increasing attacks against minorities, and normalization of discriminatory discourse. This discourse is not just from the media and civil society, but also from state officials at the highest level. The assassination on 19 January 2007 of Hrant Dink, an Armenian journalist and intellectual which voiced the Armenian question, indicates that minorities and their advocates in Turkey still are struggling.

The election in August 2007 of Abdullah Gul, the former foreign minister who has been working with fulfilling the EU human rights conditionality as the new president, is a development in terms of minority protection. Much will depend on the new government's political will to conduct reforms, and its ability to stand up to the military establishment. The government's initiation of the process to draft a new constitution is a promising start.

The concept of 'minority' still triggers discriminatory reactions. Public officials at highest levels make offensive statements about minority identity, portraying it as an undesirable and unworthy status. Zeki Sezer, the leader of Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) 'blamed' the government for portraying Kurds and Alevis as minorities for the sake of entering the EU. Advocacy on minority rights is considered as conspiracy against or betrayal of the state by nationalists and some public officials. During a press conference, Chief of Staff Yasar Buyukant blamed the EU for creating new minorities in the Republic by calling ethnic and religious communities, such as the Alevis and Kurds, minorities in its reports on Turkey (MRG 2007: 6-7).

2.3 Governmental regulations of the Turkish press

In order to understand the working situation for journalists and their ethical dilemmas, you need to know what kind of regulations they have to relate to. This sub-chapter starts with the structural level of the media in Turkey, and then on the individual level.

Turkey did not have a regulatory framework governing media content until the mid-1990s, because

of the domination of the state in all sectors of the economy, including the media. Until mid-1980s, the state had direct control over the media. In 1983 the neoliberal Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) came to power. This was the end of the military rule, and also a turning point in Turkey's economy. ANAP's leader Turgut Özal initiated a process of economic liberalization and adopted free-market reforms. The new government's support for private entrepreneurship encouraged big corporations to enter the media sector. This changed the profile of investors of the media. In the 1990s, with the termination of state monopoly over broadcasting, the Turkish media market started to be dominated by a few conglomerates, which increased their economic power through mergers, and made competition strategies by setting up cartels and engaging in promotion wars. This situation changed with the 2001 economic crisis and the following state regulation of the banking sector. Those media groups which had investments in the financial and banking sectors were particularly affected by the crisis. The rapid deregulation of the media and the emergence of cartels, led to the need for a regulatory framework to govern the market. This resulted in the adoption of the first broadcasting law, and the establishment of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK). The main reason for policymaking in the media has been to harmonize better the laws with the EU criteria.

Policy making in the media in Turkey is a bureaucratic process where priorities are set by the executive. The ministries, agencies and institutions responsible for media regulation, follow the conservative values in the constitutional and legal framework. When there's a tension between the values of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the right to privacy versus the protection of the family, nation and the state over the individual, they tend to prioritize the latter goal (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 17-18). The tension between these two values is reflected in the Press Law. The Press Law protects freedom of the press, the right to information, and the right of reply to defamatory or untruthful news. At the same time the law restricts these freedoms on the argumentation of protecting national security, territorial integrity and state secrets. A new amendment to the media law was passed in 2011, allowing for television broadcasts to be suspended and stations to be fined or closed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan or other designated ministers in cases of emergency or threats to national security (Freedom house: 2012). Also here the argument of national security is used.

In the new Broadcasting Law in Turkey (no. 6112) there are diverse types of restrictions going beyond the EU Directive which the law claims to be in compliance with. While the EU directive

cites the protection of children and prevention of hate speech as the only grounds for content restriction, the law restricts content on grounds of, inter alia, 'the national and moral values of society, general morality and the protection of the family.' The state has been criticized for violating the freedom of expression and freedom of the press by defining broadcasting principles in punitive laws rather than enabling the media to develop its own values. A further criticism is the conservative nature of the values endorsed in the Broadcasting Law by the exclusion of sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 36).

2.3.1 Penal laws

As I have mentioned in previous chapter, Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and expression are only partially upheld in practice. They are also generally undermined by provisions in the Penal Code and a strict Anti-Terror Law. Turkish law does not meet press freedom standards as laid out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). All countries that are party to the European Council, have automatically agreed to follow ECHR. The restrictive Penal Code overshadows positive reforms that have been implemented since Turkey became an EU candidate (Freedom house: 2012).

Here are some articles from the penal code which overshadow the new reforms in Turkey. These articles provide the legal basis for cases against the media organs, journalists and human rights defenders:

Defamation (Article 125)

Setting up criminal organizations for the overthrow of the constitutional order (Article 314) encouraging military personnel to disobey the law (Article 319)

Discouraging individuals from military service (Article 318)

Insulting the Turkish nation, state, parliament, government or the courts (Article 301)

Incitement to crime (Article 214)

Praising a crime or criminals (Article 215)

Incitement to hatred or animosity (Article 216)

Publishing or broadcasting obscene material (Article 226)

(Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 39).

Article 216 of the Penal Code, which bans "inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples", is used against journalists and other commentators who write about the Kurdish population or allegedly denigrate the armed forces. You can get six-months to three-year in prison if you are sentenced with this article. The academic Ismail Besikci was in 2011 sentenced to 15 months in prison for an article entitled "The Rights of the Nations to Self-Determination and the Kurds." Besikci has spent a total of 17 years in prison for similar publications on the Kurdish minority. The cartoonist Bahadir Baruter faced a one-year prison sentence for a cartoon that appeared in the weekly magazine *Penguen*, depicting the words "There is no God, religion is a lie" on the wall of a mosque. The 2004 press law that replaced prison sentences with fines for media violations is here being overshadowed by article 216 of the Penal Code (Freedom house: 2012).

Defamation cases against journalists who criticize the government have been brought by high level officials, including the Prime Minister. In 2011, 24 journalists were sentenced to a total of 21 years and nine months of imprisonment and 48,000 TL in fines in defamation cases. Two newspapers were fined to a total of 50,000 TL. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found a violation of freedom of expression in their judgment of this issue in February 2012. Prosecutors are using the Penal Code to censor the media by penalizing them for covering cases where the military officers are accused of having committed crimes against the state. Recently, criminal cases are brought against journalists for breaching the confidentiality of investigations (Article 285) and for attempting to unduly influence the courts (Article 288). These two articles have been used more

regularly since 2007 because of the Ergenokon case which many journalists have been writing about (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40). Ergenekon is a network called "the state behind the state" which consists of high ranked military people, politicians, academicians and journalists. The network is accused for being behind both terror, murder and disappearances, and makes sure the cases remain unsolved. The motivation behind all this is to maintain the secular Turkish state.

In 2011, three journalists from the website OdaTV were arrested in relation to the Ergenekon case. Later the same year the police raided a number of homes of journalists and professors in search of notes and computers. The government and the chief prosecutor in the Ergenekon case says that journalists arrested during the investigation were detained not because of their writing, but because of evidence tying them to an illegal organization, though this evidence has not been released. The

OdaTV staff was allegedly targeted for their critical reporting on the Ergenekon case. Mustafa Balbay, a bureau chief of the daily *Cumhuriyet* who was arrested in connection with Ergenekon, had been held in prison without charge for nearly three years as of the end of December 2011 (Freedom house: 2012).

Another provision that the prosecutors refer to for censoring the press, is Article 318, which makes the non-violent expression of views on conscientious objection a criminal offence, and the publication of these views in the media an aggravating factor. The provision has caused the conviction of journalists for simply reporting on conscientious objectors who refuse to serve in the army (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40).

The most widely debated and criticized provision of the Penal Code has been Article 301, mainly because of the high profile cases brought against intellectuals such as Hrant Dink and the Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk. Five columnists of the national media were also prosecuted under this provision for having criticized the banning of an academic conference on the Armenian genocide of 1915. Article 301 originated from a diplomatic row Turkey had with France in 2001 after French National Assembly recognized the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide. As a result of this diplomatic row, Turkey made constitutional amendments (MRG 2007: 5).

Article 301 of the Penal Code, which prescribes prison terms of six months to two years for "denigration of the Turkish nation," has been used to punish journalists who state that the genocide was committed against the Armenians in 1915, discusses the division of Cyprus, or criticizes the security forces. Because of growing international pressure, the government amended, but did not abolish, the provision such that prosecution in each individual case is now subject to prior authorization of the Minister of Justice. This amendment has decreased the number of proceedings launched under this provision, but it has still been found inadequate by the human rights community (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40). The amendments made in 2008 to this article were mostly cosmetic changes, substituting "Turkish nation" for "Turkishness" and "State of the Turkish Republic" for "Turkish Republic," and reducing the maximum prison sentence from three years to two (Freedom house: 2012).

2.3.2 National courts

The track record of Turkish high courts in cases involving freedom of expression and freedom of media is poor. In civil cases high courts tend to go against the established ECtHR case law, by ruling in favor of plaintiffs who bring defamation cases against intellectuals and public personalities. These plaintiffs have in several cases been high officials, including the prime minister (see 2.3.1). In March 2011, the High Court of Appeals sentenced Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk to pay around a 2,500 Euro fine for having 'violated the personalities' of plaintiffs for having stated in an interview that the Turks 'killed 30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians'.

The courts use the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code for convicting individuals who express non-violent opinions on the situation of the Kurdish minority or the armed conflict between the army and the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-PKK), which is a militant and political organization among Kurds in Turkey. Often they don't make a distinction between reporting on terrorism and terrorist propaganda, and instead regard 'media outlets reporting about sensitive issues as the publishing organs of illegal organizations'. A result of this is that journalists often are prosecuted on charges of terrorism and treated as 'terrorists' just for having performed their duties to provide the public with information (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 40-41). Amendments to the anti-terror law, officially called the Law on the Fight against Terrorism, which were passed in 2006, says that journalists can be imprisoned for up to three years for the dissemination of statements and propaganda by terrorist organizations, and five years for creating propaganda on behalf of a terrorist organization. The legislation has raised concerns about arbitrary prosecutions, since members of the pro-Kurdish press are sometimes accused of collaborating with the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militant group. The Ergenekon and PKK cases have further led editors and journalists to practice self-censorship to avoid violating legal restrictions (Freedom house: 2012).

The Turkish Constitutional Court's case law on freedom of the press and expression is also problematic. The Court has decided not to review the restrictive criminal laws, even when the head of the executive branch has recommended it. In a case brought by the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, on the grounds that the suspension of the future publications and distribution of a periodical violate the freedom of the press, the Constitutional Court found Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law to be compatible with the constitution and rejected the request for annulment. Legal

reforms have also been overshadowed by the Constitutional Court. Where the parliament adopted progressive legal reforms in accordance with the ECHR standards, the Constitutional Court ran over the changes. In May 2011 the Constitutional Court invalidated Article 26 of the Press Law, which imposes time limits on prosecutors for launching criminal cases. Once this decision enters into force in July 2012, prosecutors will no longer be bound to certain time restraints if they want to file a case about a publication in a periodical. For time being, the maximum period for filing a case is two months after publication for dailies and four months for weeklies (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 41).

Various international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Federation of Journalists and the Council of Europe (CoE) has pointed out the gravity of the situation in Turkey, and has called on the government to take the necessary measures to ensure press freedom in the country. The European Parliament published a critical report in March 2011, naming cases against journalists as 'police or judicial harassment' and expressing concern about 'the deterioration in freedom of the press, about certain acts of censorship and about growing self-censorship within the Turkish media, including on the Internet'. The Turkish Prime Minister blames the report for being biased and subjective, stating that the imprisoned journalists were behind the bars not because of their journalistic activities but 'because of their relations with terrorist organizations, and their attempts to topple the government.' Prime Minister Erdogan also protested RSF's World Press Freedom Index, which in their 2013 report rated Turkey as 154 out of 179 countries, which also means that Turkey dropped six places from 2012. In "The Press Freedom Index" published by Reporters Without Borders (2013) it's written that they do not take direct account of the kind of political system which exists in each country, but they claim that democracies provide better protection for the freedom to produce and circulate accurate news and information than countries where human rights are more often violated, for instance in terms of strong regulations on freedom of the press. In their report they have found that in almost all parts of the world, influential countries that are regarded as "regional models" have fallen in the index. In the name of the fight against terrorism, Turkey is the country which has the most journalists in prison (WPFI 2013: 2, 5).

In addition to prosecuting journalists, courts routinely issue criminal sanctions against newspapers, despite ECtHR rulings. In 2010 alone, the Kurdish language daily Azadiya Welat was suspended thrice for one month periods each time. In March 2012, a high penal court issued a one-month suspension order against the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem for having made the propaganda of

the terrorist organization. The judgment provoked such a strong public reaction that the court reversed its decision just a few days later (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 42-43).

2.3.3 The ECTHR on media freedom in Turkey

Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe since 9 August 1949. All 47 Council of Europe member states are party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since all member states of Council of Europe is a party of ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights follow up all their members, including Turkey, and their violations of ECHR.

The vast majority of cases on media freedom and freedom of expression brought to the ECtHR are decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. In the case of *Ürper and Others v. Turkey,* the Court scrutinized Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law, concluding that the banning of the future publication of entire newspapers had a chilling effect on applicants, warning them from publishing similar news in the future, and thus constituted censorship. This illustrate that newspapers constitute self-censorship in order to avoid trouble with the law. The ECtHR also noticed that the Constitutional Court of Turkey had not taken into account the Ürper and Others judgment in its jurisprudence on media freedom. Concerning paragraph 2 of Article 6 (in the ECHR?), the ECtHR held that the applicants' criminal conviction for having published statements of illegal organizations and their members, violated Article 10 of the Convention.

One case which is particularly noteworthy is when the Turkish government had argued that the amended version of Article 301 would prevent arbitrary prosecutions for non-violent opinions. In the case of *Dink v. Turkey*, the Court found a violation of Article 10 in ECHR on account of Hrant Dink's conviction for 'insulting Turkishness' in his article published in the Armenian-Turkish weekly Agos. Dink was portrayed as an enemy of the Turks and turned into an object of hatred by the national media on account of his conviction. He was assassinated 19th January 2007 (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 43-44). ECHR ruled in September 2010 that the Turkish government had failed to respond to the ultra-nationalistic hostility toward Hrant Dink. Prior to his murder, Dink had twice been prosecuted under Article 301 for insulting Turkishness (Freedom house: 2012).

In the case of *Akcam v. Turkey* (2011), the ECtHR held that 'the safeguards put in place by the

legislator to prevent the abusive application of Article 301 by the judiciary do not provide a reliable and continuous guarantee or remove the risk of being directly affected by the provision because any political change in time might affect the interpretative attitudes of the Ministry of Justice and open the way for arbitrary prosecutions' (rewrite phrase?). The Court found not only the applicant's prosecution under Article 301, but also the article itself to have violated Article 10 of the European Convention. The ECtHR also addressed the defamation cases brought against journalists. In its judgment dated 21 February 2012 in the case of *Tusalp v. Turkey*, the Court concluded that the sentencing of a journalist to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's personal rights violated Article 10 of the Convention. Finding that the criticisms did not constitute a personal attack against the Prime Minister, the Court repeats that "the press fulfills an essential function in a democratic society" and that politicians should tolerate criticism because of the fact that they are politicians. According to the ECtHR, journalistic freedom also includes being provocative overstating, which the Prime minister should tolerate. The Court also pointed out the significant amount of compensation that the applicant was ordered to pay, which was given in order to scare people from criticizing public officials in the future.

Judge Isil Karakas of the ECtHR has pointed out that the ECtHR found violations in more than 200 cases against Turkey, as opposed to 10 in the case of France. He particularly drew attention to Article 6(2) and (5) of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 301 of the Penal Code as in violation of the European Convention, and recommended abolishment of Article 301. The persistence of the Turkish judiciary to disregard the ECHR standards and the ECtHR's case law shows that the violation of press and expression in Turkey do not only origin from anti-democratic laws, but also from the understandings of judges and prosecutors. He also emphasized that long periods of pre-trial detention was not just a problem stemming from the laws, but also from judges who decide on the continuation of detentions 'on the basis of cliché' remarks which do not provide sufficient reasoning. A CoE Commissioner for Human Rights stated that in 'the absence of a drastic shift in the adjudicative approach of the judiciary,' legal reforms will not be sufficient to ensure the protection of freedom of press (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 44-45).

2.4 The Turkish media landscape

The topic of this chapter is the Turkish media landscape, and it will focus both at polarization and competition in the media market, self-regulating mechanisms in general and in Turkey, the issue of

hate speech and in Turkey, and of the engagement by different organizations to monitor newspapers in Turkey.

Istanbul and Ankara are the main media centers of Turkey. That's the cities where the headquarters of all the national newspapers and broadcasting companies are situated. Zaman, Posta, Hürriyet, Sabah, Milliyet and Haber Türk are the major ones among the national dailies.

Turkey's media landscape is dominated by large multi-sectorial groups such as Dogan Group, Turkuvaz, Ciner Group, Çukurova Group, Doguş Group, and Feza Group. All the major commercial channels and newspapers belong to these media holdings. The distribution of the print media is in the hands of Dogan Group's Yay-Sat and Turkuvaz Group's Turkuvaz Dagitim Pazarlama. These large conglomerates are also active in many other sectors.

Dogan Group, the largest and the most prominent of the media giants, owns a substantial part of the media in Turkey, namely the mainstream and nationalist leaning major dailies *Hürriyet, Milliyet* and *Vatan*, the boulevard daily *Posta*, the liberal paper *Radikal* (40,000), the sports daily *Fanatik* (190,000), the business daily *Referans* (11,000), and the English-language daily *Hürriyet Daily News* (5,500). Turkuvaz Group is owned by Çalik Holding which has connections with the ruling party AKP. The mainstream *Sabah,* the boulevard daily *Takvim* (120,000), the sports daily *Fotomaç* (200,000), and the regional newspaper *Yeni Asir* (40,000) belong to the Turkuvaz Group. Gazete *Habertürk* (220,000) was launched in 2009 by Ciner Group. The biggest selling, liberal/Islamic daily *Zaman* is owned by Feza Group, which has close connections with the Islamic sect leader Fethullah Gülen. Zaman also has a sister newspaper Today's Zaman (5,000) in English. Çukurova Group owns the nationalist dailies *Akşam* (150,000), *H.O Tercüman* (15,000), and the boulevard paper *Güneş* (110,000). The conservative Islamic daily *Yeni Şafak* (100,000) is owned by Albayrak business group. The Islamic *A.Vakit* (50,000) is more radical and sensationalist in content and has been prosecuted several times. *Milli Gazete* (50,000) is another Islamic daily known to be the voice of "Milli Görüş" which has been the ideology of a certain Islamic political tradition in Turkey.

Cumhuriyet (55,000) is not exclusively owned by any multi-sectorial group. The newspaper has traditionally been representing the left-wing in Turkey, and is now representing the Kemalists. *Star daily* (100,000) is owned by the businessman Ethem Sancak. Star has a mixture of columnists with diverse political orientations. In November 2007, several journalists and intellectuals together with

a small publishing house launched a new national daily, *Taraf*, which challenged the nationalist discourse of the media, and uncovered sensitive issues such as the role of the military in politics, the politicization of the Turkish judiciary system, and governments' legislation on state contracts. *Taraf* has achieved a respectable position in Turkish media landscape.

Anadolu Ajansi (AA), Dogan Haber Ajansi (DHA), Ihlas Haber Ajansi (IHA), Cihan Haber Ajansi (CIHA) and ANKA are the most prominent news agencies in Turkey. Anadolu Ajansi is the oldest news agency and it is the prime source for the press in Turkey. It was founded by Kemal Atatürk in 1920 to promote the independence war of the Turkish Republic. It is the 'official' news agency subsidized by the state. AA has 28 offices in Turkey and 22 offices abroad, and provides approximately 800 news and 200 photos to its subscribers each day.

The independent news agency ANKA founded in 1972 also has daily news and photographic services. It provides a daily economic bulletin in Turkish and a weekly one in English. DHA is owned by Dogan Group and primarily provides news services for newspapers, TV and radio stations belonging to the Dogan Group. Ihlas Group's news agency IHA has 145 offices in Turkey and abroad. It also covers Europe, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia and provides news services to European, American and Arabic TV channels. IHA provide service in English and Arabic too. Ajans HaberTürk belongs to Ciner Group and CIHA belongs to the Samanyolu Group. CIHA has offices in 31 countries including Gaza, Baghdad, Erbil and Kabul and gives service to 22 foreign media organizations in Arabic language. Another independent agency, Dicle Haber Ajansi (DIHA), which was established in 2002, provides services in Turkish, English and Kurdish. Of foreign news agencies operating in Turkey, you have Reuters among others (Media landscape: 2010).

2.4.1 Polarization in media market

The media market is an attractive sector for investors. One of the reasons is because they get revenues from advertising and because of the media's power to influence public opinion. Advertising both provide the main source of income for media owners, and gives the commercial media its characteristic look.

According to TURKSTAT's Print Media Statistics, there were 163 national, 73 regional and 2368 local newspapers published in Turkey. National newspaper consumption is over 80%, followed by

local papers with 15.3% and regional newspapers with a share of 2.4%. At the national level, the competition in this sector takes place over advertising revenues rather than sales. Since the market is highly concentrated, most newspapers cannot generate optimal advertising revenues and therefore make business while losing money. Dogan and Turkuvaz dominate the market by over 80 per cent, which indicates that there is almost a duopoly in the media ownership. This duopoly is not only limited to the advertising revenues, they also control the entire newspaper and magazine distribution sector (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 26, 28).

The political polarization in general and in the media in particular is reflected in the advertising revenues. An example of this phenomenon is daily Taraf. During its first two years, the newspaper operated under great financial difficulty due to its inability to get advertising from the private sector. They didn't want to be associated with a newspaper perceived as too radical by the establishment. Some companies avoid giving advertising to the newspaper because they feared it would damage their commercial reputation. The former chief editor of Star pointed out that the pro-government newspapers are getting ads through exerting political pressure on companies. The big media groups that don't manage to balance between the strong power centers in Turkey, namely the army, the government, the opposition and the business world, are also too weak vis-a-vis the political power of AKP government. Calik Holding, which is closely connected to the government, bought in 2007 the largest media group. The chairman of the board of this group is the son-in-law of the Prime Minister (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 28, 29, 50). This is one way the government gets influence in the media market. The major private holding companies pressure editors and journalists to avoid coverage that could harm the parent company's business interests. This can include avoiding criticism of the government or potential advertisers (Freedom house: 2012). It is difficult finding critical coverage about the biggest companies in Turkey. The advertising pressure prevents the media from reporting on corruptions, dismissals, strikes or non-unionization in the financial sector (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 52).

When AKP came to power in 2002, the media owners initially supported the new government. This positive atmosphere largely decreased after AKPs' second electoral victory in the local elections of 2004. The collaborative attempts of a group of political elites and media owners to bring an end to AKP's power turned in to huge conflicts between the government and the media. The fall out was particularly visible in the largest media group's Dogan Group opposition to the government reform packages. On 10 February 2008, the constitutional amendment adopted by the parliament to legalize

the headscarf at universities was covered by Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily, with the headline '411 hands rose to chaos,' referring to the number of parliamentarians who voted in favor. Hürriyet was also a part of the generating of public opinion in favor of mass demonstrations in the name of protecting secularism. This mass demonstration has later found to be co-organized by groups involving retired military leaders. After this event the AKP government figured out a strategy to eliminate media opposition. They forced the Dogan Group to downsize its media investments by introducing disproportionately heavy fines for tax fraud (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 49- 50). The alleged tax evasion was worth some $3 billion. In February 2011, the courts overturned approximately $1.1 billion in fines and interest allegedly owed by Dogan. The Dogan Group announced in April that it was selling two of its major papers, *Milliyet* and *Vatan*, to the Karacan family in partnership with the Demirören Group for $74 million, in order to raise funds to pay the remaining taxes and fines. Demirören and the Karacan family had a dispute over the control of these two papers, forcing a third party to step in to administer them. As a result of this ongoing disagreement, journalists working in these papers were having trouble getting paid. Dogan employees have after this bad experience reported practicing self-censorship to avoid more trouble with the law (Freedom house: 2012). The side various media organs chose to align with in the conflict between the military and the government is not just a question of political reference, but is also a reflection of the deep social, economic and political transition taking place in the country since the early 1980s (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 13).

As a result of the economic consequences it might have if a newspaper covers a case which the government doesn't approve, newspaper are reluctant to address sensitive issues. Many of those issues are minority issues, such as the Kurdish and Armenian issues. Other issues can be the position of the Army and the Cyprus question. An example of this phenomenon occurred after the death of 34 Kurdish civilians who were bombed by military fighter jets in the Uludere/Roboski village of the Hakkari province at the end of 2011. The victims were villagers engaged in cross-border smuggling who were reportedly mistaken as PKK militants. The mainstream media did not cover the massacre in the first 18 hours and waited till the government issued a press statement before they released their first coverage. When they had released their first coverage, the public opinion was already informed about the incident through the Kurdish news sources and the social media. This incident damaged the reliability of the mass media in the dissemination of news (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 51).

2.4.2 Working conditions for journalists

The new ownership structure at the beginning of the 1980s resulted in a shift in the journalistic profession. Traditional family-owned media ownership was replaced by new investors who already operated in other industries of the economy such as energy, telecommunications, finance or the construction sector. The new owners of the Turkish press gradually carried the corporate mentality to their media operations. The commercialization of the media led to an increase in the sensational news and tabloidization of the press (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 23, 49).

In the 1990s the market was deregulated. This resulted in the development of 'clientalist' relationships between media patrons and the state. The media patrons began to put pressure on politicians to maximize their profits in their other activity areas, using their media outlets. While media owners competed with each other financially, they shared a common mindset of protecting the 'state interest' (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 49). The media owners shared this common mindset of protecting the 'state interest' because they are dependent on the state to maximize their profits in other areas. That is why they want to maintain this clientalist relationship.

This relationship between the media owners and the state, also have consequences for the journalists. The new media owners often force journalists to make a choice between their labor union memberships and their jobs. Most of the media employees are forced to work outside the legislation regulating the rights of journalists (known as the law 212) and without permanent contracts. Media workers who are not provided a contract under the law 212 cannot obtain a press card and cannot become a member of the Turkish Journalists Union (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikas-TGS) which is the only trade union that has the authority to negotiate collective agreements for journalists. Due to the pressure of the media owners, the influence of TGS has diminished considerably (Media landscape: 2010). A labor union representative stated that as soon as employers find out about their unionized employees, they pressure them to quit the union. He added that their members who were dismissed due to their union activities have great difficulties finding a job in the sector (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 54).

In Turkey there was a financial crisis in 2001. This crisis was caused by the patronage relationship of media conglomerates, politicians and businessmen through widespread corruptions in the banking sector. This crisis resulted in the dismissal of about 5,000 journalists working in media

groups that had investments in the banking sector. Few dare to bring a lawsuit against their former employers because they fear that they will not find a job in the sector afterwards. There is an unwritten rule that media companies don't hire journalists another media company has fired. This is another reason why people are reluctant to being a member of a union, since it has happened that members have been dismissed due to their union activities. Research conducted for the TESEV report (2012) shows that a very high number of media employees lack social security benefits. Journalists are forced to frequently change jobs, resulting in high and media companies are reluctant to have a transparent policy when it comes to labor relations (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 50, 54). This media ownership structure raises concerns about the objectivity and independence of the journalists, and hinders diversity and pluralism in media (Media landscape: 2010).

Media enterprises that make no profit and work under conditions that are not economically profitable, survive just on the resistance of their owners. Labor exploitation is a significant source of media subsidy in Turkey. A media executive stated that this situation creates an extraordinary pressure for cost-cutting on the owners. These conditions make issues such as increasing the quality of journalists and improving their working conditions secondary, and result in informal employment practices which are harmful for journalists. An editor working for a broadcasting company said that the lack of skilled journalists in the sector was a fact because nobody wanted to invest in high quality media in Turkey, and that they rather try to employ young and inexperienced journalists who don't pay attention to the ethical aspect of the media' (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 56).

2.4.3 Self-regulation

Self-regulation is done by the press for the reason of maintaining professional respect, provide reliable news, and comment what should and should not be done in order to be regarded as trustworthy by the reader. There are three mechanisms established in journalism to make these values more likely to be implemented, namely ethical codes, press councils and ombudsman.
The ethical codes of the press are composed of the entirety of the principles ensuring objectivity in news, the primacy of the public rights to information, the confidentiality of private life and news sources, the avoidance of the provocation of violence and conflict as well as of discrimination.

The effort to establish written ethical codes in journalism began with the creation of professional

associations. These associations as well as the societies and trade unions that were formed at the beginning of the century referred to basic ethical principles in their declarations. Later, the press-media organs began to determine their own ethical codes (Höylü 2006: 30-31). A code of conduct comprises a set of principles and rules determined by members of the profession to let the media perform the best service possible to the public. The basic responsibility of the journalist is to provide public opinion with correct, unbiased and principled news (Höylu 2006: 7, 12).

Associations such as the press council, include the representatives of the public as well as of the press, and have the power to issue adjudications which must be published in the paper. It also has the power to impose small fines. An ombudsman is someone who receives and evaluates the complaints of readers relating to the press and finds solutions to remove tensions between the press and the reader. He is responsible for investigating readers' complaints about the accuracy, balance, and quality of published news stories. The ombudsman produces appropriate suggestions and responses to clarify stories or to correct errors. The characteristics which establishes the independence of the ombudsman is his special status which separates him from the journalists (Höylu 2006: 32, 34).

The problem with journalism is that journalistic decisions often are being made not on the basis of journalists' professional expertise about what it is important for the public to know, but on the basis of market research about what kinds of things potential customers would want to know (Iggers 1998: 78). This is one obstacle of the implementation of a code of conduct. What potential customers would want to know may not be regulated by ethical values.

One thing to bear in mind, is that the sort of ethical discourse that takes place on a daily basis among journalists is different from the more abstract and theoretical discourse that can be found in codes of conducts. The way journalists report and edit, are shaped by the relations of power and by the institutional priorities within the organizations that employ them (Iggers 1998: 15-16) (see 2.4.1).

In the book of Iggers (*Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest*, 1998) there are several theories of why journalists can have difficulties articulating their responsibilities. James Carey of Columbia University offers a set of explanations. His essay, "Journalists Just Leave", takes its title from a remark made by Arthur Caplan, former associate director of the Hastings Center. He

observed that nearly all other professional groups that attend conferences at the center start ethics study groups, organizations, journals, or engage in other forms of ethical discourse, except for the journalists. Carey's explanations are that neither journalists nor philosophers know how to talk about journalism ethics, and that journalists fear that to have a public discussion about their professional ethics is the first step down the road to increased regulation. Since journalism is a far more public activity than medicine for instance, journalists feel more exposed and more defensive about their practices. Unlike the doctors, lawyers, and ministers who provide the model for discussion of professional ethics, journalists are not independent practitioners serving individual clients, but rather hired working for large organizations (Iggers 1998: 28).

2.4.4 Self-regulation in Turkey

With these issues in mind regarding the difficulties with self-regulation and ethical codes in general, the focus shift form self-regulation in general to self-regulation and ethical codes in the case of Turkey.

Self-regulation came on the agenda after the coup in 1960. The search for self-regulation to prevent journalists from being subjected to governmental restrictions, resulted in the founding of the Press Ethics Legislation and the Press Honor Board (Höylu 2006: 35). Journalists had also earlier addressed the issue of self-regulation, but because of the worsening of the relationship between the press and the government, it had been problematic to get through their wish of self-regulation of the press. The press felt more free when the restrictions on the freedom of the press, by the National Unity Committee, turned out not to be implemented. Since certain newspapers were challenging this new freedom, some journalists were concerned they would face restrictions again. The Journalists Organization and the Istanbul Journalists Union convened a meeting with the newspaper owners and reached an agreement on the establishment of a self-regulatory mechanism.

The journalists and newspaper owners who gathered to celebrate Press Day on July 24, 1960, proceeded to conclude the Press Ethics Code. They also adopted a document establishing the foundations of the Press Honor Council. The goal of the Press Honor Council was to bring into operation the Press Ethics Code and to start with a self-regulatory mechanism. By adopting the Press Ethics Code, journalists were for the first time acknowledging the framework of their Profession. The regulations both described the journalists' duties and defined what is regarded as

unacceptable (Höylu 2006: 38). The Press Honor Board was a voluntary professional institution and membership in it required a written covenant. The board was in the end unsuccessful because of its shortcomings that emerged over time.

A shortcoming originating from the structure of the board was that they had no power to impose sanctions on those who were guilty of violating the Press Ethics Code. During the first year the Board had become powerless in preventing irresponsible publications because of its inability to obtain the necessary respect. The self-regulatory efforts of the press continued after the failure of the Press Honor Board, and on 14 February 1972, the Turkish Journalists Union endorsed the Press Ethics Codes of Journalism adopted by the International Press Institute. The codes constitute the second basic document in the field of press ethics after the Press Ethics Code (Höylu 2006: 39, 42).

The Turkish Press Council was formed by a group of journalists in 1986, and is supported by media owners as well. The Press Council, which had the aim of 'a freer and more respected press', declared 'the Professional Ethics of the Press' to create a media environment where ethical principles were implemented. It developed its own charter, which was most recently amended in 2003. The independence of this body from the state and official ideology has been highly contested by members of the profession. Currently, the Press Council 'accounts to very few newspapers and does not enjoy significant respect among the media community'. A group of journalists, who parted their way with the Press Council, recently established the Media Association (Medya Dernegi) to support and raise the standards of the media. In 2011, the association announced a new code of ethics for journalists, which was developed during a three-day Media Ethics Workshop held in January of the same year.

The Turkish Journalists Association (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti), which was formed in 1946, made sure that the Council did not represent all journalists through its own 'Rights and Responsibilities of Turkish Journalists Declaration' in 1998. This declaration is the most referred source on ethical codes for journalism. Some media groups and newspapers have in recent years declared their own professional codes and established self-regulatory institutions. The most noteworthy is the Publication Council of the Dogan Group with its publication codes (Höylu 2006: 55-56) (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 53). To sum up the efforts of establishing a self-regulatory mechanism, one can argue that the ideological polarizations and political divisions within and among various media and journalists' associations prevent them from engaging in collaborative efforts to develop rules of self-regulation.

The last form of self-regulatory mechanism is ombudsman. The institution of ombudsman was initiated in Turkey with the appointment of Yavuz Baydar by Milliyet, which is part of the Dogan Media Group, at the beginning of 1999. Baydar used his weekly 'Readers' Representative' column in Milliyet to respond to complaints from readers and to criticize editors and journalists in the context of professional principles. Baydar also published the views of the journalists responsible for the stories (Höylu 2006: 60). Newspapers like *Sabah*, *Hürriyet*, *Vatan*, *Yeni Safak*, *Aksam* and *Zaman* have ombudsman too (Media landscape: 2010).

2.4.5 Hate speech

Hate speech is often directed at minorities, and is a certain form of discrimination of other people. In a code of conduct, discrimination is often included. In order to say anything about hate speech, I need to define what hate speech is. I have chosen to use the definition of hate speech made by the Council of Europe. The fact that they have made a definition of hate speech, insinuates that hate speech is a topic of international interests.

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted in 1997 a Recommendation on hate speech that stated the term:

"shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin" (Council of Europe: 2009).

As I have written earlier in this master thesis, the media has a clientalist relationship with the government/state. The media owners have the power to influence the government in the way that they can take a pro-government stance through the news they print in their newspapers, and thereby the government can give them some advantages with giving them more state contracts (see 2.4.1). This means that both the media and the government/state are institutions with power.

There is one scholar in particular which looks at the relationship between the press and the state, namely Teun Van Dijk. He has been a professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam until 2004, and is at present professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. In his book

(Racism and the Press, 1991) he describes these two institutions as *power elites*. He thinks that despite its dependence on other power elites, the press does not passively participate in the reproduction of power. The press also produces its own dimension of the power structure through its strategies of selection, emphasis, focusing, exaggeration, relevance assignment, description, style or rhetoric. They press also have the power to set the agenda and to define the reality.

The term *elite racism* implies that these elites have a special set of racist ideologies and practices, and also that their position allows them to preformulate those of the population at large, and to produce and reproduce the majority ethnic consensus. Anti-racist ideologies can be marginalized and excluded from popular opinion formation. Groups that work for the weakening of majority group control, and especially of political and corporate control, risk being attacked with the media's own strategies. These strategies can be everything from verbal abuse to more subtle forms of marginalization, such as limiting access, biased reporting and quotation, or discrediting (Dijk 1991: 41-44).

The press has different strategies of how to reach their potential readers. They define the message they want to communicate by how they phrase the headline. They summarize what they perceive to be the most important aspect with the news. The journalists' definition of the situation influences the interpretation made by the readers. Headlines are usually read first, and the information expressed in the headline is used by the reader during the process of understanding the meaning of the rest of the text. They are also used to activate the relevant knowledge the reader needs in order to understand the news report.

Headlines also have an important role in the everyday routines of news production. Just like the readers, journalists use summarizing headlines to understand and memorize the information they get from their many sources. They are not only written in order to do the best summary for a news report, but also in order to draw attention from the readers. That's because readers often decide whether to read a news report or not on the basis of the information in the title (Dijk 1991: 51).

Headlines about minority affairs are essential in the definition of minority events. In the right-wing press, this definition tends to be negative. If minorities, immigrants, anti-racists or the left are generally defined as a problem in the conservative press, these headlines may even further emphasize this evaluation by defining them as criminals, deviants, irrational mobs or lunatics.

Topics represent what news-makers consider to be the most important information about a news

event. The selection of topics results from routines of news-making, and embodies criteria of journalistic decisions about the newsworthiness of different events (Dijk 1991: 69-71). The way the press presents and represents social actors, is part of a broader ideological structure of value. It is this ideology that explains why specific groups are dealt with positively or negatively and why such value judgments constitute a coherent system of social representation. This system features norms and values that define fundamental goals of groups and their members. In the editorials of the conservative press, and especially of the tabloids, this ideological framework is more visible and straight forward (Dijk 1991: 147).

Dijk thinks that the special role of the press needs to be evaluated in terms of its uses by the readers and the ways readers process the news (Dijk 1991: 23). In order to understand how readers process the news, you need to ask the readers themselves. This is often done by conducting interviews. Teun A. Van Dijk carried out in-depth interviews with around 150 people in the Netherlands and asked them about a number of 'minority' issues they had learned about from newspapers. Through discourse analysis of these interviews he got insight into the minority attitudes and ideologies of different kinds of readers, and of how their perception of the news are shaped by the contents of the press stories about these issues (Dijk 1991: 224). He asked people to talk informally about the minority issues they have read about in the newspaper and to analyze such interviews. This will raise suggestions about the detailed contents and structures of more general attitudes about minorities, as well as about some of the relations between these social representations and the social representations of journalists expressed and conveyed by news reports in the press. (Find an explanation for social representation)

A first assumption is that the formation or change of the minority beliefs of the readers as a function of news reports in the press, presupposes that the readers actually understand such news reports. Research shows that many people sometimes understand very little of news reports. The process of influence must be based on that 'little' that readers do understand. What the people do understand of new reports, they can only use their relevant information later when they remember this information. Any influence of the press must be based on the little people memorize of what they read (Dijk 1991: 227-228). The processes of generalization and abstraction often involve discourse and communication. People hear or read how other people understand and evaluate events and often adapt their models to those of others, if only in order to be able to communicate, or to feel like a competent member of a group. Few of the interviewees have direct personal experiences with the minority events they learned about through public or personal communication (Dijk 1991: 230, 233,

236). One conclusion from the analysis of their recall protocols is that time delays are not always a main factor in such recalls. When an event is massively reported, the readers may effectively have integrated this story in their models and their more general knowledge and attitudes towards this group (Dijk 1991: 243). Another conclusion is that the media plays a key role in determining how the public thinks about social and political reality. Even though the media may have different short-range effects on media users, they influence the formation of ideological frameworks which the readers shape after reading the news (Dijk 1991: 225).

Editorials offer practical, common-sense frameworks for making sense of the social situation in the society. Many readers accept these editorials, just because they have no occasion to form alternative, anti-racist attitudes and ideologies (Dijk 1991: 150). Newspapers are easy accessible, and no "class-phenomenon". You don't need to be educated to read the newspapers. This is one of the problems with news in the newspapers, if you don't have any other sources of information, you can base your knowledge upon distorted news without knowing it.

Peoples' opinion-making process is slightly different. Once people have acquired some information about specific minority events, people may accept or disregard the more neutral or negative bias associated with these stories in their newspapers. Right-wing readers of a right-wing newspaper have an ideological framework that facilitates the development of right-wing opinions whatever the opinion of their newspaper. The same could be said to be true for left-wing readers of left-wing papers. They will tend to form biased models of situations reported in the press if these situations can be interpreted in line with their dominant prejudiced attitudes. Press opinions and reader opinions will tend to be similar and reinforce each other, which is also obvious from the very choice of newspapers in the first place (Dijk 1991: 237-238).

By comprehensive reporting the media are able to define a public debate and to communicate the essential contents of minority situations that have lasting effect on people's knowledge about the society at large. Analysis of the opinions expressed in the interviews, showed that the opinion structures adopted by the readers closely followed those made available by the newspapers. Even though there are variations in the attitude structures disclosed by the newspapers, there is a remarkable consensus about the main points of the debate. People may differ about specific points of policy, and have the imagination that there is a 'free debate' in the newspapers. In practice very few readers provoke the ideologies about the minority situation as it is defined by politicians and newspapers. The media provide the facts and opinions that people use partly in what to think, and

which they also use in devising how to think about minority affairs (Dijk 1991: 244).

2.4.6 Hate speech in Turkey

I've talked about the press in general and how they define what the readers think of for instance minority events in the newspapers. Now I want to explore this topic in more specific terms. I assume that even though Dijk wrote about the European press, you find similarities on the structural level between the European press and the Turkish press. I claim that my findings in this section, strengthens Dijks' claims that the press influence the interpretation the readers have of certain events they read about in the newspapers. I take this one step further, and shows that when people read about racism and hate speech in the newspapers, it can also lead them to do hate crimes towards those people which they read about in the newspapers.

Hrant Dink foundation, which was founded after the assassination of Hrant Dink, conducted a one-year study on hate speech in Turkish newspapers. They categorized their hate speech findings, and the most frequently seen hate speech they analyzed, were hostility/ war speech, followed by invectives /defamations/denigrations, followed by exaggeration /ascription / distortion and symbolization. In many examples, more than one of these categories was present. When this was the case, the dominant speech was taken into consideration for analysis purposes (Dalkiram 2012: 5). Earlier in my master thesis I've written about journalists that have been charged for being connected to terrorist organizations, or doing terrorist propaganda when they write critically about the Kurdish issue. When you find hate speech in newspapers, it's the other way around. Hate speech in newspapers is a result of uncritical journalism, and this kind of journalism has arguably less problem of passing self-censorship.

The Turkish nationalism is regarded as the fundamental value in Turkish newspapers even though there are some ideological differences between different newspapers in Turkey. This value also forms the discourse about Kurds, Alevis and Gypsies and Armenians (Göktas 2012: 95). Nationalism can be linked with hate speech, and strengthens the in-group or the majority group in the society. When it is defined as a positive value, hate speech actually becomes less controversial than critical reporting of news event. Earlier in Turkish history nationalism has had extreme consequences, for instance when Turkey exchanged populations with Greece, mobs attacks were tolerated, non-Muslims had to pay heavier fines and so on. The murder of the Armenian Hrant Dink

has been regarded as a result of massive writing about him as a traitor of Turkey in the newspapers. The assassinator only knew about Hrant Dink through what he had read in the newspapers.

In the shadow report published by European Network Against Racism (2012), they write about different cases where minorities have been victims of hate crime. In the report it looks like these hate crimes have been a result of writings done in the newspapers. It also seems like hate speech has come from public officials themselves. In 2010 there were several attacks reported in the media against different minority groups and people of Kurdish origin in particular. Racist nationalist discourse and hate speech by politicians in the run up to the general election, which was held on 12 June 2011, is thought to be linked to the rise in racist violence (Bilgen and Kizilkaya 2012: 4).

When racist hate speech is performed by politicians, it can have a crucial effect. They can reach out to many people because they are profiled people with power. The language used after security forces are killed in armed conflict, is often harsh and can lead to social hostility and hate crimes. In an IHD's Report they tell this:

> As a result of the examination we carried out in the county, we determined that about 40 workplaces were ruined. We also determined that the Building of BDP was ruined together with the furniture in it and its doors were broken down with sledge hammers. It was determined that the ruined workplaces remained as they were and their owners did not lay claim to them because they were afraid of being lynched. It was determined that Turkish flags were hung from the windows of almost all of the houses as well as two very large ones at the entrance of Dörtyol county. We also came across those who hung Turkish flags from their workplaces, even though they were Kurdish, because of their fear' (Bilgen and Kizilkaya 2012: 28).

There have been rare occasions where RTÜK resorted to its powers to sanction discrimination against minorities. The agency suspended a women's show on ATV, a national television station, on grounds of 'inciting people to revenge and hatred.' The sanction was imposed after the host of the program criticized the Kurdish population of Van, a province badly hit by an earthquake in October 2011, for seeking rescue from the same police that they 'had thrown stones at' during mass demonstrations (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 37).

These links between hate speech and hate crime is also strengthened by the *three phases of persecution,* made by the former president of the World Evangelical Alliance, Johan Candelin. This model divides the phases into active and passive stages. The phase is active if the state is directly

involved and passive if the persecution is performed by private people/civil society and the state fails to take action to stop the persecution and protect the victims. The three phases can overlap or occur at the same time. Disinformation lies and stereotyped images in e.g. media, educational material and in the way politicians and officials describe religious minorities. Acts that justify discriminative acts can be rumors, prejudice and hostilities among the population. It can also be discrimination in relation to legislation, implementation of legal provisions and public services, employment, education and family matters. Violent persecution threats of or acts of violence against a person or a person's belongings due to his/her religious affiliation, e.g. imprisonment, torture, physical harassment, displacement and violent attacks (Stefanus alliance international 2013: 14).

There are also other groups than minority groups which can be a target of hate speech. If you challenge the discourse in the mainstream media, you can yourself be a target of hate speech. In other words, hate speech can be used as a weapon to silence the opposition. Since the media has a clientalist relationship with the state, it's also possible that it's in the interest of the state that hate speech is conducted at certain groups. In a report published by Freedom House in 2012, which is an independent watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world, they write about the impact of blasphemy laws on human rights. In this report they write about how blasphemy laws can be used in order to silence opposition. This can also say to be true with hate speech.

It may be predicted that for the right-wing Press especially, the main opponents politically will be the radical left, ethnically the most militant minority groups, socially the pro-minority welfare organizations, and culturally those who are symbolic competitors for the definition of the minority situation. That could be anti-racist educators, scholars, writers, as well as some politicians (Dijk 1991: 44). Cultural autonomy, and especially anti-racism in education, is explicitly condemned as examples of lack of patriotism (Dijk 1991: 149).

2.4.7 Social monitoring of newspapers

Lately there has been a growing awareness on the need for social monitoring of the media. The problems of self-regulation of the Turkish media, as well as the strict nature of the governmental regulation, have encouraged civil society to monitor the media's compliance with universal principles and professional codes of ethics. Various non-governmental organizations and activist groups started media watch initiatives in order to expand the culture of diversity and to reduce

discrimination, racism and hate speech. MEDIZ (Woman's Media Watch Group) has been monitoring sexism in the media since 2006. The group had a public discussion of the issue at a conference titled 'For a non- sexist Media' and published a book named End to Sexism in Media. KAOS GL regularly watches sexism and discrimination in the media against LGBT individuals.

After the assassination of Hrant Dink in 2007, hate crimes and hate speech in the media became a pressing issue for civil society. The Association for Social Change (Sosyal Degisim Dernegi) published a report entitled Hate Crimes in National Press: 10 years, 10 examples. Recently they launched a campaign for the adoption of Turkey's first anti-hate speech law. The International Hrant Dink Foundation combats racism and discrimination based on ethnic and religious grounds through

media monitoring. During a two years project funded by the European Commission, the Foundation analyzed 24 newspapers, published four monthly reports and organized workshops for journalists. The Human Rights Joint Platform (Insan Haklari Ortak Platformu- IHOP) published a report titled I am not Racist but...: Racist and Discriminatory Speech in the Press, which points out that 'discrimination denial strategy' is one of the most typical examples for discrimination in the media (Kurban and Sözeri 2012: 60).

BIA is a non-for-profit organization that monitors and reports violations of freedom of expression, monitors the newspapers' coverage about human rights, woman and children rights issues, and the functioning of the media in terms of media ethics. Its news and information network Bianet provides daily coverage of the issues that are ignored in the mainstream media, especially about human rights, gender rights, minority rights and children rights issues (Media landscape: 2010).

CHAPTER 3

THEORY

The background chapter is about politics in Turkey, governmental regulations of the Turkish press, and the Turkish media landscape. This chapter focuses at the chosen theory in this master thesis, which is Social Dominance Theory (SDT). The theory places the empiri in a theoretical framework. It helps you to interpret the findings in both the analysis chapter, and the background chapter.

Social Dominance Theory claims that in all societies some groups dominate other groups. They call this phenomenon group-based hierarchy. Social Dominance Theory claims that group-based hierarchy is sustained by using legitimizing myths. Legitimizing myths are myths that defend this inequality in the society between different groups. If the legitimizing myths are increasing or sustaining the inequality between groups, they are called Hierarchy-enhancing myths (HE-LM). If the legitimizing myths are decreasing the inequality between groups, they are called Hierarchy-attenuating myths (HA-LM). The concept of something being Hierarchy-enhancing and Hierarchy-attenuating can also be transferred to institutions. The Hierarchy-enhancing institutions are often more powerful than Hierarchy-attenuating institutions, which is one way why the inequality between groups sustain the society. Social Dominance Theory also focuses at people on the individual level. Even though there are people in the same group, with the same social status, some people are more discriminative than others. They measure this by Social Dominance Orientation. People are described with high or low SDO.

3.1 Social dominance theory

No matter the society's form of government, the contents of its fundamental belief system, or the complexity of its economic structures, human societies tend to organize as group-based social hierarchies, where at least one group enjoys greater social status and power than other groups. Members of dominant social groups tend to enjoy a disproportionate share of positive social value or material and symbolic resources such as political power, wealth, and protection by force, health care, leisure, and education. Negative social value is disproportionately left to members of subordinate groups in the form of underemployment, dangerous and unpopular work, disproportionate punishment and stigmatization. Although the definitional bases of group-based hierarchical organization vary across societies and within the same society over time, group-based hierarchical organization appears to be a human universal. Social dominance theory has been developed in order to have a better understanding of how group-based social hierarchy is formed and maintained. Social dominance theory assumes that we must understand the processes producing and maintaining prejudice and discrimination at different levels of analysis, including cultural ideologies and policies, institutional practices, relations of individuals to others inside and outside their groups and the psychological predispositions of individuals.

Social dominance theory argues that societies have three different systems of group-based hierarchy. The first system is an age system, in which adults have disproportionate social power over children. The second system is a gender system, in which men have disproportionate social, political, and military power compared to women, and the third system is an arbitrary-set system, in which groups constructed on "arbitrary" bases not linked to the human life-cycle, have differential access to things of positive and negative social value. Arbitrary-set groups may be defined by social distinctions often related to power, such as nationality, "race", ethnicity, class, estate, descent, religion, or clan (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 271- 273).

3.2 Legitimizing myths

According to social dominance theory, group-based social hierarchy is produced by the effects of discrimination across different levels, namely institutions, individuals, and through intergroup processes. Discrimination across these levels is structured to favor dominant groups over subordinate groups by legitimizing myths, or consensually shared social ideologies in the society. Social dominance theory assumes that group-based inequality is not just a result of intimidation and

discrimination by dominants against subordinates. Social dominance theory rather states that the decisions and behaviors of individuals, the formation of new social practices, and the operations of institutions are shaped by legitimizing myths. Legitimizing myths are consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, stereotypes, and cultural ideologies.

Social dominance theory distinguishes between two functional types of legitimizing myths. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths (HE-LMs) contribute to moral and intellectual justification for group-based oppression and inequality. Some illustrating examples can be different forms of racism, sexism, heterosexism, stereotypes, nationalism, Confucianism, and internal attributions for poverty. These diverse myths have been used to argue that inequality is fair, legitimate, natural, or moral. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths tend to organize individual, group, and institutional behavior in ways that sustain dominance.

Ideologies that counter group-based dominance are called hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths (HA-LMs). Examples of hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths are political doctrines such as social democracy, socialism, religious doctrines such as the preferential option for the poor or inclusive and egalitarian themes in religious scriptures, and humanist doctrines such as feminism and human rights. One factor determining the potency a legitimizing myth has to either enhance or attenuate group-based social hierarchy, is the degree to which it is consensual across members of both subordinate and dominant groups. While social dominance theory assumes that, everything else being equal, dominants will generally show greater endorsement of hierarchy- enhancing legitimizing myths than will subordinates, and subordinates will display greater endorsement of hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths than will dominants, within stable social systems, dominants and subordinates will agree with respect to these legitimizing myths more than they will disagree (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 275-276).

3.3 Institutional discrimination

In the same way as legitimizing myths, many institutions can be classified as either hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating. Hierarchy-enhancing (HE) institutions promote and sustain inequality by assigning disproportionately more positive social value or less negative social value to dominant groups than to subordinate groups. Powerful hierarchy-enhancing institutions include profit-maximizing financial institutions, transnational corporations, internal security organizations

such as KGB and FBI, and criminal justice systems. Criminal justice systems are viewed as important mechanisms of group dominance and control because subordinates are over-represented in prison cells, torture chambers, and execution chambers across many different societies.

Hierarchy-attenuating (HA) institutions reduce the consequences of hierarchy-enhancing institutions, but seldom balance their influence. They try to aid members of subordinate social groups such as the poor, ethnic and religious minorities, and attempt to help them getting access to resources otherwise limited to dominants, such as public services. Hierarchy-attenuating institutions include human rights, civil rights, civil liberties groups, welfare organizations and religious organizations. Such institutions often lack substantial and permanent funding, force, legal precedent, or other bases of power. In contrast to the criminal justice and employment sectors, which regularly assign negative social value such as prison terms and dangerous work situations to subordinates, hierarchy- attenuating institutions rarely assign negative social value to dominants.

The discrimination committed by hierarchy-enhancing institutions is a potent cause of group hierarchy for several reasons. First, institutions can mobilize and allocate larger amounts of resources than individuals can. Second, large institutions, such as national governments and multinational corporations, have a great systematic influence. Third, because institutions eternalize themselves, the discrimination they engage in operates over generations, and when individuals or groups try to fight those practices, institutions often defend their discriminatory practices as part of defending the institution itself. Fourth, institutions establish their own internal norms, which coordinate the people who work in them and homogenize individual differences. Fifth, individuals in many institutions, including the military and corporations, are frequently exempted from being condemned for their institutional actions because the institution has special legal status (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 276-277).

One of the most robust causes of group-based dominance is the use of the criminal justice system to enforce social hierarchy. Three conditions must be met for the state to use its system of military/police and courts to enforce social hierarchy. First, the criminal justice system must be filled by people with prejudicial and punitive attitudes that are consistent with their roles. The second condition that must be met is that the public must tolerate the group prejudice of the criminal justice system. Third, if the criminal justice system is effective in enforcing group

dominance, then there should be more inequality where it is applied more forcefully (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 307-308).

3.4 Individual discrimination

Discrimination made by individuals happens when an employer decides not to hire a person who has applied for a job, a real-estate agent decides not to sell to a potential buyer, or a prosecutor decides to charge a defendant with a less serious offence, and the reasoning behind these decisions are made on the ground of the ethnicity of the individual, nationality, social class, sexual orientation, or gender. Which groups are generally favored and which are disfavored in such decisions, depends partly on the contents of the legitimizing myths. The social structure of society more often lead to hierarchy-maintaining than hierarchy-attenuating behavior. People in high-power groups usually have more things of positive social value they can assign to others, and more power to ensure that things of negative social value are assigned to people in other groups. A hierarchical structure implies it's easier to do actions that maintain or enhance inequality than doing actions that attenuate the hierarchy (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 278-279).

People and institutions select each other's so that the legitimizing myths and values are compatible with their own standing. This implies that people's co-workers are likely to reflect back and affirm their own prejudices, beliefs, and values. People in hierarchy-enhancing institutions are not likely to be challenged by people who hold hierarchy-attenuating beliefs and attitudes because such people work in different institutions and jobs. Institutions ingrain functionally compatible ideologies through their own institutional culture and norms, and give employees practice at using such ideologies in their work. The tendencies to enhance hierarchy or to attenuate it are all coordinated through legitimizing myths among individuals, their local work-groups, institutions, and how the institution assign resources (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 306-308).

3.5 Intergroup processes in discrimination

Group-based social inequality is also partly produced and maintained by intergroup processes, specifically the collaborative activities of dominants and subordinates. This collaboration is achieved by behavioral asymmetry, or coordinated differences in the behavioral repertoires of dominants and subordinates that produce better outcomes for dominants than for subordinates. Two major types of behavioral asymmetry are asymmetrical in-group bias and ideological asymmetry.

Asymmetrical in-group bias. Social dominance predicts that the degree of in-group bias differs systematically across levels of status and power. Within stable group-based dominance systems, dominants will often display more in-group favoritism vis-a-vis subordinates than will members of subordinate groups vis-a-vis dominants, especially with respect to dimensions of power and privilege. Asymmetrical in-group bias favoring dominants is also shown by people's endorsement of legitimizing myths. The more legitimate the social system is perceived to be, the greater the degree to which dominants will display in-group favoritism compared to subordinates.

Ideological asymmetry. Many of the psychological and ideological forces that help sustain group dominance, work better for people in dominant than in subordinate groups. Although hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths influence the behaviors of both dominants and subordinates, they are often easier for people in dominant groups to endorse.

3.6 Social dominance orientation

Social dominance orientation (SDO) captures to which extent individuals desire group-based dominance and inequality. These desires for social dominance are expressed in individual acts of discrimination and participation in intergroup and institutional processes that produce better outcomes for dominants than for subordinates. The more an individual wants group-based dominance and inequality, the higher level of SDO the person has acording to this way of measuring. One way individuals with high SDO can justify their discriminatory actions, is by supporting a wide variety of legitimizing myths that have in common the notion that dominant and subordinate groups deserve their relative positions of superiority and inferiority in the social hierarchy.

According to social dominance theory, hierarchical relationships among groups are both partly a cause and partly a result of these processes. Societies that are structured more hierarchically are likely to have larger mean differences in SDO between dominant and subordinate groups, and hierarchy- enhancing legitimizing myths and social policies that are more powerful than hierarchy-attenuating alternatives (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 281-282).

Social dominance theory assume that members of dominant arbitrary-set groups are expected to have higher levels of SDO than members of subordinate groups, because they want to sustain the privileged access to social and economic resources that they have access to through their dominant

position (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 287-288).

SDO has been shown to correlate with prejudice against a wide range of subordinate arbitrary-set groups defined by religion, race, and ethnicity. People with high SDO believe the world is a zero-sum game and because they desire power, they will use others to get ahead. This belief is compatible with the relative meanness of those with high SDO. Their mentality leads them to support economic competition over social welfare programs. People with high SDO tend to be unfeeling and confident (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 303-304).

SDO posites that all factors such as being a function of group position and situational contingent social identities, stable individual differences, and socialization experiences are involved in determining people's orientation towards group-based social inequality. SDO should be seen both partly as a result of hierarchical relationships among groups, and partly as a cause of those relationships (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 294).

This research shows how group dominance works as a system, infecting the attitudes of individuals, social roles, and institutional behavior in an interdependent and self-perpetuating manner. Social dominance theory is a broad theory that generates hypotheses about how different aspects of group dominance systems work together with one another (Levin, Pratto, Sidanius 2006: 308).

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the methodology chapter there is an explanation of the research design, how I approached the interviewees, research process, reliability and validity, and type of research. The methodology chapter shows how the interviews have been conducted and why this type of interviewees and research design has been chosen.

4.1 Research design

This study of journalists' ethical challenges, is based on 10 interviews of people in the age between 25 and 65, who has worked and works as journalists and columnists, in TV, or in organizations familiar with the issue of hate speech in media in Istanbul. They work primarily in leftist/mainstream newspapers, and organizations considered as being liberal. I have conducted a semi-structured interview with all the interviewees.

The research question is:

How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes of conduct and hate speech?

As mentioned in the introduction chapter, I look at the issue of minorities in Turkey, and how they are perceived and described by journalists in Turkish newspapers. When it comes to the issue of hate speech in newspapers, hate speech is often targeted at minorities. I want to use a theory which could highlight the relationship of group-based hierarchy between the majority and the minority, and understand the reason for stereotyping minorities through hate speech. A theory which I find useful in this regard is Social Dominance Theory. This theory states that in all societies at all times there is a tendency of group-based hierarchy. Discrimination between dominant and subdominat

groups, or majority and minority groups in this context, happens both at individual and institutional

level. This means that people can be met with discrimination both from individuals and institutions. This theory is also useful when understanding the relationship between journalists and the government, which one of these two groups are the dominant, and what resources a dominant group has versus a subdominant group. Social Dominance Theory is useful when doing the analysis. It creates a theoretical framework for understanding the data.

In order to get some good reflections and thoughts around the research question, it's very useful to interview Turkish journalists themselves, and people who work in organizations, or in TV, where they have competence in the field of hate speech in newspapers and codes of conduct in Turkish media. People who are in the business, knows what kind of ethical challenges journalists have, are well-suited for answering the question about codes of conduct, and they would also have some thoughts regarding hate speech in newspapers. When interviewing a person who works in organizations you get some reflections around the outcome of what journalists write in newspapers, since they would know a lot about the use of hate speech in newspapers.

The type of data used in this master thesis is qualitative data from interviews. Since a tape recorder was used during the interview, I didn't have to make notes, and could focus fully on the interview and be able to think which question to ask next.

Money and time constraints are often issues when doing investigations for a master thesis. The field work in Istanbul was covered by the Priscilla scholarship, which means that there was no financial problems of conducting the interviews. The stay in Istanbul resulted in 10 interviews, and a lot of data. Doing more than 10 interviews would create a lot of work afterwards, with transcribing and coding all the material, figure out what to use in the master thesis and then finally write the master thesis. Due to the constraints you have by writing a master thesis in only a year, conducting 10 interviews between mid-october till mid-november is perfect both in term of doing the interviews early in the master thesis process, and in term of the data material resulting from the interviews.

4.2 Approaching the interviewees

An introduction letter was sent to all the people I contacted, called "enquiry regarding participating in interviews in connection to a master thesis". The introduction letter inform about what I study,

what is the topic of my master thesis, how many people I want to interview and who I want to interview. It finishes with how I want to conduct the interview, duration of the interview and that

the researcher and the interviewees will figure out together with the researcher how to conduct the interview. The introduction letter underlines that it is voluntarily to participate and that the interviewee has the right to withdraw from the project at any time. All the information will be treated confidentially, the recordings will be deleted when the thesis is finished, and no individual will be recognized in the master thesis.

Since most of the appointments were arranged in Istanbul through the snowball method, the introduction letter was not sent to all the interviewees. In some cases I just had a telephone number, and got the appointment straight away, and had no time to send the introduction letter. In such cases I tried to inform the interviewee orally as best as possible. Anyway it seemed that the interviewees didn't pay much attention to this sort of formalities.

4.3 Research process

First of all the research question was approved by my supervisor. I had decided to do qualitative interviews with 8-10 persons in Istanbul working as journalists, columnists, in TV, or in organizations familiar with the issue of hate speech in media. Conducting interviews involves issues such as confidentiality, so the project had to be approved by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). After they approved the project, the process of recruiting interviewees started. Being in Norway and trying to reach journalists by writing them e-mails, turned out to be challenging. Before going to Istanbul conducting those interviews, I had only 3 appointments, and all these appointments were made with people working in organizations. The conclusion was that it would probably be easier to recruit interviewees after arriving Istanbul. The strategy to recruit interviewees was to use the snowball method, which means that you recruit interviewees by asking those you have an appointment with if there is someone they could recommend as interviewees, and then you get the contact information to these new potential interviewees. The snowball method worked out very well, and resulted in 10 interviews from mid-October till mid-November 2012.

After conducting the interviews, the job of transcribing the data from the interviews has to be done. I started to code the data after transcribing the data. The method in use for analyzing the data is thematic analysis, which is related to content analysis, which has been mentioned in the introduction chapter. In this form of analysis the data is organized into different themes and

categories. There is no focus at how people frame their words and sentences during the interview, but what people say. Since the focus where at the latter, I allowed myself to proofread the data in order to make the quotations in the analysis chapter easier to read. I claim that the meaning of what has been said in the interviews has been kept. When analyzing the data thoroughly, different categories emerged out of the data. Some categories were already mentioned in the interview guide, other categories emerged out of what the interviewees said in the interviews. The different categories became sub-chapters in the analysis chapter. After the sub-chapters was lined up, the data was organized into these different sub-chapters. The different categories were written with another color into the interviews in order to easier find the relevant material when the different quotations from the interviews were incorporated in the master thesis.

When analyzing the data, I have tried to build bridges between the data and the theory. The background chapter is also included in the analysis. When using the background chapter in the analysis, the data are better contextualized, and makes the different chapters in the master thesis more interconnected.

4.4 Reliability and validity

Except for one interviewee, I could speak English without a translator. This means that there are fewer chances for being misunderstood than if there was a translator. It is also easier to establish a contact with the interviewees when there's not a translator there. The interviewees had good analysis of the situation in Turkey with regard to codes of conduct and hate speech. All were familiar with the terms codes of conduct and hate speech, so there was no need to explain the research question in depth. The interviewees in this project were quite homogenous in the sense that they were primarily working in leftist/mainstream newspapers, and organizations considered as being liberal. I think this is a result of using the snowball method, since people often know better other people which work in the same type of environment as yourself.

My aim of this master thesis is not to find the "truth about ethical challenges for journalists in Turkey". Rather it is to have some reflections around this issue from people who has been working as journalists or working with hate speech in relation to newspapers. One way of showing that this are their reflections, is by using words like "they claim that..." "This interviewee means..." One the other hand, what the interviewees say does in large part match with the background chapter. This strengthens the reliability of my interviewees. When someone mentions issues regarding different

articles in the Turkish constitution for instance, those articles have also written about in the background chapter as troublesome.

4.5 Type of research

Since I did a semi-structured interview, the questions were not asked in the same order to all the interviewees. The questions were asked in the order which was most natural according to how each interview developed. The questions were formulated around different themes, which mean that the interviewees could speak quite freely within each question.

Before going to Istanbul, I was uncertain about the reception of the master thesis project, but I received only good feedback. The interviewees were open minded and just curious about why I had chosen this topic for my master thesis. I got the impression that the interviewees were quite aware of the issues raised in the research question, and they also had many reflections around the topic. No one had problems with being recorded while the interviews were conducted.

The interview guide was build up gradually, starting with general questions most people are comfortable talking about, such as what is their profession and which working experiences they have, followed by questions about their perception of the role of the media, principles, and challenges with implementation, cooperation and campaigns developed by organizations. In the end the interviewees were asked if they had anything to add.

Out of the eleven interviewees I spoke with, three of them worked in an organization, in which one of them had earlier worked as a journalist. Two of the interviewees' works as professors, in which of them had earlier worked as a journalist, and the other writes columns besides working as a professor. Three of them work just as journalists, and the last three work in television, as Editor-in-chief for a newspaper, and as Ombudsman for a newspaper. They were somewhere between 25 and 65, and seven of them were women. The interviewees were a homogenous group in the sense that

they work primarily in leftist/mainstream newspapers, and organizations considered as being liberal. On the other hand they had different types of jobs, which mean that they brought different perspectives into the interviews.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

I have structured this analysis by starting with two topics describing the background of Turkey, and also the framework for understanding the context of the other issues discussed in this analysis. That's why the topics Polarization and Nationalism in Turkey are in the beginning of the analysis. I continue with the topic of minorities, because you can understand the topic of minorities better when it comes in the light of nationalism in Turkey. Media ownership is not particularly connected to the topic of minorities, but is a framework for understanding better the topics of Freedom of speech/Government, Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia, and Self-censorship. After analyzing the topics of Media ownership and Freedom of speech/Government, you can put Self-censorship in the context of these two topics. Codes of Conducts and implementation come after all the other issues as a topic of how the media themselves try to implement Codes of Conducts. Social media is not a topic I focus on in this master thesis, but since social media is a media which are just being more and more used, and also influence the other media, I have chosen to have it as a part of my analysis.

5.1 Polarization

Polarization is a term that recurred among several of my interviewees, and also in the background chapter. Polarization in this setting means that the society is divided into two ideologies and this causes a polarization, or two opposing poles. The issue of polarization creates a framework for understanding both the politics, the media and the society in Turkey, and that's why it's important to have the issue of polarization at the beginning of the analysis. Several interviewees mention the issue of polarization, which is one historical framework important to take into consideration.

I asked about how the interviewee perceived the media in Turkey

I must say that Turkish mainstream media have two heads now. In the past it was one. Only the big capital connected to the state or government, have the ability to change everything, and to discuss whatever they want to. Now we have two mainstream media, one of them is the continuation of the old mainstream media, which is western modern-secular media, and the second one, which is new, is connected to today's AKP government. They are more conservative and more Islamist, but they are connected to today's government, and they have power now. They have money and they have power. These two mainstream media are in competition. They are defending different positions, so every issue in Turkey, every debate, every problem is seen in glasses of these two mainstream media. The people have their own positions, one belong to one, or the other (Interviewee 4).

The interviewee says there is a connection between the new media and the government. The old mainstream media represents the western-modern secular media, and the new mainstream media represents the more conservative islamist media. There is a competition between these two media. It seems like the polarization in politics is also reflected in the media (see 2.2). The people position themselves to one of these two sides, so the polarization in politics and media is also reflected in the society. The polarization in politics has existed for decades. The coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were orchestrated by the military when they thought the heritage of Atatürk, namely secularism and laicism, was in danger. The government is now more Islamic oriented, and represent a political shift in Turkey. Even though there is a political shift in Turkey, it seems like both political sides have power and resources in the media since they can promote their views through the newspapers.

I asked whether the interviewee find newspapers in Turkey good at avoiding negative speech towards minorities.

No, there is a huge polarization in Turkey. There's a hegemonic class in every period. It used to be the militarist police and the republican elites at the beginning. Now it's political Islam. We have Islamists and we have laicists in this country, so there is a huge conflict between them. You can see all the discourses in the media against each other. They blame each other, they write wrong stories, they distort reality against each other (Interviewee 9).

This interviewee uses the terms hegemonic class when talking about the polarization. The interviewee says that political Islam is the hegemonic class at the moment, which insinuates that the government is the hegemonic class now, when connected to what interviewee 4 said about the government being more Islamist. The previous interviewee says that the two mainstream media are in competition. This interviewee uses a stronger expression, and says that there is a huge conflict between these two sides. The result is the same, they use the media to write stories about the other political side. These stories are often wrong stories about the other political orientation, according to interviewee 9.

Since they can use the media to express their opinions about the other political side, they need to have a lot of power and a resource to do so, as interviewee 4 says they have. One illustrating example is when the parliament adopted a constitutional amendment on 10 February 2008 to legalize the headscarf at universities. This event was covered by Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily, with the headline '411 hands rose to chaos,' referring to the number of parliamentarians who voted in favor. Hürriyet was also involved in generating public opinion in favor of mass demonstrations in the name of protecting secularism against the government. This has later found to be co-organized by groups involving retired military leaders (see 2.4.1). Media owners and other political elites got together against the government. In this case the secularist side, which is often represented by the military, used Hürriyet to promote their views about this constitutional amendment.

 I asked if the interviewees had anything to add before we finished the interview.

> As long as the society remains as polarized and as long as the audience remains this static, then I see almost no way for the media organizations to change their behavior. (Interviewee 10 B): There is so much internalized hatred in the people too, regular people who buy newspapers. It's in their culture to hate the other. It's just so normal in their daily talk-to-talk that they ought to single people out. (Interviewee 10 A): But this is not to say that business should be as usual. The hope is that there is at least more awareness than in the past regards to that issue… (Interviewee 10 A & B).

These interviewees add another perspective at the issue of polarization. They also mention the

audience, which I think can be regarded as the Turkish society in general. They say that the audience doesn't demand other news then what they have in the newspapers. They just remain static. Interviewee 10 B says that it's in the culture to hate each other, and confirms what interviewee 4 said about people choosing sides. Maybe this is a product of the polarization in the society. The fact that this polarization in Turkey has been present for several decades through coups in Turkish history, would arguably affect the society at large as well. They are used to the polarized news in the newspapers, and newspapers can also offer you a framework for making sense of the social and political situation in the society (see 2.4.5).

As shown above, several of the interviewees that I spoke to, mentioned the polarization in Turkey. They mentioned it in different contexts in the interviews, and I didn't have polarization as a subject to discuss in my interview guide. I interpret this to be something the interviewees are concerned about. The polarization in the country affects the media landscape. It seems like the polarization in the country can provoke distorted and wrong news. Since people don't react to this type of news, they're arguably used to this kind of discourse in the media. Often they even position themselves against one or the other side of this polarization in media and politics. It also seems like political Islam at the moment is the 'dominant hegemonic class', as interviewee 9 put it.

5.2 Nationalism in Turkey

When talking about polarization in a country, you talk about two strong powers in a country that competes for power. Nationalism has another character. Even though the society can be polarized, they can in a way be united when it comes to nationalism. Both secular and islamist parties can be nationalistic for instance. Just as with the issue of polarization, several interviewees also talked about nationalism in Turkey, which is another historical framework important to take into consideration.

I told the interviewee about the research question, and then I just let the interviewee talk.

The historical background of this country is too heavy. Like in any artificial nation building

process, the history of this nation building is so heavy in terms of human loss and mutual atrocities, that of course minorities are subject to permanent hate speech in this country. In the media unfortunately there is no consciousness about it, quite to the contrary. Minorities, especially the non-Muslim minorities, Christian and Jewish minorities, are subjected to this hate speech on a daily basis. There are some ombudsmen in some new newspapers who try to raise attention of the journalist to this sort of language, but with no avail. There is still a long way to go, and there are some nationalist newspapers where the entire newspaper is full of hate speech. But the main problem is the matter of mentality (Interviewee 5).

This interviewee mentions that the cost of the nation building is heavy in terms of human loss and mutual atrocities. In this nation building process many Armenians were killed which has later been termed the Armenian genocide. The homogenization policies in the nation building process were at the expense of minorities. Some of the policies were about advocating the supremacy of the Turkish history and language, the forced resettlement of minorities in predominantly Turkish areas in order to assimilate them into the 'Turkish culture', the prohibition of the use of non-Turkish names, the ban on the use of minority languages in schools and in courts, and the requirement of 'belonging to the Turkish race' for recruitment to military academies and employment in the public sector (see 2.1). According to the interviewee, minorities are still subjected to this hate speech on a daily basis. When taking a look at the Turkish history in terms of how the minorities have been treated, it might not be so strange that they are subjected to hate speech. The interviewee draws a line between the nation building process, the treatment of minorities during this nation building process, to the treatment of minorities in Turkey today.

I ask the interviewee whether there are few or many nationalistic newspapers in Turkey.

Nationalism is a problematic phenomenon in Turkey as well. Whoever you ask "are you a nationalist?" they would say: "yes". The problem is that nationalism is referred to as something positive in this society, so even the mainstream media, some newspapers, I gave you the example of Akit, they are standing in a popular point in the middle, as they know that nationalism sells. There will be a certain amount of nationalism in any kind of

newspapers apart from the newspapers of Kurds. There are some nationalistic newspapers which define themselves with this nationalism. These kinds of ideas should be marginalized in a democratic modern society, but if they're standing in the middle, if they're popular and they become normal, then it´s a problem. They would say: "yeah, what is the problem?" (Interviewee 3).

This interviewee says that nationalism is referred to as something positive in the society. This also makes it harder to marginalize hate speech from newspapers, since hate speech and nationalism is interconnected. The Turkish nationalism also forms the discourse about Kurds, Alevis, Gypsies and Armenians (see 2.4.6). Nationalism is a consensually shared value in the society (see 3.2)

I ask if the interviewee see hate speech as a problem in Turkish media, and where you find such speech.

Today it's better, but mainstream media is nationalist, and you can see that, being an Armenian and a Kurd can sometimes be a problem. But it's not reaching the point of hate speech today. I don't see a lot of examples in the mainstream media, but some radical Islamist or nationalist newspaper are creating that kind of stuff every day. But mainstream media; I don't think so (Interviewee 4).

Both these interviewees claim that mainstream media is nationalist. There might be a difference in how problematic they find the writing in the mainstream newspapers. Interviewee 3 found mainstream newspapers more problematic than interviewee 4. Maybe they have different definitions of what they find problematic, or what they regard as hate speech.

The interviewee talked about that if you are seen as insulting Turkishness you are subjected to legal inquiries, but if you are disseminating hate speech about Jews, you wouldn't end up in trouble. I then asked the interviewee if the reason was because the latter was not about insulting Turkishness.

It's about improper legislation, and about the internalized nationalism and the foreign xenophobia, racism. It's a problem in this part of the Europe, and I thinks it's the same everywhere now, in Europe as well, Scandinavia, or the Netherlands, or wherever. There's Islamophobia, there's all sorts of hate speech that's spreading, but here it's also widespread,

it's in Greece, it's in Spain, it's everywhere. Hate speech is a problem, and we are now asking for the government, the parliament to pass criminalization of the hate speech law, so that it is properly covered by law (Interviewee 6).

Since they don't have a proper law against hate speech, you can't get prosecuted for writing hate speech. The interviewee says that this is not a problem particularly for Turkey, but it's a problem everywhere. This set hate speech in an international perspective, and illustrates that hate speech is not just a problem in Turkey.

Interviewee 5 talks about the consequences the nation building process in Turkey had for the minorities in the country, and that the hate speech the minorities in Turkey face today, is partly a result of the treatment of the minorities earlier in history. Interviewee 3 says that everyone in Turkey is a nationalist, and that this attitude cause problems for marginalizing nationalistic ideas. Interviewee 4 also says that mainstream newspapers are nationalist, but says that even though they are nationalist, the interviewee wouldn't classify their writings as hate speech. Interviewee 6 says that the issue of nationalism, racism and hate speech is not an issue particularly for Turkey, but it's everywhere, and thereby issues also at an international level.

All these interviewees think that nationalism is a problem in the country, and several of them link nationalism to negative speech about minorities in Turkey. Several of them also link nationalism with hate speech directed at minorities.

5.3 Minorities

The topic of minorities is connected to nationalism in Turkey. In the chapter of Nationalism in Turkey, minorities were mentioned as facing hate speech as a result of the nation building process. Since the topics nationalism in Turkey and Minorities are closely connected, I find it natural to place these two topics after each other in the analysis.

This interviewee has worked as a journalist before, and now works in a non-governmental organization. I asked whether the interviewee works towards journalists and cooperate with them regarding issues like hate speech. This is a part of the answer the interviewee gave me.

It's so common that you read something in the newspaper and you begin hating specific groups of people, for example LGBT people. Most of the media outlets cover those news, and write "they are not even human" or something like that. That's a huge problem. Most of the media outlets who does this, are the conservative type. You can never change their view. You may try. There's an LGBT organization, KAOS GL. They have met the nationalist party. You never know how it went, but at least they met. There are some LGBT people who has been attacked right now, in Istanbul. The news are horrible. They have plackards saying: "You are doing prostitution here, I don't want my child to grow like this" and stuff like that. There's a specific newspaper who writes about refugees on the Syrian border, and they have a hate campaign against the refugees on the border. "They are robbing us, they take our money, they do bad things to our people" and stuff like that. Most of them are not true as far as we know, but they keep doing it. This is against humanity and solidarity, this is against Truth Telling, this is against being Fair. On the other hand, a newspaper always wants a fancy title. There's a saying, everyone knows that "sex sells". If someones' right has been violated, they always look to his ethnics or something like that. Instead of saying that John's right has been violated, they write: a croupled Kurdish right has been violated. This is always about selling and how they can make people read the news. It's not about informing people (Interviewee 2).

The interviewee mentions that there has been an attack against LGBT people. According to this statement, it looks like hate speech against sexual minorities comes both from the society and the media. The interviewee also talks about how the reporting about Syrian refugees violates different principles in a code of conduct, such as Being Fair and Truth Telling. It means that in practice, at least in some newspapers, they don't have respect for such codes. They arguably have more focus at having headlines that sells, or a fancy title, as the interviewee says. In the interviews which Teun A. Van Dijk conducted with some 150 people in the Netherlands, it showed that they would remember news if they were written repeatedly. If news about minority events is always communicated in a negative way, this will eventually form the perception the audience have about minorities (See 2.4.5).

Council of Europe has stated that the term hate speech "shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive

nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin". Looking at this definition of hate speech, it suits the interviewees' description of what is going on in the media against both refugees and LGBT people. They have been met with both discrimination and hostility. The newspaper which wrote about the refugees on the Syrian border uses stereotypes of the refugees in order to legitimize their hate speech. They stereotype a whole group. Stereotyping people is a way of legitimizing their myths. Stereotypes can be called Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths (HE-LMs) (see 3.2). This way of legitimizing their attitudes against subordinate groups, such as minorities, is a way of sustaining inequality between the majority and the minority in the society.

In this interview I mention that the newspaper the interviewee works for might not be the worse newspaper regarding containing a lot of hate speech, both since it's not a typical mainstream newspaper, and since it's a leftist newspaper. I ask whether the interviewee finds a tendency of writing about minorities in a negative way in mainstream newspapers.

> It depends on the political and moral line of the newspaper. If that line is very clear, they're going to be very clear on their ideas about minorities as well. Some newspapers almost do their job for targeting them. There is one newspaper called Akit. It's a very conservative newspaper. It almost gives names and encourages people to react for them. They work as campaigns to humiliate some people. It's their line (Interviewee 3).

Conservative newspapers use hate speech on purpose since they have a certain nationalistic agenda. This ideology explains why specific groups are dealt with positively or negatively. In conservative newspapers this ideological framework is more visible and straight forward (see 2.4.5). The interviewee says that this newspaper almost gives names and encourages people to react for them. In the example of the Hrant Dink murder in 2007, Hrant Dink was regarded as an enemy of the state and a traitor of the country in the newspapers. The assassinator of Hrant Dink didn't know him personally, but had made an opinion about him through what he read about him in newspapers.

The former president of the World Evangelical Alliance, Johan Candelin, has developed the *three phases of persecution.* Those three phases are: disinformation, discrimination and violent persecution. In the case of Hrant Dink it seemed like he was in a way a victim of all these phases.

He was a victim of disinformation through the media. He had to suffer under the article 301 about *insulting Turkishness.* And he was a victim of violent persecution, which caused him his life. I don't know which newspapers where involved in this case, but it shows that newspapers can be the first phase of the *three phases of persecution.* In the example of Hrant Dink, the newspapers were instrumental in these *three phases of persecution.*

This interviewee has been working with a code of conduct for a media group, and I ask whether hate speech is a part of the code of conduct in this media group.

> I conducted a research on the way the Turkish media dealt with the Armenian question. That was done for a think-thank a couple of years ago. The Armenian question is one of the questions where a lot of hate speech is generated in the media in Turkey. At least there is an assumption that the Armenian question is one issue of the hate speech. It's true that in the media you will find examples of hate speech centering the Armenian identity. People will call, say, the PKK terrorists for Armenians. The term Armenian might be used as a negative thing. What I found was that this exists, but it exists mostly in marginal media outlets. The mainstream media is quite clear of all this. It's very very difficult to find something like that in the mainstream media. I don't want to say that the mainstream media is completely innocent, obviously there are cases there as well, but it's very very rare (Interviewee 8).

This interviewee says that you find hate speech very rarely in mainstream media, but you find it more often in marginal newspapers. Some marginal newspapers tend to be conservative newspapers, and I assume that interviewee 3 and interviewee 8 talk about the same type of newspapers. So in the case of conservative and marginal newspapers, they both agree that you will find hate speech towards minorities.

I ask what kind of format the newspaper the interviewee works for has, and what the newspaper mostly writes about.

> We're giving news, some untold stories of Turkey. We are trying to follow up the issues about minority rights, human rights and democratization process. We are trying to be a platform of different suppressed groups in Turkey. Because Turkish republican history was full of that kind of suppression. Different groups, non-Muslims, Kurds, homosexuals, etc.,

are suppressed, and have problems with the state, and even the society. They cannot express themselves, they cannot excess their rights as citizens. Turkish history is very monolithic. The official history is: everything is good, there aren't any problems in Turkish modernization process. Discrimination is not mentioned. Nothing is mentioned about bad consequences of the nationalism being so deep-rooted in the society. But after 1990s, thanks to the EU-process, democratization process started, and the untold stories are coming out from different groups, and this newspaper is a part of this process. We are speaking of this kind of identity problems, we are speaking of the Armenian genocide, which is also a part of the history of this society (Interviewee 4).

The interviewee says that minority groups in Turkey such as non-Muslims, Kurds, homosexuals, have problems both with the state and with the society. The interviewee blames the Turkish history for this suppression that still exists in Turkey today. As mentioned in the Nationalism in Turkey chapter, the policy of the state during the formation of the republic of Turkey has been at the expense of the minorities in Turkey. It seems like the interviewee thinks it's a little bit better today because of the EU process. In the Copenhagen criteria it says among other things that every country that wants to join EU, must have respect for and protection of minorities. Even though it's probably a little bit better after the EU process started, the concept of minority still trigger discriminatory reactions. Public officials have made offensive statements about minority identity. Advocacy on minority rights are by some public officials considered as betrayal of the state (see 2.2.1). Another aspect is that 'minority rights' have been associated with an unjustified interference in Turkeys' internal affairs. During the founding of the Turkish republic, Turkey had to grant minority rights, and especially to ´non-Muslims´. They were forced by the allied powers to grant these minority rights (see 2.1). This was probably very humiliating for Turkey, and by fulfilling the EU process, it arguably reminds them of the treaties of Lausanne and Sevres where they also was obliged to grant minority rights for minorities.

This is just in the beginning of an interview. Here I also start by saying the research question of my master thesis. I thereby ask what the interviewee works with and other background questions.

This country is full of issues. How I see the hate speech and the hate crime, which is very much related to media, is that there is no such a consciousness in Turkey. This politically

correctness is not something people pay attention to. In our daily language there are tons of expressions which may relate to hate speech, and on the other hand it doesn't mean that it's going further than that. But the historical background of this country is too heavy. Like in any artificial nation building process, the history of this nation building is so heavy in terms of human loss and mutual atrocities, that of course minorities are subject to permanent hate speech in this country. In the media unfortunately there is no consciousness about it, quite to the contrary. Minorities, especially the non-Muslim minorities, Christian and Jewish minorities, are subjected to this hate speech on a daily basis. There are some ombudsmen in some new newspapers who try to raise attention of the journalist to this sort of language, but with no avail. There is still a long way to go, and there are some nationalist newspapers where the entire newspaper is full of hate speech. But the main problem is the matter of mentality (Interviewee 5).

Like the former interviewee, this interviewee thinks that the Turkish history is one reason for the difficult situation for minorities in Turkey today. The previous interviewee talked about minorities being suppressed, and this interviewee says they are victims of hate speech, both in newspapers and among people in general. The interviewee also says that it's no awareness of hate speech in the media. The interviewee thinks a part of the problem is the mindset of people. In the polarization chapter Interviewee 10 a and b said that there was much internalized hatred in people. Perhaps parts of this culture of hatred were created already from the nation building process. In any case it seems like hate speech is a matter of peoples mindset and attitude according to interviewee 5 and 10 a & b.

In an interview I did with another interviewee, the interviewee told me that they published a list every now and then with names of newspapers which had been using hate speech lately, in order to put hate speech on the agenda and confront those newspapers. I asked whether interviewee 3 thought it would mean something to someone working for a newspaper to see their name/newspaper in that list, and if the interviewee believed it would depend on which newspaper the journalist works for.

Some of the journalists might not be aware of what's regarded as hate speech. There are historical old words, let's say about gypsies. There is this tradition, and because you´ve heard it since you were a kid, you think it's normal. But when you think and check it with a

journalistic mind, or a resourcable mind let's say, you should see that there is a hate speech there against gypsies, so we should be careful about it (Interviewee 3).

The interviewee talks about a tradition of how gypsies are being perceived in the society. Traditions are normally something that has existed for some time. When the interviewee says that there are some historical words about gypsies that people have heard since they were kids, and people start to think that it's normal, it seems like this stereotyping of gypsies have become a legitimizing myth. The reason for calling it a legitimizing myth, is that when people start to think it's normal, they have already accepted this stereotyping. This means that it has become a consensually held value in the society (see 3.2). Hate speech becomes incorporated in the daily language. This connects hate speech with what is being said by interviewee 10 a & b in the polarization chapter and interviewee 5 in this chapter. People remain static and don't react two what is being written. Hate speech has become normal both in the context of polarization in the society and towards minorities. Several interviewees have said that even though they didn't find hate speech in mainstream newspapers, there could be nationalistic writings, and writings around the minority identity which is not positively angled. So it might be that mainstream newspapers would for instance write a stereotyped story of gypsies without reflecting around whether the story would be regarded as hate speech or not.

This interviewee works as an ombudsman in a Turkish newspaper. I ask whether the interviewee finds a lot of hate speech in the newspaper.

> It has increased. It has always to do with the Kurdish and the Armenian issue, but also about illegal immigrants, female immigrants say from Ukraine, Russia. Sometimes they are coming into the picture as objects of hate speech or humiliation or something like that. Anti-Semitism is also pretty much in the newspapers, not in this paper so much, but the other issues particularly. Hate speech is a problem, because Turkey is one of the few countries that have not properly criminalized hate speech. It's almost like the States, but in a sense that if you are seen as insulting Turkishness, you are in problems, subjected to indictments, legal inquiries, but as long as you are disseminating hate speech about Jews, it's okay (Interviewee 6).

This interviewee says that lack of legislation about hate speech in Turkey is one reason why hate

speech is a problem in the country. You can see an issue of group based hierarchy here. When you're using hate speech towards minorities, it's not a problem, but if you say something that can be regarded as a critique of the majority, or *insulting Turkishness,* you're in problems. There is a discrimination of different groups through the laws. The resource of having legislation about hate speech in the case of minorities, are not there yet. On the other hand there are articles in the Penal Code, such as article 301 *insulting Turkishness*, which are in the favor of the dominant group in society. Hrant Dink, which was an Armenian, and representing the Armenian minority in Turkey, was convicted for insulting Turkishness because of an article he had published in the weekly newspaper Agos. Prior to his murder he had been convicted for insulting Turkishness twice (see 2.3.3). Social dominance theory assumes that there are three conditions that must be met for the state to use the courts to enforce social hierarchy. One of these criteria is that the public must tolerate the group prejudice of the criminal justice system. According to Social Dominance Theory, it would mean that there is an acceptance in the society of the court system in that regard, but in the case of article 301 there has been a lot of both national and international pressure in order to abolish the article.

This interviewee has been working as a journalist before. I ask whether the newspapers the interviewee has worked for write in a negative way about minorities or not.

> We have minorities in this country, religious minorities, ethnic minorities. They are in trouble in terms of hate speech. Especially Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Jews. They are being targeted as the victim of hate speech very often. Specially because there is a huge conflict in the South-East Turkey. The Kurdish population is being targeted by the mainstream news media. Being a Kurd is equal with being a terrorist in Turkey, so all the Kurdish people is being targeted, is being framed as PKK guerrilla, as PKK terrorists in the news media. Me myself was targeted as "the other", as the public enemy because I'm saying the truth. If you are targeting somebody, if you are using hate speech, there is no problem with that if you are being perceived as the enemy by the most of the population. People have no problem with that. They give consent to your situation. Most of the people are giving

> consent to this kind of discourses in the media. So, most of the people are nationalist, most of the people are anti-Kurdish, most of the people hate Armenians. They don't believe in

what we did in 1915 to Armenians (Interviewee 9).

This interviewee connects hate speech against Kurds with the conflict in the South-East Turkey. Kurds are being targeted as terrorists. This is also a form of stereotyping a group of people, just like with the gypsies. According to the Hrant Dink Foundations' study of different newspaper in Turkey during a year, the most frequently seen hate speech they analyzed was hostility/war speech. So hate speech connected to the conflict in South-East Turkey can be a part of the reason why hostility/war speech was the most frequently seen form of hate speech. It looks like there's not a problem to use hate speech towards someone if it's perceived as an enemy by the government or the population. If you're criticizing the way the government handle the Kurdish issue, you can end up having trouble with the government. This interviewee talks about being perceived as a "public enemy" for telling the truth. Dijk also writes about how groups that works for weakening of the majority group control, risk being attacked with the media's own strategies. They can respond by marginalization and biased reporting in the newspapers (see 2.4.5) One reason for the readers to not respond to what's written in the newspapers, might be that they're afraid of the reactions of their criticism. The interviewee also says that most people give consent to the situation, which reflects the view of interviewee 5, which says that it's all a question about mindset. People accept this kind of discourse in the media. One reason why most people don't react to hate speech in the media, according to interviewee 9 (and 5), is because most people are nationalists and anti-Kurdish. In the chapter of polarization, the focus was at how the society was divided between secularists and political Islam. In the case of nationalism which is mentioned here, it is arguably an agreement between these two sides. The minorities become a "threat from the outside". It seems like the legitimizing myth of stereotyping and nationalism is interconnected.

Interviewee 2 talks about hate speech in the context of LGBT people and refugees on the Syrian border, and that in conservative newspapers you could find statements like "they're not even human" about LGBT people. One reason why newspapers would write in this way, is because they want their newspapers to sell. Interviewee 3 talked about the differences between newspapers in terms of hate speech, and that it was normal to find hate speech in conservative newspapers. In the second quotation, this interviewee talked about some historical words about gypsies, and that these historical words people have heard since they were kids, and as a result of that they wouldn't react if they found this sort of stereotyping of gypsies in the newspapers. Interviewee 4 talks about minorities being suppressed, and that this is partly a result of the Turkish history and the nationalism deep-rooted in the society. Interviewee 5 says that hate speech is related to media, and,

connects hate speech with the nation building process in Turkey. Interviewee 6 says that the Kurdish & Armenian issue is and illegal immigrants face hate speech in the media. The interviewee says that lack of legislation is the reason why hate speech can pass without problems in the media. Interviewee 9 says that Kurds often face hate speech because of the conflict in South-East Turkey. In this context Kurds are often being targeted as terrorists. The interviewee also talks about a consent in society around this type of discourse in media, and that people don't react to it. Turkey was hostile towards minorities during the nation building process. This hostility persists in society today, which you can see both in the way newspapers write about minorities, and the fact that people accept this kind of discourse in the media. Since there is no legislation about hate speeh in Turkey, newspapers won't face reactions from the court system either. Several interviewees say that you don't find hate speech in mainstream newspapers, but even though you don't find hate speech in newspapers, you can find writings about minorities in mainstream newspapers which don't have to be positively angled.

5.4 Media ownership

Media ownership is more related to the topics Freedom of speech/government, Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia, Self-censorship and Codes of Conducts and implementation. The topics of media ownership are connected to the media structure in Turkey, and how the media sector is connected to other sectors. It also has to do with the connection between the media and the government.

This interviewee has earlier worked as a journalist, and is now working in an organization. I ask the interviewee about the role of the media, and whether it has a consumer role or take the role of informing the public.

> Unfortunately now the media outlets are also working in other sectors. In the place I used to work they were also doing automotives, constructions, and they also had a bank, so they have the same interests as the government. You may say the same thing for the most of the media outlets. This is where it gets complicated. In the old days maybe we could talk about the media as conservative, left-wing, right-wing or something like that, now it's totally different. I mean, you may still be right- or left-wing, but if you have the same interests as

the government, it also affects the pieces you cover (Interviewee 2).

The interviewee says that it's not just about being left-wing or right-wing newspaper in Turkey, because the media is connected to politics through investments. It can be difficult to be a hard core left-wing newspaper if it is conflicting with what the governments' view. Another problem with the issue of investments in other sectors than media, is that major private holding companies can pressure editors and journalists to refrain from coverage that could harm the parent company's business interests **(**see 2.4.1).

I ask the same interviewee about the effect of principles and ethical guidelines for journalists, and whether it's difficult to follow such principles when working as a journalist.

> If there is corruption in the construction sector and the media outlet has a share of the same company, they wouldn't write about it. It would not be good (Interviewee 2).

Even though you as a journalist would like to do critical journalism, you cannot do it if it's about a company that the owner of the newspaper you work for has investments in. That's why it's difficult to find critical coverage about the biggest companies in Turkey. Since the media earn a lot of money by offering advertisement space for companies in their newspapers, it's not smart to write critical about those companies they have in their advertisements. The advertising pressure from companies prevents the media from reporting on corruptions, dismissals, strikes or non-unionization in these companies (see 2.4.1).

This is in the end of the interview and I just asked the interviewee if there was anything more the interviewee would like to say before we finished the interview.

> Say, you have media owner X, who is in cell-phone business, or energy. It's very difficult for that newspaper to cover critically something about the company that is owned by the owner of the newspaper (Interviewee 6).

This interviewee says quite similar things as interviewee 2.

I ask the interviewee what kind of role the interviewee thinks the mainstream media has, and what kind of interests the interviewee thinks the mainstream media has.

> Media company owners have other interests in other companies, like oil companies, construction companies, automotive companies etc. They're not making money from the media business, but from other businesses. They are using media or media companies to get public funds or state contracts from the government. The media have a newspaper or a TV channel, and they are serving as the apparatus of the government, so that the government gives them a state contract from electric business for example. They are not making money with the newspaper, because the newspapers have very low circulation in Turkey. Only Hurriyet makes money from the news business, but the others make money from other businesses, so they are quite imbedded with the government (Interviewee 9).

This investment culture started with the deregulation of the media market in the 1990s. It resulted in the development of 'clientalist' relationships between media patrons and the state. The media has begun to push pressure on politicians to maximize their profits in their other activity areas using their media outlets. Even though the media owners compete with each other, they share a common mindset which is to protect the 'state interest'. Since the media ownerships are dependent on the state to maximize their profits in other areas, they have to protect the state interests in order to maintain this clientalist relationship. If a media company is interested in a state contract for electric business for instance, it wouldn't be very clever to print critical articles about the government in the newspapers the company owns. The Prime minister pushes the media owners to keep journalists under control or else they would have to dismiss them for their critical press coverage of the government's policies, on the grounds that their portrayals would risk destabilizing the economy (see 2.4.2).

This interviewee is part of a Turkish media platform for journalists who want to raise awareness about ethics in Turkish newspapers with focus at improving journalism in Turkish newspapers. This is a voluntarily media platform where journalists can join. I ask about what format the interviewee wants the media to have. The interviewee touched upon some aspects which have been mentioned

by other interviewees as well.

> The individual journalist is sometimes not very powerful. We are aware of structural problems in the media. Many media organizations are owned by companies, and when you have that kind of a structure, it's hard to get away from all the influence for journalists from other factors (Interviewee 10 a).

This interviewee underlines that it's difficult for the journalists to be powerful because of the structure in media. This structure has been illustrated by interviewee 9.

What all these interviewees are mentioning here, is that the structure of the media in Turkey can make it difficult for you to perform your job as a journalist the way you want to, because you always have to be careful of what to write and what not to write about. You have to be in line with the interests of the owners of the newspaper you're working for. It's quite obvious that it's not a smart thing to criticize a construction company, if it turns out that those who own your newspaper also owns this construction company. The former associate director of the Hastings Center, Arthur Caplan has made a set of explanations why journalists' have difficulties with ethical codes, one explanation is that journalists are not independent practitioners serving individual clients, but rather hired hands working for large organizations (Iggers 1998: 28). This explanation is strengthened by what my interviewees told me. One thing which is only mentioned by interviewee 9, is that newspapers don't really sell much in Turkey, except for Hurriyet. The interviewee further says that they use the newspapers to get public funds, and in order to do that, you shouldn't write anything that the government doesn't approve.

5.5 Freedom of speech/Government

Freedom of speech is sometimes conflicting different laws in Turkey. A problem is when what someone regards as freedom of speech someone else regard as hate speech, or blasphemy. To regard some speeches as blasphemy or, for *insulting Turkishness,* can also be regarded as a way of eliminating opposition.

I mention to the interviewee that I have read a master thesis which also focuses on media ethics in

Turkish newspapers, and that the interviewees told the author of the master thesis that monopolization, absence of editorial freedom, and lack of job security where things they took into consideration when they were writing for their newspapers. This interviewee talks about articles in the Turkish constitution which can constrain freedom of expression.

> We have article 216 which is concerning incitement to hatred and hostility, or making comments. The pianist and composer Fazil Say wrote something on twitter and now he's being on trial. Freedom of speech is always violated in Turkey. This article is not actually aimed to put those people on trial, they're meant for protecting some people, but mostly it's not used the way it should be used. This is one example why most of the journalists do auto-censorship (Interviewee 2).

The interviewee says that article 216 is meant for protecting people, but generally most of those articles are not used the way it should be used. Instead of protecting people, these articles can be used to put people on trial. Such articles can cause journalists to do self-censorship. If you look at the consequences such articles have for journalism in a human rights perspective, they actually prevent journalists from their right to freedom of speech. Article 216 in the Penal Code, which bans "inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples" has been used against journalists and others who write about the Kurdish population or allegedly denigrate the armed forces. An academic named Ismail Besikci was sentenced to 15 months in prison for an article entitled "The Rights of the Nations to Self-Determination and the Kurds." Besikci has spent a total of 17 years in prison for similar publications on the Kurdish minority. The cartoonist Bahadir Baruter got a one-year prison sentence for a cartoon that appeared in the weekly magazine *Penguen*, depicting the words "There is no God, religion is a lie" on the wall of a mosque (see 2.3.1). The worse consequence for violating such articles by performing you right to freedom of speech, is that you can end up in prison.

I tell the interviewee the topic of my master thesis, and thereby let the interviewee talk. The interviewee touches upon different topics, and this is one of the topics.

> A very famous columnist of Radikal was sent away just because of what he wrote, actually it was about the prime minister. He was always standing in the leftist and oppositional line. He

was writing for Radikal since the beginning, for sixteen years, but a couple of months ago, he was sent away. There are many journalists who have been taken to trial for humiliating or criticizing the prime minister. And as this power means politic and economic power as well, the owners of the newspapers can't dare to be in a bad position with the AKP. They know that they can lose many things, because most of them have other kinds of investments as well, in energy sector or in any other sector. If your relation is once getting worse with the leading party, it means that your capital is in danger somehow (Interviewee 3).

This interviewee mentions that people have been put on trial for criticizing the prime minister. ECtHR has addressed such defamation cases brought against journalists in Turkey. In the case of Erbil Tusalp, which was ordered to pay 5,000 TL, ECtHR in its judgment dated 21 February 2012 concluded that the sentencing of a journalist to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's personal rights violated Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. They claim that the criticisms did not constitute a personal attack against the Prime Minister, and state that "the press fulfills an essential function in a democratic society" and that politicians should tolerate criticism because of the fact that they are politicians. According to the ECtHR, journalistic freedom also includes being provocative and overstating, which the Prime minister should tolerate (2.3.3) So according to ECtHR Turkey violate article 10 of the European Convention for Human Rights, which Turkey adhere to due to their membership of the European Council.

I mention article 301 about insulting Turkishness, and that this article has been debated.

There are so many! This is in the Penal Code, you also have the anti-terror law, and many others. Let's say you write a piece about the PKK. If you cover news about them, you may also be prosecuted. The government would say that it's propaganda for the rebel group, and that's impossible! You're a journalist, you are doing your job. Most of the people are prosecuted just because they are doing their job. It´s the same for the lawyers in Turkey. If you are defending such people, you also get prosecuted. Most of the people who are in jail are lawyers and journalists (Interviewee 2).

In the quotation of interviewee 9 in the sub-chapter of minorities, the interviewee says that Kurdish people are portrayed as PKK terrorists in the media, and that this interviewee personally had been framed as a public enemy for telling "the truth". I understand "the truth" to be a way of writing about Kurdish people without saying that they're terrorist, and writing about them in a more nuanced way. When looking at that quotation in the light of this quotation, it seems like it can be difficult to have an alternative way of reporting about the minority events such as the Kurdish people and the conflict in south-east Turkey. To say this very simple: if you as a journalist try to write more nuanced, and say that the Kurdish people not are PKK terrorists, you can end up being accused for being a terrorist yourself. The government could say that it's propaganda for the rebel group, as interviewee 2 says here. This means that journalists are often prosecuted on charges of terrorism and treated as 'terrorists' just for having performed their duties to provide the public with information.

A majority of the media freedom and freedom of expression cases in Turkey brought to ECtHR, are decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law (see 2.3.2). The fact that a lot of the decisions brought to ECtHR are decisions based on the Anti-Terror Law, shows how difficult it is to report about the Kurdish issue in Turkey. It seems like it's easier to get away with it if you write hate speech about the Kurdish people and claim that they're terrorists, than if you have a non-violent opinion about the Kurdish people, and try to report in a more nuanced way.

I asked if the interviewee had anything to add before we finished the interview. Here the interviewee talks about laws and freedom of expression.

> In Turkey you have problems with the press freedom and freedom of expression, because we have potentially forty articles in six or seven laws, that limit the freedom of expression; anti-terror law, Internet law, radio-television law, press law, and Penal Code, which is five, and that's enough. And those forty are there, either functional or dormant, in shelf, so they can take it up one day and use it against you. That's why we have this problem, particularly with Kurdish colleagues, most of the jailed ones are Kurds, and also Turkish colleagues who have been subjected to legal proceedings because they are covering critical court proceedings, political court proceedings (Interviewee 6).

What this interviewee says shows that the media is highly regulated by different laws and that these laws can be used against you if you want to cover critical court proceedings for instance. This just underlines what the previous interviewees have mentioned about articles that can be used against you. Another aspect this interviewee brings up, is that a lot of the journalists who are prisoned, are Kurdish. The government is probably more likely to think that Kurdish journalists writing about the Kurdish issue are terrorists, than Turkish journalists.

I ask the interviewee if you can be accused for insulting Turkishness (article 301), or for supporting Kurds if you through an article criticize how news have been covered in South-East Turkey about Kurds.

> They [government] are trying to prevent religion, mostly Islam, against criticism from other people, from left-wing politicians, from atheists, agnostics, or from other people. Many people are being trialed because of this. One example is the Turkish pianist Fazil Say. He was in a court house, being sued because he was saying that religion is bull shit or something. There is a caricaturist, my friend, Bahadir Baruter, who is a very famous caricaturist. He wrote something in one of his caricatures, saying that: there is no God, religion is bull shit, or something like that. He's in trouble because of this. They perceive this as Islamophobia. It's not Islamophobia, this is his personal opinion about religion and God (Interviewee 9).

Islam is the majority religion in Turkey. If you criticize Islam you can end up in trouble, or being accused for Islamophobia. Peoples' personal opinions are mixed up with hate speech. Islamohobia is one type of legitimizing myth. It is a type of ideology, and when someone is critical of religion for instance, they call it Islamophobia in order to defend their actions of putting these people on trial (see 3.2).

I start by saying that this is a threat to freedom of speech.

> Exactly! There is no freedom of speech though in Turkey these days. There has never been freedom of speech, real freedom of speech, but it is getting worse day by day. Unfortunately, because the one-party rule is quite dangerous. They are becoming fascist dictators in Turkey,

and people like dictators in this country, unfortunately, like Pakistan, like some other countries. They support these dictators, and these dictators use all the channels to stop people talking, thinking, sharing, opinions, protesting etc. It's just getting really awful (Interviewee 9).

The interviewee blames the government for the constraints on freedom of speech. When looking at what the previous interviewees have said, it can be concluded that the way the government restricts freedom of speech, is by actively use the article in the Penal Code, and the Anti-Terror Law to put people on trial accusing them for *insulting Turkishness* or for being terrorists. In a Human Rights perspective those articles actively put constraints on freedom of speech. Interviewee 9 says that "people like dictators in this country". Even though it might sound a bit harsh to say that they are dictators, AKP do have a lot of power in Turkey, especially since they have a one-party rule. Another concern this interviewee has, is that people support this government. When people are supporting the government, they in a way also support their way of ruling.

This interviewee is a professor which also writes columns. I asked if the interviewee tried to write something to counter-act hate speech when writing columns.

In a country where you don't have a proper democratic culture, the danger is to shift very quickly from anti-hate speech legislation to anti-free speech practice. This is the biggest danger. Still a long long way to go, but there are some positive turns which didn't exist before (Interviewee 5).

This interviewee says exactly what can be the danger with having hate speech legislation. It can be used for anti-free speech practice. When looking at the previous examples of what journalists have been convicted for, it seems like even now, without having anti-hate speech legislation, people are being convicted for different forms of hate speech, which others would consider as just exercising the right of freedom of speech. One example is article 216 which bans "inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples", which in practice have been used for hindering freedom of speech.

Fazil Say was mentioned as an example by three different interviewees. These examples shows what kind of consequences you might end up with if you write what you want, using freedom of

speech. If you challenge the majority religion, Islam, you can be taken for "Islamophobia". You can also end up in trouble if you criticize the government, and the Prime minister. Interviewee 9 claims that there has never been freedom of speech in Turkey, and that it's actually getting worse day by day. The interviewee thinks that the reason behind it is become it's a one party rule in the country today. If you write about the conflict in South-East Turkey and if you criticize the governments' way of handling this situation, you might end up in trouble. This is less likely to happen if you write about them in a negative way and call them terrorists.

One interviewee says that laws which are meant for protecting people, are being misused, so instead these laws put people on trial. Another interviewee talks about the danger to shift from anti-hate speech to anti-free speech practice. The other interviewees mention different examples of people who have been prosecuted for their writings. This shows that already today there is a certain anti-free speech practice in Turkey.

5.6 Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia

Freedom of speech/government-chapter shows that there the Penal code and the Anti-Terror Law are used to prosecute journalists who write about the Kurdish issue or the army. On the other hand, there is no legislation of hate speech and hate crime in the context of minorities. This Hate crime legislation and Islamophobia-chapter focuses on the governments' suggestion of having hate crime legislation in the context of Islamophobia.

Interviewee 3 tells me that last year a campaign for legislation for hate crimes was launched, with the effort of many NGOs. They were demanding heavier punishments for hate crimes, but there was no response from the government while this campaign was going on. Then the interviewee says that a couple of months ago there was a film about Muslims, and I ask if the interviewee was thinking of "The innocence of Muslims".

> Yeah. After that film the prime minister for the first time in his life said: "hate crime is a very serious thing. Our government will work on hate crimes. Islamophobia is one of the biggest crimes of humanity. Suddenly the Prime minister stole the idea of civil society. When he was mentioning hate crimes, he only used Islamohobia. So now the people who

were working for this campaign, are not sure if this legislation is made, it can be used against freedom of expression. In his mind, and in the governments mind, the only hate crime is Islamophobia. It can lead to serious freedom of expression problems. There is one example apart from this legislation, you know Fazil Say? The very famous musician. He re-twittered something about Islam, I don't remember the tweet at the moment, but he was criticizing and humiliating in some terms Islam, but it was just a speech. Now he is being trialed for humiliating Islam, so it's a very big danger related to freedom of expression (Interviewee 3).

Other interviewees have also talked about the hate crime legislation in the context of Islamophobia. This interviewee says that the government didn't listen to the civil society when they wanted hate crime legislation in the context of minorities. It was only after the movie "The innocence of Muslims" that the prime minister launched the idea of hate crime legislation, but only to be used in the context of Islamophobia. If there will be a legislation directly about Islamophobia, the legislation can be used for hindering freedom of speech even more. Even without this type of hate crime legislation, people have been convicted for humiliating Islam, as was the case with Fasil Say.

I ask the interviewee if you can be accused for insulting Turkishness (article 301), or for supporting Kurds if you through an article criticize how news have been covered in South-East Turkey about Kurds. The interviewee comes with different aspects which are connected with some of the other topics I have mentioned before.

Hate speech is becoming very problematic in these days in Turkey, because the government is trying to make a law about hate speech within the context of Islamophobia, not within the context of ethnic minorities, or religious minorities, or disable people, etc. They are really interested in Islamophobia. It is stupid, because Turkey is a Muslim country. 90% of the people are Muslims and, in a Muslim country there wouldn't be Islamophobia, because the majority of the people are Muslims. They're trying to distort the perception about hate speech, about the definition of hate speech. It's quite dangerous, because if you're trying to create a law against Islamophobia in a Muslim country, no one says: Hey, being a Muslim is not a good thing, you cannot say that: religion is bad for people. You can be a victim of hate speech, because they say that: Hey, you are writing against religion, so you are

Islamophobic. Many people are being trialed because of this. One example is the Turkish pianist Fazil Say. He was in a court house, being sued because he was saying that religion is bull shit or something. There is a caricaturist, my friend, Bahadir Baruter, who is a very famous caricaturist. He wrote something in one of his caricatures, saying that: there is no God, religion is bull shit, or something like that. He's in trouble because of this. They perceive this as Islamophobia. It's not Islamophobia, this is his personal opinion about religion and God (Interviewee 9).

This interviewee shares the same concerns as interviewee 2 about hate crime legislation in the context of Islamophobia can be used to hinder freedom of speech.

I just tell the interviewee the topic of the research question.

What is needed first and foremost, is a clear, legal framework. Of course it's not always easy to have such a framework, because you can easily, end up in a liberty-side legislation. While trying to embed or put breaks to the hate speech, you may end up to put breaks on the free speech. This is the risk, and there are some activist groups which I advise time to time, who are in touch with the government and the legislator to have a decent piece of legislation on that, but we haven't so far seen anything coming. Quite to the contrary the Prime minister has made his intention clear to punish the hate speech against Islam in an Islamic country, which is quite weird, and this is where we are (Interviewee 5).

This interviewee addresses the importance of having a clear legal framework in order to put breaks to the hate speech. The interviewee also addresses the issue of implementation of such a framework, and that it can be used as another law for preventing free-speech. This is connected to chapter 5.5 about Freedom of speech/government, where it is illustrated that laws meant for protecting people instead are used to prosecute them.

All the three interviewees find it strange that the government would rather adopt a hate crime legislation in the context of Islamophobia rather in the context of minorities, since more than 90 % are Muslims. They fear that it would in principle be used for further prevent freedom of speech.

5.7 Self-censorship

Self-censorship is a practice done in journalism in order not to print anything that would cause troubles for the newspapers and for those working in the newspapers. Self-censorship is related to media ownership and their investments in other sectors, the clientalist relationship between media and the government, and the governmental regulation of the press.

I talked with this interviewee about media groups. The interviewee mentioned Dogan, Dogus and Chalik. The interviewee further mentions that these three media groups have many newspapers, radio-channels, TV-channels and magazines. I then ask the interviewee if there might not be so many different perspectives in the newspapers since three media groups owns that many newspapers.

> Yes, you might not get so many different views. There are some columnists who write what they want, but looking at the last two years most of them are unemployed right now, because they got fired. This makes people do more auto-censorship. Now people know that if they write such things, something will happen to them (Interviewee 2).

This interviewee tells you what might happen if you write about those cases that you want to write about. You might end up losing your job. This fear of losing your job, can make journalists to do auto-censorship, which means that you censor yourself first, to prevent getting into trouble. Auto-censorship is also called self-censorship, which is the term mostly used in this master thesis. In 2008 when Hürriyet had the case of '411 hands rose to chaos,' the government responded with giving the Dogan group a disproportionally heavy fine for tax fraud. The Dogan group had problems with financing the fine, and had to sell two of its major papers, *Milliyet* and *Vatan*, to the Karacan family in partnership with the Demirören Group. These two families ended up in a disagreement, and meanwhile journalists working in these newspapers were having trouble getting paid. Dogan employees have reported practicing self-censorship to avoid further trouble with the law (see 2.4.1). This is one example of which consequences it can have for journalists when they write about something which for instance the government doesn't approve of. For many journalists it's more important getting paid than writing about what you would like to write about, which result

in self-censorship.

I asked the interviewee about the role of the media.

> The mainstream media is quite profit oriented right now. There is no intention to tell the truth to the people, especially news media I'm talking about. That's why all the organizations and news rooms are changed in terms of this profit orientation. They are careless about public needs and public rights to know. They don't give a shit about it, so that's why all the media companies have high parallelism with the government, high parallelism with the political parties. Their role perception is that the media is not the mediator between the public and the state, but that the media serves for the state. They are afraid of the prime minister, and they don't want to write something which is going to make our prime minister crazy or mad, so they are very balanced in terms of using censorship and self-censorship. They know what to write and what not to (Interviewee 9).

Interviewee 3 said in the chapter of Freedom of speech/Government that a journalist lost his job because he wrote something about the prime minister. If you're afraid of losing your job if you write something which might be perceived as affending, people use self-censorship also in this context. In the case of Erbil Tusalp, which was convicted to pay 5,000 TL in compensation for having attacked Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogans' personal rights, the ECTHR rulings decided that the prime minister should be able to handle when journalists write critical about the prime minister.

The media doesn't want to become enemy of the government and the prime minister, because they have a lot of power also in the media landscape. According to the interviewee, the media is very profit oriented, and doesn't have the focus of public needs and public rights to know, and one of of the reason is because they have high parallelism with the state.

To conclude these two interviewees talked about reasons for doing self-censorship, such as not losing your job. Another aspect they talked about is that the media is quite profit oriented, so they don't care about publics' needs, but rather about what the governments' needs.

5.8 Codes of conducts and implementation

An issue with all kinds of laws, rules and guidelines, is how it is implemented. There can be many guidelines on paper, but if these guidelines are not implemented, they don't have any effect.

I ask if the interviewee, which former has worked as a journalist and now is working in a non-governmental organization, works towards journalists and cooperates with them when it comes to the issue of hate speech.

> There's a platform about hate speech, they [the activist] are trying to put it in the legislation, and we are also a part of that platform. We are trying to remove hate speech from all the media outlets, but it's nearly impossible. Just to sell the newspaper they do stuff like that. Most of the newspapers willingly make people targets. The problem with the law in Turkey, actually the problem of the law in most countries, is that you may change the law, but you can never make sure that it's implemented (Interviewee 2).

The interviewee talks about a platform where organizations are gathered in order to put hate speech in the legislation. This is probably connected to the campaign launched by The Association for Social change (Sosyal Degisim Dernegi). They launched a campaign for the adoption of Turkey's first anti-hate speech law (see 2.4.7). The interviewee further raises the problem of implementation. If you're not implementing a law, it's just a dormant law. Even though you have put political pressure on the government and they adopt a law about hate speech for instance, the law also needs to properly implemented, otherwise it's not of any help. This has happened with the legal reforms in Turkey. Several times the legal reforms have been overshadowed by the Constitutional Court. They have ignored changes when the parliament has adopted progressive legal reforms in accordance with the ECHR standards. One example is when the Constitutional Court invalidated Article 26 of the Press Law in May 2011, which imposes time limits on prosecutors for launching criminal cases. Once this decision enters into force in July 2012, prosecutors will no longer be bound to certain time restraints if they want to file a case about a publication in a periodical (see 2.3.2). This shows that it's not enough just to implement new laws, you also need a court system that will accept these new laws.

I ask if the interviewee wants to add something before the interview is finished.

Your thesis topic is a very crucial one for journalists all over the world. It's good to discuss this topic, but just discussion is not enough. You also need the implementation to change things. When we are talking about the ethical codes, these ethical codes should be alive and open. We don't have time to discuss in depth about the ethical codes. We have to deal with the laws, regulations, bosses, and so on. They are all related with each other. The journalists have to struggle against these laws and regulations, but we also have to work on these ethical codes and especially hate speech (Interviewee 7).

Interviewee 7 talks about that ethical codes should be alive and open. The interviewee also says that they don't have time to talk about these ethical codes. The journalists spend a lot of time in just adjusting to laws and regulations. In the book of Iggers (*Good news, bad news: Journalism Ethics and the Public Interest*, 1998) there are several theories of why journalists can have difficulties articulating their responsibilities. James Carey of Columbia University offers some explanations. In his essay "Journalists Just Leave", he observed that nearly all other professional groups that attend conferences about ethics, start ethics study groups, organizations, journals, or engage in other forms of ethical discourse, except for the journalists. Carey's explanations are that journalists don't know how to talk about journalism ethics, and that journalists fear that to have a public discussion about their professional ethics is the first step down the road to increased regulation. Since journalism is a far more public activity than medicine for instance, journalists feel more exposed and more defensive about their practices. Journalists are not independent practitioners serving individual clients, but rather hired working for large organizations (see 2.4.3). It seems like since the media is so highly regulated that journalists spend more time in doing self-censorship than thinking about ethical guidelines.

I ask if the interviewee thinks that campaigns started on an international level, such as the campaign launched by the Council of Europe called "speak out against discrimination", would be effective in Turkey, and how journalists would perceive a campaign like this.

Let's say I'm a journalist, and I use a lot of hate speech. I come to one of your workshops,

you're training me, so now I'm a trained journalist. I go to work, I write a piece, and show it to my editor. Since my editor has been working there for five or six years, he or she is accustom to the media outlet I'm working in, and he or she will say "okay, fine, but people won't read it. Change it and add some other stuff. So it goes back to me. So I wrote it, and then I send it back and take into consideration the code of conduct I have to be in line with. There's a ping pong here, between me and my editor. Then my editor gives up, takes the piece, rewrites it himself or herself, and then sends it out to the bigger chief. It's not just about the correspondence with the journalist and the editor. It's also about the editor and the bigger people in the newspaper. That's the problem (Interviewee 2).

According to how the interviewee answers me, it's not just to attend a course and learn how to "speak out against discrimination". Perhaps you start writing articles about this topic, but the article might end up being censored anyway. What you write have to be approved by the editor, and if the editor doesn't want to have this article in the newspaper you work for, you haven't come any further. This is connected to the media structure in Turkey, and that the media have interests in other sectors and in politics.

I ask the interviewee, which works with a code of conduct for a media group, how this code of conduct is going to be implemented.

There will be cases when people will interpret these guidelines differently. There will be cases where they will be in doubt about what to do. The most important, crucial thing is: who is going to decide when there is a conflict? Who is going to say: okay you are right, you are wrong. Who is going to say: let's do this this way. In most cases, this duty is given to the managers themselves. Which is not a good idea, because then the managers start controlling their own work. What we did, is, to create a post, which might be called an Ombudsman, although we don't call it an Ombudsman, which will be someone from the outside trying to mitigate between the various parts. Even his mitigation might be not enough. Ultimately it will be the boards of directors who solve the issue, but I don't think that most of the issues will go that far. This is something we have to see, because obviously these things can look very nice on paper, but it's important to see how it will work out (Interviewee 8).

In this case the interviewee talked about the implementation of an ethical guideline at the workplace of the interviewee. What the interviewee mentions as one way of making sure that there is a good implementation of the ethical guideline, is by having a sort of an Ombudsman, someone from the outside, to mitigate between various parts. Also this interviewee mentions that it's important to see how things will work out in practice, and that it doesn't help if it only looks nice on paper. Having an Ombudsman in a newspaper, would probably solve the example interviewee 2 came with between the editor and the journalist. The Ombudsman could discuss the issue with these two parts, and perhaps comes with solutions. This will also help avoiding self-censorship which the editor or manager, as interviewee 8 puts it, would probably have done.

I ask if the TV-channel the interviewee works for is more open minded and less nationalistic since it's an international TV-channel.

> The Association of Turkish journalists has for many years ago published a code of conduct. This is an internally developed concept, we have this already. The problem comes with the implementation. We have to create more and more bodies in order to protect these values. Maybe what we lack, is bodies that have power, credibility and respect to protect these values. There you have a problem. The matter is self-regulating organizations, like press councils, various bodies of the media itself. They are very important in making these texts into the real life. If you leave the application of these principles to individuals, they are in a very weak position. You have to build walls around them, to protect them. And these walls are these kind of independent bodies, that have credibility and respectability. There we have problems. Practically I don't think we have these bodies (Interviewee 8).

The interviewee says that ethical guidelines would be very weak if it were just up to the journalists to follow them, and that what they need is bodies like press councils to protect these ethical guidelines. These councils are very week in Turkey today. They have tried earlier in history to have self-regulation and functioning press councils and press honor board, but it didn't work out very well since they didn't have sanction options. A part of the problem of the implementation is that you may have the laws, but not the bodies to protect those laws and implement them properly. Another issue not mentioned here, is that political divisions within and among various media and journalists' associations might also prevent them from engaging in collaborative efforts to develop

rules of self-regulation (see 2.4.4).

I ask if this interviewee has anything to add before we finish the interview.

> What I said about the lack of independent bodies is not very well understood in this country, but you have to take into account that there are several of them. We have the equivalent of the press council. It is there, and it has its own complained mechanism. It has its own code of conduct, and they accept complains from the public and give verdicts, but it has almost no credibility. There is another one, which was established as an alternative to the press council, that also lacks credibility. The national union of journalists. They are not organized in the newspaper or media, media is almost completely non-unionized. Therefore they also don't have an impact. The association of Turkish journalists, okay it has a certain credibility, but that credibility is not enough to deal with the public authorities. So, a journalist that is in a difficult position in terms of ethical principles and editorial values, find himself or herself rather alone. I think that's one big issue in this country. It's a very big issue. Unless we find a solution to that, whatever laws you have, whatever guidelines you'll issue, the situation will be more or less the same (Interviewee 8).

This is an elaboration of the previous theme interviewee 8 talked about. The interviewee says that the problem with ethical principles and codes of conducts, is that if the journalist really want to follow such rules, it's no one to support this journalist properly, since different bodies lack credibility and journalists are not unionized.

I have just told the interviewee about this master thesis, and then the interviewee talks.

> It's difficult to find out ethical practice and ethical codes in Turkey, because there is nothing like this. There is no responsibility and accountability among journalists, and the journalistic organizations are quite weak. Journalists are not organized and unionized. Although there is a journalist union in Turkey, journalists are not being a member of the union, because they

are afraid of being fired by the bosses. It used to be functioning well during the 1980s, this is when I started journalism actually, I was a member of the journalist union, and it was functioning well. Because unions are good to have when doing independent journalism, because you can fight against bosses, their demands and requests, but if you are not unionized you are quite weak. You are just alone against all the pressure coming from the big companies, the government and media bosses. Starting from the 1980s, journalist unions began to be quite weak, and then good journalists started to leave the field. Ethical journalists, you know. And then there was a replacement in the journalistic field (Interviewee 9).

If you're unionized you can easier fight against bosses, but on the other hand it seems like if you're unionized you can risk being fired because they don't like that you're unionized. At the beginning of the 1990s, the new media owners forced journalists to make a choice between their labor union memberships and their jobs. Few dare to bring a lawsuit against their former employers because they fear that they will not find a job in the sector afterwards (2.4.2).

People in hierarchy-enhancing institutions are not likely to be challenged by people who hold hierarchy-attenuating beliefs and attitudes because such people work in different institutions and jobs. Institutions ingrain functionally compatible ideologies through their own institutional culture and norms, and give employees practice at using such ideologies in their work (see 3.4). This is illustrated by interviewee 9 who says that a lot of good journalists left the field because it was getting more difficult writing good journalism, and those who are left are probably journalists who have fewer problems with writing about Kurdish people as terrorist for instance. An editor working for a broadcasting company said the following on the lack of skilled journalists in the sector: 'Nobody wants to invest in high quality media in Turkey. They make an effort to hire young, inexperienced, presentable individuals who are unaware of and who do not care about ethical aspect of the media' (see 2.4.2).

I have just told the interviewee the topic of my master thesis.

If I say one sentence about the ethical codes and hate speech and how the Turkish journalists deal with it, is that they don't. That's my first answer. Of course there are some councils,

there are some unions, but first of all the journalists in Turkey, somehow are surrounded by the laws and regulations, and by the ownership structures, and then not being member of a union, trade union. During the last years for instance, the journalists are surrounded and somehow are obliged to struggle for the journalists who are in prison or under trial, so this is the more crucial thing we have to deal with, and that's why these ethical codes, and concerning the hate speech, concerning the macho nature of the media in general is very difficult (Interviewee 7).

This interviewee sum up several aspects other interviewees also have mentioned. This interviewee talks about the other challenges that journalists have to face, such as the media being highly regulated. This in turn makes less space for discussions about ethical codes.

One of the interviewee talks about the challenge of doing ethical journalism, because what the journalist writes has to be approved by the editor. If the editor doesn't approve what is being written, the journalist hasn't come any further. This implies that attending a anti-discrimination course in journalism, wouldn't necessarily pay off, since what the journalist write has to be approved by the editor. The relationship between the journalists and the media owner is too weak, and for journalists to be able to follow a code of conduct, it has to be protected by bodies such as the Press Council and the Turkish journalists association. These bodies are too weak, so the journalist stands rather alone. Another problem is that the newspapers have started to hire young and inexperienced journalists, so many journalists which have focused on ethical journalism, have left the field.

5.9 Social media

Facebook, twitter and YouTube are examples of social media. What is special with social media compared to regular media, is the fact that all people who have access to Internet can express their opinions through social media. Even though the government can regulate and even close certain types of social media, it is much more difficult controlling social media than newspapers. Social media is not the focus in this master thesis, but it's so widespread, commonly used and serves as an alternative information channel, that it's natural to have it as a topic in the analysis.

I ask if the organization the interviewee works for cooperates with journalists when producing

reports.

> Social media is really difficult to control, the language they use there, the TV-shows, because many people can't see those kind of language at once in social media. So it's widespread, it spreads very quickly and it's even more dangerous (Interviewee 1).

Social media is that it's less controlled than other types of media. There are no ethical principles, only the principles carried within each individual which uses the social media. If hate speech is expressed on Internet it's more dangerous than if it's expressed in newspapers, because it spreads so quickly, and can reach to a greater amount of people.

I asked the interviewee how the media group decided to make their own principles for their work.

> Since a long time Dogan Publishing Group had its own code of conduct, but we felt that it was not enough to cover the television activities. It was a bit more centered on the newspaper side of the business. It wasn't enough to cover the television+ there were things that we wanted to add, like for instance how to deal with the social media. Which is a new thing, that code of conduct was written almost maybe ten years ago, so it was in that sense also a bit out of date (Interviewee 8).

The fact that Dogan Publishing Group has added social media in their new code of conduct, shows that social media is important to take into consideration. Since the last code of conduct was written maybe ten years ago, there has been a rapid growth of the use of social media the last ten years.

I ask the interviewee if the marginal extreme nationalist newspapers also can have a huge impact even though not many people read those newspapers.

> Sure. Because of the social media actually (Interviewee 9).

This comment implies that even though a newspaper can be very marginal and not many people read it, it can be read by many if the content of their writings are spread through the internet. Social media can be instrumental in spreading extreme views that otherwise would have been marginalized.

I ask the interviewee about the climate in the society. I wonder if the media is a mirror of the society or if the society is formed by the media.

> Media is still a tool to shape the society; the governments, the parties, the interest groups are using media as a tool too, in order to shape the society. But now we have some possibilities to break it, as Internet, Twitter, Facebook. So people can get the right information from those sources (Interviewee 4).

Here the positive side of the social media is mentioned. If social media is used the right way, it can be used for correcting biased news from the government and different parties. One way social media challenged regular media in terms of being an informative news channel, was with the incident in Hakkari province at the end of 2011. 34 Kurdish civilians were bombed by military fighter jets in the Uludere/Roboski village. The mainstream media waited till the government issued a press statement before they released their first coverage. When they had released their first coverage, the public opinion was already informed about the incident through the Kurdish news sources and the social media (see 2.4.1).

I just ask the interviewees if they have anything to add before I finish the interview.

> I think the internet has played a role in it to, the social media. People have become more aware. Before maybe some of those violations were being done unknowingly, even the readers are understanding that certain things are incorrect with the free float information, and social media (Interviewee 10 b).

The interviewees mention both the positive and the negative effects of having social media. Social media is more dangerous in terms of hate speech, because it spreads more quickly, and it is more difficult to stop. The positive effect of having social media is that they operate outside the media structure, and news that different newspapers are reluctant to print, can be spread through social media. In the case of the bombing in the Hakkari province, Kurds are able to document the bombing by filming and post it on Facebook or as a video on YouTube.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

How do Turkish journalists deal with ethical challenges in their work with special regard to codes of conduct and hate speech?

In this master thesis I wanted to get to know more about how minorities are perceived and described by journalists in Turkish newspapers, since I assume that newspapers are instrumental in shaping peoples' attitude towards minorities. I also suggest that it is the other way around that newspapers reflect the already existing attitude people have towards minorities.

I also wanted to explore to what extent journalists follow codes of conduct in their daily work, and if they don't, what are the reasons for not following a certain code of conduct. In the introduction there are different suggestions of reasons why journalists wouldn't follow a code of conduct. Maybe the problem is on an individual level, that most journalists are not well enough educated about codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. Or perhaps it is on an institutional level, that there is no room for following ethical guidelines such as a code of conduct because media only care about profit maximation.

Based on the analysis chapter it seems like hate speech occur both in the context of polarization and in the context of nationalism. When it occurs in the context of polarization, it is because of the conflict between political Islam and the secularists in Turkey. Both sides have economical resources and power to use the newspapers for expressing their opinions about each other. These news are often distorted and biased, and would in extreme cases be regarded as hate speech.

Hate speech also occurs in the context of nationalism. When it occurs in this context, it is mostly targeted at minorities. The nation building process in Turkey was at the expense of minorities. Illustrating examples are the ban on the use of minority languages in schools and in courts, and the requirement of 'belonging to the Turkish race' for recruitment to military academies and

employment in the public sector. This national history is one factor why minorities face hate speech in Turkey today. This is reflected both in society and media. When minorities face hate speech, it often has a stereotyping character. It could be to say that a minority group is stealing, or, in the case of the conflict in South-East Turkey, to say that all Kurds are terrorist. When it comes to this conflict, newspapers are instrumental in this form of hate speech.

Since Turkey lacks hate speech legislation in the context of minorities, journalists don't get prosecuted for writing hate speech. The newspapers are more or less nationalistic, which means that even though not all newspapers write what would be defined as hate speech, there can be negative discourse about minorities in the newspapers.

When it comes to code of conduct, it's one of three self-regulation mechanisms in journalism made in order for the journalists to maintain professional respect and to let the media perform the best service as possible to the public. A code of conduct should be protected by press councils and journalist associations, which is another self-regulating mechanism. The press council and the Turkish Journalists association are not functioning well in Turkey, since they don't have any power to sanction if a journalist violates a principle in a code of conduct.

Instead of having a well-functioning self-regulation mechanism, Turkey has a well-functioning governmental-regulated press. It is not well functioning in the sense that journalists themselves want it to be this way, but in the sense that the government succeed in functioning as a regulating mechanism for the press. The fact that the government regulates the press, results in a lot of self-censorship. The government regulates the press through different media laws, and through the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. There are articles in the Penal Code which in practice only is used for the purpose of prosecuting journalists, such as article 301 *Insulting Turkishness*. The Anti-Terror Law has been used when journalists write non-violent critical articles about the conflict in South-East Turkey. Some of the goals of the principles in a code of conduct is to ensure that the journalist provide reliable news and avoid discrimination. A journalist can have the intention of writing a reliable and non-discriminative article about this conflict, but can end up being prosecuted for writing propaganda for a terrorist organization. In order not to get in trouble with the law, many journalists do self-censorship, which is a way of self-censoring the content of what is being written.

Another factor which results in self-censorship, is the interconnection between the media and other financial sectors. Media owners invest in different companies, and if there is corruption in a company the media owner for a newspaper have invested in, the journalists employed for this

newspaper do self-censorship in order not to get in trouble with the media owner. Then in turn the media owner doesn't get any problems with the given company.

Media also has a clientalist relationship with the government. Media owners use media to get state contracts from the government, and in turn the media serves as the apparatus of the government. Since the media sector has economic interests in being on line with the government, they have a common mindset of protecting the interest of the government. This means that journalists also do self-censorship when they write about the government, because the media owner doesn't want to have any problems with the government either. Self-censorship prevents journalists from doing their job properly, and in a human right perspective self-censorship prevents journalists from exercising their right to freedom of speech.

There are a lot of laws preventing journalists from exercising their right to freedom of speech, but there is no legislation preventing journalists from writing hate speech, which is not a human right. Activists and organizations have tried to do something about this by launching a campaign which suggests that Turkey adopt hate crime legislation in the context of minorities. The government has not listened to the civil society. After the movie the "innocence of Muslims" they instead suggested hate crime legislation in the context of Islamohobia. This would in practice mean a hate crime legislation in the context of the majority, instead of a hate crime legislation in the context of the minority.

If there would be hate crime legislation in the context of minorities in Turkey today, it would also be a question of implementation of this legislation. If the law is not implemented, the legislation has no effect. There are examples of reforms that have been made in Turkey which has not been respected by the court. One illustrating example is the legal reforms implemented by the parliament to fulfill the ECHR standards. These reforms were overrun by the court system. This means that it's not enough to change the laws, there also has to be a court system which approves of the new changes in the law.

In a theoretical perspective nationalism is a legitimizing myth. These myths are consensually held values, attitudes, stereotypes and cultural ideologies. Racim, sexism and nationalism are three types of legitimizing myths. Several of the interviewees say that that people don't react when they read hate speech in the newspapers. It seems like the nationalistic attitude has become normal, and that nationalism has become a consensually held value.

Legitimizing myths are categorized into hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths, where nationalism is classified in the former category. Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths contribute to moral and intellectual justification for group-based oppression and inequality. In Turkey, nationalism is infused in the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. Article 301 *insulting Turkishness*, is one example in this regard. The Penal Code is being used for intellectual justification for group-based oppression and inequality. They justify violating freedom of speech by saying that journalists are insulting Turkishness. The government becomes the dominant group since they have more power and resources, and they can assign negative social value to journalists, since the journalists can get prosecuted and in worse case end up in prison.

Institutions can also be classified as either hierarchy enhancing or hierarchy attenuating. An example of a hierarchy-enhancing institution, is the criminal justice system. They are viewed as mechanisms of group dominance because subordinates often are over-represented in cases brought against them in court and in prison cells. In the case of Turkey, a lot of cases are brought against journalists, and also many journalists are in prison.

The organizations which work for the government to adopt hate crime legislation in the context of minorities, are typical hierarchy-attenuating institutions. These institutions include human rights, civil rights, civil liberties groups, welfare organizations and religious organizations. They try to balance the consequences of hierarchy-enhancing institutions, but still the hierarchy-enhancing institutions have disproportionally more power. In the case of Turkey the organizations try to help minorities in being protected by a hate speech law, but since organizations, which represent the civil society, don't have as much power as for instance the criminal justice system, the government can decide not to listen to them.

Ideologies that counter group-based dominance are called hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths, which are political doctrines such as social democracy, socialism, and human rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a court which bases its decisions on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This means that ECtHR is a hierarchy-attenuating institution which protects a hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myth. ECtHR tries to counter the dominance of the criminal system in Turkey. Also in the case of ECtHR, they lack the base of power which the criminal system has, and their judgments are only recommendations for Turkey.

Institutions and people select each other in order to make the values and legitimizing myths

compatible. It seems like that's also the case for these interviewees. They have chosen to work for newspapers which have the most compatible values as themselves. One of the interviewee was a former journalists, but didn't manage to work as a journalist anymore because it wasn't compatible with the interviewees' values. This interviewee also said that the newspaper owners choose young and inexperienced journalists, which didn't care that much about ethical principles. Then they choose to have people in their work which affirm the values of the newspaper, and they won't get confronted.

Conclusive remarks

When the research question was formulated, I expected to find hate speech primarily targeted at minorities, but it turned out that hate speech also could be targeted at political enemies. Since hate speech can lead to hate crime, newspapers have an effect in forming peoples' attitude towards minorities. In the case of Hrant Dink, it was an ultranationalist which assassinated him, so this is not to say that everyone would react in an extreme ways just by what they read. Peoples attitude towards minorities are not just formed by the press, but also by the nation building process of Turkey, where minorities were suppressed. There are direct proves that newspapers reflect the already existing attitude people have towards minorities, but the media is profit oriented, so they would print news people have the interest of reading. People in general complain very little about hate speech in newspapers, so there is an acceptance of what is being written.

There is an assumption in the introduction chapter that a code of conduct is not being followed as much as one should hope for. The analysis has confirmed this assumption. The problem lies both on an individual and structural level. Many journalists don't care following a code of conduct because the media hire young and inexperienced people who they think would easily adjust to the value of the given newspaper, which could be the value of profit-maximation. Since the bodies which should protect a code of conduct don't have real sanction mechanisms, there is no incentive for following a code of conduct either. A code of conduct can also be conflicting with the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law, if a journalist would write reliable and non-discriminative about the Armenian genocide or the South-East conflict. Journalists have been prosecuted for doing exactly that. Since the media have economic interests in being in line both with the government and companies they have invested in, journalists focus more at performing self-censorship than following a code of conduct. If journalists don't think about what they write about companies and the government, it will have consequences. So there is an incentive for doing self-censorship.

One interviewee says that the danger is to shift from anti-hate speech legislation to anti-free speech legislation, but I would say that to a certain degree there is already an anti-free speech legislation in Turkey. This was said in the context of adopting hate crime legislation to protect minorities.

For the journalists to be able to follow a code of conduct, the self-regulating must be functioning much better than it does in Turkey today. The working conditions must also be improved for journalists, so that they have time to discuss ethics in depth, and not to worry about all the governmental laws and regulations. If there was a better climate for discussing ethical in depths, and less worries about self-censorship, hopefully it would also create more diversity in media, and a better discourse about minorities in newspapers.

Further research

Because of the limitation of time and the aim of having a specific focus at newspapers in this master thesis, social media has barely been a subject except for in chapter 5.9. Even though social media is not in scope in this master thesis, I think it would have been interesting to look at to which extent social media challenges the role of the regular media. Maybe social media can be instrumental in changing the uneven balance between hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating institutions? In some cases organizations don't get their suggestions through because there is not enough awareness among the people about the issue. Even though organizations don't have as much power as the criminal system in Turkey, there is also a power having a lot of people which support you. The social media can be a way to reach out to more people. If hate crime legislation in the context of minorities was an issue many people in Turkey cared about, it would be more difficult for the government to overlook the suggestion. A government is after all chosen by the people, so they have to make sure that they stay popular.

Social media is instrumental in informing people about news when they happen, and perhaps social media easier perform the duty of "public rights to information"? In the Uludere/Roboski incident, where 34 Kurdish civilians were bombed by military fighter reportedly mistaken as PKK militants, the mainstream media did not cover the massacre in the first 18 hours and waited till the government issued a press statement before they released their first coverage. Meanwhile people had already been informed through the Kurdish news sources and the social media. This incident

damaged the reliability of the regular media.

Maybe the government must change their laws regulating the media in order for the journalist to be able to write more critical journalism, since people get to know the news through social media anyway? That could be one way of increasing the reliability of the media.

There are also negative effects of the quick flow of information on social media. Extreme forms of hate speech can reach out to much more people than it would have done without social media. One example is the movie "the innocence of Muslims". It was posted on YouTube in June 2012, and during some months it was known to the whole Muslim world. It resulted in many peaceful demonstrations, but also in violent riots, causing the life of an American ambassador in Libya. Social media are also regulated in many countries, but I'm not certain if they mostly regulate freedom of speech or hate speech. But maybe there are possibilities for social media to be self-regulated?

I leave those reflections and questions open for discussion.

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Theme guide:

Background questions

Concerning around:

Experience, motivations

Type of work the person has now

Role of the media

What kind of role do you think that the media has:

consumer role, information role etc.

Principles

Usual principles/ethical guidelines for journalists, in which way do you think they are being followed as an insider/outsider:

Truth Telling - an addiction to factual accuracy, checking and re-checking;

the skill of anticipating the possibility of error

Independent and Fair – stories that are complete, without suppression

of significant facts; striving to avoid bias

Humanity and Solidarity – doing no direct, intentional damage to others

Challenges with implementation

Ethical challenges in newspapers: monopolization, the absence of editorial freedom, the lack of job security, failure to accept ethical codes, ethics vs. profit

Your own thoughts of ethical challenges in different medias: Radio, TV, newspapers etc…

Cooperation

In your work, how do you cooperate with:

Newspaper owners, press associations, ombudsman, the readers and organizations (NGOs), TV, radio

(Angle it from your own standing)

Campaigns developed by organizations

Any knowledge and thoughts about these efforts (or similar efforts):

-Speak out against discrimination

- Press Council's code of principles

- Journalists Association of Turkey (TGC)

-National codes, or universal codes

The Turkish Journalists Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities:

Preface

Every journalist and media organization should defend the rights of journalists, observe professional principles and ensure that the principles defined below are followed. Those who are not journalists but participate in journalistic activities in media organizations under different forms and those who target foreign audiences in Turkey or Turkish audience abroad also come under the responsibilities defined here.

The directors of media organizations, chief editors, managing editors, responsible editors and others are responsible for compliance with professional principles by the journalists they employ as well as their media product.

Journalists' rights constitute the basis of the public right to information and its freedom of expression. Professional principles, on the other hand, constitute the basis of accurate and reliable communication of information.

Professional principles assume self-regulation by journalists and media organizations. Their primary criterion for judgment is their own conscience.

A. Human and Citizen Rights:

Every individual has the right to be informed and to have access to news as well as freedom of thought, expression and free criticism.

Freedom of press and publication, which is the main tool of freedom of thought and expression, is one of the basic human rights.

It is a general rule that these rights should be guaranteed by the constitution in a democratic state.

B. Definition of a Journalist:

Any individual whose job is to gather, process, communicate news or to express opinion, ideas and views regularly at a daily or periodical print, video, audio, electronic or digital medium employed on a fulltime, contractual or copyright basis and whose main employment and means of livelihood consists of this job, and who is defined as such by the legislation that covers the functioning of the organization at which he or she is employed, is a journalist.

All enterprises functioning in the field of press and publication are obliged to recognize the rights granted to journalists by law.

C. Responsibilities of Journalists:

The journalist uses the freedom of the press conscientiously and honestly to further the public's right to be informed and to have access to accurate news. For this purpose, the journalist should fight all forms of censorship and self-censorship and to inform the public on this question.

The responsibility of the journalist to the public supersedes all other responsibilities, including those to his employer and public authorities.

Information, news and free thought are of a social nature that separates them from all other commercial commodities and services. The journalist carries all responsibility for the news and information he publishes.

The limits and contents of journalists' freedom are primarily determined by their responsibility and professional principles.

D. Journalists' Rights:

1. Journalists have the right to free access to all sources of information and the right to observe and research all phenomena that affect public life or are of interest to the public. Obstacles, such as secrecy or classification, should be based on law in matters concerning public affairs and convincing reasons in private matters.

2. Journalists must take into account the basic policy line of the media organization that should be included among the terms of their employment contract.

3. Journalists have the right to reject all sorts of suggestions, proposals, requests and instructions that are outside, conflict with or are not openly described in that basic policy.

4. Journalists cannot be compelled to defend an opinion that they do not share or to perform any assignment that violates professional principles.

5. Journalists, particularly those who are employed at an editorial and managerial level, should be informed about important decisions that affect and determine the functioning of the media organization; whenever it is necessary they should take part in making these decisions.

6. Relevant to their function and responsibilities, journalists have the right to organize. They also have the right to sign contracts individually to safeguard their moral and material interests. The journalists should be paid a salary that is commensurate with their social role, skill and the amount of work required. Their salaries should also guarantee their economic independence.

7. According to the principle of the protection of sources, the journalists cannot be compelled to reveal their sources or testify about them. This principle may be waived with the consent of the source. The journalist may reveal the identity of his source in cases where he has been clearly misled by the source.

E. The Basic Duties and Principles of a Journalist:

1. The public has a right to know. The journalist has to respect facts and to report accurately, whatever the consequences from his personal point of view.

2. The journalist defends, at whatever cost, the freedom of gathering information, news evaluation and making comments and criticism.

3. The journalist defends the universal values of humanity, peace, democracy, human rights, and pluralism and respects differences. Without any discrimination based on nation, race, ethnicity, class, gender, language or religious and philosophical belief, the journalist recognizes the rights and values of all nations, peoples and individuals.

The journalist refrains from publishing material that incites enmity and hatred among 92

individuals, nations and societies. The journalist should not target the cultural values or beliefs (or

lack of beliefs) of any society or of an individual. The journalist should not publish or broadcast material that justifies or incites violence of any kind. 4. The journalist should refrain from publishing and broadcasting news and information, the source of which is unknown to him. In cases where the source is not known, he is obliged to warn the public.

5. The journalist cannot ignore or destroy relevant information, alter or falsify texts and documents. He must refrain from publishing material that is incorrect, false or misleading.

6. The journalist cannot resort to misleading methods in order to obtain information, news, visual images, audio material or other documents.

7. Even if the person in question is a public figure, unless journalists obtain permission they cannot violate privacy for purposes that are not directly related to the public right to information.

8. Journalists are committed to the rule that any inaccurate information published should be corrected in the shortest possible time. Every journalist respects the right to respond on condition that it is not misused or abused.

9. According to the rule of professional secrecy, journalists can not reveal the sources of information and documents entrusted to them under any circumstances unless allowed by their sources.

10. Journalists should refrain from slander, insult, distortion, manipulation, rumor, gossip and groundless accusation.

11. Journalists cannot seek material gains or moral advantages from publishing or withholding an item of information or news. Professional principles are the main guide for journalists in establishing and conducting relations with people or institutions and sources of information, including even heads of state as members of parliament, businessmen and bureaucrats.

12. Journalists should not combine their professional work with advertising, public relations activities or propaganda. Journalists cannot accept suggestions, advice or material benefits from sources of advertisement.

13. Whatever the subject matter, journalists cannot use information for personal interest before it is fully made public. They cannot use their profession to obtain any form of personal privilege (outside rights given by laws and regulations).

14. Journalists cannot resort to blackmail or any form of threat to obtain information. They should resist all pressure to gather information by such means.

15. Journalists must reject all kinds of pressure and should not accept instructions regarding their job from anyone except the executives of the media organizations employing them.

16. Anyone entitled to be called a journalist is committed to fully abiding by professional principles. While observing due respect to the laws of the country, journalists should rebuff all interference from the government and official institutions. Professionally, journalists should take into account only the judgment of the public, colleagues and verdicts of independent jurisdiction.

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1817. Journalists should function according to the public's right to know and not prejudices regarding domestic and international policy issues shaped by those in government. Journalists should be guided solely by basic professional principles and concerns for a free democracy.

TURKISH JOURNALISTS CODE OF CONDUCT

News and Comment:

The distinction between news and comment or editorials should be made clear to enable the public to discern easily the difference between them.

Photography – Visual Images:

Any photograph or visual image used should be clearly marked to show whether it is real or an enactment or simulation. The audience should be allowed to easily discern whether the image is accurate or a representation.

News – Advertisement - Announcements:

The texts and visual elements of news and editorials should be clearly separated from the texts and visual elements of advertisements and commercial announcements to leave no room for confusion.

Judicial Reporting:

During the preparatory investigation of a legal case, news and commentaries that might influence and weaken the legal process should not be disseminated. News during the trial should be provided free of any prejudice or inaccuracy. The journalist should not become a party in any legal process about which he is reporting. Nobody should be represented as guilty before the legal verdict is finalized. Nobody should be implied as guilty in news and comment unless found guilty at the end of the legal process.

Minors:

The identities and visual images of minors as defendants, witnesses or victims in criminal or sexual assault cases should not be published or made public. In cases where the personality and behavior of minors could be affected, journalists should not interview or use the visual image of a minor unless given prior permission by the family or an adult responsible for the minor in question.

Sexual Assault:

The visual images and identities of the victims of sexual assault cases should not be published or made public expect in instances where there is a clear public interest in such publication.

Identity and Special Cases:

An action or an offence committed by an individual should not be attributed to race, nationality, religion, sex or sexual choice or any disease or physical or mental disorder unless there is relevance or evident public interest. These special character traits should never be the subject of ridicule, insult or prejudice.

Health:

Sensationalism in health issues should be avoided, Dissemination of information that would incite desperation or create false hope should be prevented. Rudimentary findings of medical research should not be presented as final and definitive. Before suggesting the use of a particular drug, an expert scientist should be consulted. Any journalist, who is conducting research at hospitals, should openly declare his identity and enter prohibited areas only with the permission of hospital authorities. Journalists should not take visual images or audio recordings at hospitals without the permission of hospital authorities, the patient or relatives responsible.

Gifts:

Journalists should reject personal gifts and material benefits that would create public doubt or prejudice over the contents of a particular news item or information and the decision to make it public.

Company Interests:

The rights, responsibilities and duties of journalists described in "The Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities" determine how they function in a media organization. Within this professional framework, the journalist should not take part in activities not relevant to the publishing policies of the media organization, either voluntarily or by compulsion, even if such activity may be in the interest of the company.

Self-criticism:

Journalists and media organizations should correct their mistakes and engage in self- criticism beyond their legal obligation in order to respect the right of reply and correction.

Impartiality:

Journalists and media organizations should clearly announce their positions in cases where they are parties in a dispute or a contractual matter. Any media organization or commentator can disseminate comments in accordance with their political, economic and social affiliation. In such cases, the nature of the affiliation should be clearly stated and a clear distinction drawn between comment and news.

Privacy:

The basic principle is the protection of the public interest. Situations in which the privacy principle does not apply include:

a. Research and publication on major corruption or criminal cases;

b. Research and publication on activities that would have a negative effect on the public;

c. Cases where public security or health is at stake;

d. To prevent the public from being misled or deceived or from committing mistakes because of the actions or statements of the person in question.

Even in these situations, the private information made public should be directly related to the subject. The extent to which the private life of the person in question affects his public activity should also be considered.

Information – Documents:

Journalists should not take documents, photographs, audio recording or visual images without the consent of the person concerned expect in cases where the public interest is at stake. This principle can only be waived in cases where there is a clear public interest and if the journalist has a firm conviction that the material cannot be obtained otherwise.

Payment in Exchange for Information:

The journalist should not offer or give money in exchange for information, documents or visual images to defendants in a criminal case or to witnesses or their associates.

Cases of Shock and Confusion:

When there are people in distress, sorrow, danger, disaster, destruction or shock, the journalist's approach should be humane and respectful of privacy. He must refrain from exploiting feelings.

Relatives and Associates of Defendants:

Journalists should not expose the identity of the relatives and associates of defendants or convicted persons unless they are directly related to, or are essential in, a correct perception of the events that transpired.

Suicide Cases:

In cases of suicide, publishing or broadcasting information in an exaggerated way that goes beyond normal dimensions of reporting with the purpose of influencing readers or spectators should not occur. Photography, pictures, visual images or film depicting such cases should not be made public.

Economic and Financial Information (Insider Information):

Even if the current law does not ban it, journalists should not use economic and financial information obtained for personal interests before making it fully public. Journalists should not disseminate information about securities, stocks, shares and other papers of value they or their relatives or associates hold, without accurately informing their superiors at the media organization about such ownership. Journalists should not indulge in real estate or similar transactions if these are the subject matters of their news and comment.

Embargo, Preview, Off-the-Record:

Journalists should comply with the publication date specified by the source of a piece of information or a document unless they have obtained such information independently. Journalists

have no commitment to let anyone, including the source, preview the drafts of news stories, interviews, commentaries or visual images of

material they are preparing to publish or broadcast, except responsible persons at the media organizations employing them. Journalists should not publish or broadcast off- the-record information or statements.

Competition:

Journalists should refrain from deliberately causing professional harm to their colleagues even for purposes of competition. They should refrain from acts that would prevent their colleagues' material from reaching the public.

Sourcing:

Journalists should give credit to the sources of information, including material from agencies, other colleagues or other publications.

Non - journalists:

The actual titles and professions of those who perform journalistic activities at media organizations should be clearly announced periodically or occasionally in order to inform the public.

Questions of Identity:

Whatever the expertise of a journalist, his main job is journalism. Police reporters should not act or disseminate information as policemen or police spokespersons. Similarly, sports reporters are not spokespersons for sports clubs and reporters assigned to cover a political party are not members or spokespersons of that party.

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend;

Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 10, freedom of expression, says:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.